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INTRODUCTION
Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran’s nuclear
program, Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran’s
nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only afﬁrmed what
this analysis ﬁrst suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort
to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring
a nuclear bomb. Iran’s continued pursuit of uranium enrichment
and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more
conﬁdent nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we
might do now to hedge against these threats.
These questions are the focus of this volume. The book is divided
into four parts. The ﬁrst presents the ﬁndings of the NPEC’s working
group on Iran. It reﬂects interviews with government ofﬁcials and
outside specialists and the work of some 20 regional security experts
whom NPEC convened in Washington to discuss the commissioned
research that is contained in this book. Some of this report’s ﬁndings
to keep Iran and others from overtly deploying nuclear weapons or
leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are beginning
to gain ofﬁcial support. The U.S. Government, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and an increasing number of
allies now support the idea that states that violate the NPT be held
accountable for their transgressions, even if they should withdraw
from the treaty. There also has been increased internal governmental
discussion about the need to clarify what should be permitted under
the rubric of “peaceful” nuclear energy as delineated under the NPT.
The remaining report recommendations, which were presented in
testimony before Congress in March of 2005, remain to be acted
upon. Whether they will or will not, of course, depends greatly on
how public ofﬁcials view the Iranian nuclear threat.
This, then, brings us to the book’s second part, “Tehran’s
Nuclear Endeavors: What’s the Worry?” Richard Russell starts off
this section by detailing how Iran’s neighbors are likely to hedge
their own security bets as Tehran goes literally more and more
nuclear and ballistic. Critical to what these nations might do is just
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how nuclear-capable they are themselves. This is detailed by Wyn
Bowen and Joanna Kidd in their chapter, “The Nuclear Capabilities
and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors.” In it, we learn just how close
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are to acquiring nuclear
weapons of their own. The special case of Turkey, a full-ﬂedged
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally, is addressed in
greater detail in Ian Lesser’s chapter, “Turkey, Iran and Nuclear
Risks.” The good news here is that if the European Union and the
United States provide proper support on both security and economic
fronts, Turkey is unlikely to go its own way. The bigger picture of
what might transpire after Iran overtly goes nuclear, though, is sure
to be grim. Kenneth Timmerman spells out the increased prospects
for war and much more violent terrorism in his chapter, “The Day
After Iran Gets the Bomb.”
What can be done? The two popular policy options―military
strikes against Iran’s known nuclear facilities and imposing
economic sanctions against Tehran―are analyzed in the book’s
third part, “Is There A Simple Military or Sanctions Fix?” Shlomo
Brom, a retired Israeli general, explains why, although it would
be extremely popular in Israel to attempt another Osiraq-like raid
against Iran’s known facilities, the operational prospects for success
are not very high. What of having the United States assume this
mission? Thomas Donnelly, a staunch supporter of the invasion of
Iraq, explains how launching a limited raid against Iran’s nuclear
facilities could jeopardize the larger American campaign to liberalize
and moderate the Middle East. Imposing economic sanctions against
Iran is a possible alternative, but how realistic or effective would
these likely be? These questions are addressed in the analysis by
George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero, “Iran Gets the Bomb―
Then What?” Their conclusion is that it will be difﬁcult to secure the
support necessary to make sanctions against Iran work.
This, then, brings us to the book’s ﬁnal part, “Further Courses
of Action.” In it, two traditional and two unorthodox policy
options are examined. The ﬁrst of these, which is to reduce the
potential vulnerability of Persian Gulf energy shipments to Iranian
interference, is examined by Dagobert Brito and Amy Myers Jaffe in
their chapter, “Reducing Vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz.” By
refurbishing existing pipe lines and building others, the need to send
vi

oil and gas through the strait could be dramatically reduced at a
relatively affordable level of spending. This, of course, would require
the cooperation and support of the major oil producers in the region.
Their help also would be needed to fortify existing levels of defense
cooperation with the United States, without which the prospects of
deterring and containing a nuclear-ready Iran would surely be low.
What exactly can be done in cooperation with the Persian Gulf states
is detailed by Michael Eisenstadt in his chapter, “Deter and Contain:
Dealing with a Nuclear Iran.” What role might diplomacy play in
keeping Iran from exploiting its ability to disrupt energy exports from
the region? Douglas Streusand examines this question in his analysis,
“Managing the Iranian Threat to Sea Commerce Diplomatically.”
Using the sea control agreements reached with Turkey and the Soviet
Union as models, Streusand suggests several negotiating and public
diplomacy initiatives that would keep Iran from using its military
capabilities to interfere with continued free passage of goods in and
out of the Persian Gulf. The success of this effort, as with so many
others, of course, would depend on the solidarity of the United States
and its key allies, not only in but outside of the Gulf region. How
likely such support may be is the focus of the concluding chapter by
Thérèse Delpech entitled “What Transatlantic Strategy on Iran?”
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CHAPTER 1
GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN:
REPORT OF THE NPEC WORKING GROUP
Henry Sokolski
OVERVIEW
When it comes to Iran’s nuclear program, most U.S. and allied
ofﬁcials are in one or another state of denial. All insist it is critical
to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, few
understand just how late it is to attempt this. Iran is now no more
than 12 to 48 months from acquiring a nuclear bomb, lacks for
nothing technologically or materially to produce it, and seems dead
set on securing an option to do so. As for the most popular policy
options―to bomb or bribe Iran―too few analysts and ofﬁcials are
willing to admit publicly how self-defeating these courses of action
might be.
This report, based on commissioned research and 2 years’ worth
of meetings with the nation’s leading experts on Iran, the Middle East,
and nuclear proliferation, is intended to highlight sounder policy
options. It makes seven recommendations designed to reduce the
potential harm Iran might otherwise do or encourage, once it gained
nuclear weapons or the ability to have them in a matter of days.
The report reﬂects analysis done at a series of competitive strategies
workshops that focused on the next 2 decades of likely competition
between America and Iran and what comparative strengths the
United States and its allies might use to leverage Iranian behavior1.
These workshops identiﬁed three threats that are likely to increase
following Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons option.
1. Even More Nuclear Proliferation. Iran’s continued insistence
that it acquired its nuclear capabilities legally under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would, if unchallenged, encourage
its neighbors (including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Turkey,
and Algeria) to develop nuclear options of their own by emulating
Iran’s example, by overtly declaring possession (in Israel’s case)
1

or by importing nuclear weapons (in Saudi Arabia’s case). Such
announcements and efforts, in turn, would likely undermine nuclear
nonproliferation restraints internationally and strain American
relations with most of its key friends in the Middle East.
2. Dramatically Higher Oil Prices. A nuclear-ready Iran could be
emboldened to manipulate oil prices upward. It might attempt this
either by threatening the freedom of the seas (by mining oil transit
points as it did in the l980s, or by threatening to close the Straits of
Hormuz), or by using terrorist proxies to threaten the destruction of
Saudi and other Gulf state oil facilities and pipelines.
3. Increased Terrorism Designed to Diminish U.S. Inﬂuence.
With a nuclear weapons option acting as a deterrent to the United
States and allied action against it, Iran would likely lend greater
support to terrorists operating against Israel, Iraq, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Europe, and the United States. The aim of such support
would be to reduce American support for U.S. involvement in
the Middle East, for Israel, and for actions against Iran generally,
and to elevate Iran as an equal to the United States and its allies
on all matters relating to the Persian Gulf and related regions. An
additional aim of the terrorism that Iran would support would be to
keep other nations from supporting U.S. policies and the continued
U.S. military presence in the Middle East.
All of these threats are serious. If realized, they would undermine
U.S. and allied efforts to foster moderate rule in much of the Middle
East and set into play a series of international competitions that could
ultimately result in major wars. Most U.S. and allied policymakers
understand this and are now preoccupied with trying to prevent
Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapons option. As Iran gets
closer to securing this option, though, two questionable courses of
action―bombing or bribing Iran―have become increasingly popular.
Neither, however, is likely to succeed and could easily make matters
worse.
Certainly, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities risks leaving other
covert facilities and Iran’s nuclear cadre of technicians untouched.
More important, any overt military attack would give Tehran a casus
belli either to withdraw from the NPT, or to rally Islamic Jihadists
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to wage war against the United States and its allies more directly.
Whatever might be gained in technically delaying Iran’s completion
of having a bomb option would have to be weighed against what
might be lost in Washington’s long-term efforts to encourage more
moderate Islamic rule in Iran and the Middle East; to synchronize allied
policies against nuclear proliferation; and to deﬂate Iran’s rhetorical
demonstrations against U.S. and allied hostility. Meanwhile, merely
blufﬁng an attack against Iran―sometimes urged as a way around
these difﬁculties―would only aggravate matters: The bluff would
eventually be exposed, and so only embolden Iran and weaken U.S.
and allied credibility further.
As for negotiating directly with Tehran to limit its declared nuclear
program―an approach preferred by most of America’s European
allies―this, too, seems self-defeating. First, any deal the Iranian
regime would agree to would only validate that the NPT legally
allows its members to acquire all the capabilities Iran mastered.
Second, it would foster the view internationally that the only risk
in violating required NPT inspections would be to be caught and
then bribed to limit only those activities the inspectors managed to
discover.
Considering these shortcomings, the working group decided
that, rather than trying merely to eliminate Iran’s ability to develop
a nuclear option (something that may no longer be possible), it also
would be useful to devise ways to curb the harmful things Iran might
do or encourage, once it secured such an option. This approach
produced seven recommendations that the workshop participants
believed were not receiving sufﬁcient attention currently. These
steps, they argued, would increase the credibility of current efforts
to prevent Iran from going nuclear and needed to be pursued, in any
case, if prevention failed. These recommendations were:
1. Discrediting the legitimacy of Iran’s nuclear program as a
model for other proliferators through a series of follow-on meetings
to the 2005 NPT Review Conference to clarify what activities qualify
as being “peaceful” under the NPT.
2. Increasing the costs for Iran and its neighbors to leave or
infringe the NPT by establishing country-neutral rules against
violators withdrawing from the treaty and against NPT violators
more generally.
3

3. Securing Russian cooperation in these efforts by offering
Moscow a lucrative U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement.
4. Reducing Persian Gulf oil and gas production and distribution
system vulnerabilities to possible terrorist disruptions by building
additional back-up capabilities in Saudi Arabia.
5. Limiting Iran’s freedom to threaten oil and gas shipping by
proposing a Montreux-like convention to demilitarize the Straits of
Hormuz and an agreement to limit possible incidents at sea.
6. Isolating Iran as a regional producer of ﬁssile materials by
encouraging Israel to take the ﬁrst steps to freeze and dismantle such
capabilities.
7. Backing these diplomatic-economic initiatives with increased
U.S.-allied anti-terrorist, defense, naval border security, and nuclear
nonproliferation cooperation.
Would taking these steps eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat?
No. Given Iran’s extensive nuclear know-how and capabilities,
it is unlikely that the United States or its allies can deny Iran the
technical ability to covertly make nuclear weapons. Yet, assuming
adoption of the steps described, it would be far riskier diplomatically,
economically, and militarily for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons
than is currently the case. More important, taking these steps would
leverage the comparative strengths of the United States and its friends
in a manner that would undermine Iran’s efforts to divide the United
States from its allies and to deter them from acting against Iranian
misbehavior. It would not only discourage Iran’s neighbors from
following Iran’s nuclear example, but force a needed reconsideration
of what nuclear activities ought to be protected under the NPT
(including those Iran has used to justify completing its own nuclear
breakout capabilities). Finally, it would map a non-nuclear future
for the Middle East that might be eventually realized (assuming a
change of heart by Iran and others) through veriﬁable deeds rather
than dependent on precise intelligence (which is all too elusive).
BACKGROUND
When U.S. and allied ofﬁcials speak of Iran’s nuclear weapons
program, imperatives are used freely: Iran, we are told, must not
4

be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons; the United States and its
allies cannot tolerate Iran going nuclear; a nuclear-armed Tehran is
unthinkable.
Yet, the truth is that Iran soon can and will get a bomb option.
All Iranian engineers need is a bit more time―1 to 4 years at most.
No other major gaps remain: Iran has the requisite equipment to
make the weapons fuel, the know-how to assemble the bombs, and
the missile and naval systems necessary to deliver them beyond its
borders. As noted in the working group’s earlier report (Checking
Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions), no scheme, including “just in time” delivery
of fresh fuel and removal of spent fuel from Bushier, will provide
much protection against Iran diverting its peaceful nuclear program
to compliment its covert efforts to make bombs.2
As for eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities militarily, the United
States and Israel lack sufﬁcient targeting intelligence to do this. In
fact, Iran long has had considerable success in concealing its nuclear
activities from U.S. intelligence analysts and International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. (The latter recently warned
against assuming the IAEA could ﬁnd all of Iran’s illicit uranium
enrichment activities). As it is, Iran already could have hidden all it
needs to reconstitute a bomb program, assuming its known declared
nuclear plants were hit.
Compounding these difﬁculties is what Iran might do in response
to such an attack. After being struck, Tehran could declare that it
must acquire nuclear weapons as a matter of self-defense, withdraw
from the NPT, and accelerate its nuclear endeavors. This would
increase pressure on Israel (which has long insisted that it will not be
“second” in possessing nuclear arms in the Middle East) to conﬁrm
its possession of nuclear weapons publicly, and thus set off a chain
of possible nuclear policy reactions in Cairo, Damascus, Riyadh,
Algiers, and Ankara.
On the other hand, Iran could continue to pretend to comply
with the NPT, which could produce equally disastrous results. After
being attacked, Iran might appeal to the IAEA, the Arab League, the
Non-Aligned Movement, the European Union (EU), and the United
Nations (UN) to make Iran’s nuclear program whole again, and
once again, use this “peaceful” program to energize and serve as
a cover for its covert nuclear weapons activities. This would again
5

put the entire neighborhood on edge, debase the NPT, and set a
clear example for all of Iran’s neighbors to follow on how to get a
weapons option. In addition, as more of Iran’s neighbors secured
their own nuclear options, Washington’s inﬂuence over its friends
in the region (e.g., Egypt and Saudi Arabia) would likely decline,
as well as Washington’s ability to protect North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies (e.g. Turkey) and non-NATO allies (e.g.,
Israel) in the region.
In addition, Iran might respond to an overt military attack by
striking back covertly against the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
or Israel through the support of non-Iranian terrorist organizations.
The ramiﬁcations of any of these responses are difﬁcult to
minimize. Finally, Iran could take any and all of these actions without
actually ever testing, sharing, or deploying, nuclear weapons.
Certainly, as long as most nations buy Tehran’s argument that the
NPT’s guarantee to “peaceful” nuclear energy gives it and all other
members the right to develop everything needed to come within a
screwdriver’s turn of a nuclear arsenal, Iran will be best served by
getting to this point and going no further. Indeed, by showing such
restraint, Iran’s mullahs could avoid domestic and international
controversies that might otherwise undermine their political
standing, along with possible additional economic sanctions, and
the added costs of ﬁelding a survivable nuclear force. Meanwhile,
as long as Iran could acquire nuclear weapons quickly, Tehran could
intimidate others as effectively as if it already had such systems
deployed.
None of this, of course, argues for reducing pressures on Iran
to curb its nuclear activities. The United States and its allies should
continue to do all they can to head Iran off, including efforts to
throttle Iran’s “civilian” program. Indeed, if all Washington and its
allies do is pressure Iran not to acquire nuclear arms openly, without
pressuring Iran to give up its “civilian” nuclear efforts, Iran will
best them easily by using these civilian facilities to develop a quick
nuclear breakout capability, claiming its entire nuclear program
is legal under the NPT, and wielding it diplomatically much as it
would if it actually had nuclear weapons.
What should we expect when, in the next 12 to 48 months,
Iran secures such a breakout option? If the United States and its
6

allies do no more than they have already done, two things. First,
many of Iran’s neighbors will do their best to follow its “peaceful”
example. Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Saudi Arabia will all claim that
they too need to pursue nuclear research and development to the
point of having nuclear weapons options and, as a further slap in
Washington’s face (and Tel Aviv’s), will point to Iran’s “peaceful”
nuclear program and Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons arsenal
to help justify their own “civil” nuclear activities. Second, an ever
more nuclear-ready Iran will try to lead the revolutionary Islamic
vanguard throughout the Islamic world by becoming the main
support for terrorist organizations aimed against Washington’s key
regional ally, Israel; America’s key energy source, Saudi Arabia; and
Washington’s prospective democratic ally, Iraq.
Early in 2004, senior Saudi ofﬁcials announced they were
studying the possibility of acquiring or “leasing” nuclear weapons
from China or Pakistan (this would be legal under the NPT so long as
the weapons were kept under Chinese or Pakistani “control”). Egypt
earlier announced its plans to develop a large nuclear desalinization
plant and is reported recently to have received sensitive nuclear
technology from Libya. Syria, meanwhile, is now interested in
uranium enrichment. Some intelligence sources believe Damascus
already may be experimenting with centrifuges. And Algeria is in
the midst of upgrading its second large research reactor facility,
which is still ringed with air defense units.
If these states continue to pursue their nuclear dreams (spurred
on by Iran’s example), could Iraq, which still has a considerable
number of nuclear scientists and engineers, be expected to stand idly
by? And what of Turkey, whose private sector was recently revealed
to have been part of the A. Q. Khan network? Will nuclear agitation
to its south and its repeated rejection from the EU cause Turkey to
reconsider its non-nuclear status? Most of these nations are now
friends of the United States. Efforts on their part to acquire a bomb
under the guise of developing “peaceful” nuclear energy (with Latin
American, Asian, European, Russian, or Chinese help), will only
serve to strain their relations with Washington.
With such regional nuclear enthusiasms will come increased
diplomatic pressure on Israel, an undeclared nuclear weapons state
and America’s closest Middle East ally. In July 2004, the IAEA’s
7

Director General and the major states within the Middle East urged
Israel to give up its nuclear arms in proposed regional arms control
negotiations. Israel’s understandable reluctance to be dragged into
such talks or to admit to having nuclear arms now will not end these
pressures. If Israel has a secret nuclear arsenal, Arabs argue, why
not balance it with Iranian, Saudi, Egyptian, or other covert nuclear
weapons programs? How fair is it for the United States and Europe
to demand that Middle Eastern Muslim states restrain their own
“peaceful” nuclear ambitions if Israel itself already has the bomb
and is publicly arguing that it will not be “second” to introduce
nuclear weapons into the region? Wouldn’t it make more sense to
force Israel to admit it has nuclear weapons and then to demand
that it give them up in a regional arms control negotiations effort
(even though once Israel admits it has weapons, many of its Muslim
neighbors, who still do not recognize Israel, are likely to then use
Israel’s admission to justify getting nuclear weapons themselves)?
This then brings us to the second likely result of Iran becoming ever
more nuclear-ready: A more conﬁdent Iran more willing to sponsor
terrorist organizations, especially those opposed to Israel and the
current government in Iraq. With Hamas in decline, Iran already has
been seen to be increasing its support to groups like Hezbollah in
Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon, groups which want to liberate their lands
from American and Israeli “occupation.” Increasing its aid to these
groups certainly would help Iran take the lead in the Islamic crusade
to rid the region of Zionist―American forces and thereby become
worthy of tribute and consideration by other Islamic states. Also,
bolstering such terrorist activity would help Tehran deter Israel and
the United States from striking it militarily.
Beyond this, Iran is likely to increase its assistance to groups
willing to risk striking the United States. News reports in August
2004 claimed that Iranian diplomats assigned to UN headquarters
in New York were to survey 29 American targets to help terrorist
organizations interested in hitting the United States. The aim here
appears to be, again, to deter the United States from hitting Iran
and to divide U.S. opinion about the merits of backing Israel, or
supporting any other anti-Iranian measure or group.
A nuclear-ready Iran is also likely step up its terrorist activities
against Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Iran already is reported to
8

have several thousand intelligence agents operating in Shia regions
of Iraq and is actively contributing to community associations there.
Meanwhile, there are nearly a dozen terrorist organizations operating
within Iraq now employing Hezbollah in their groups’ names. As in
the case of earlier Iranian penetration of Lebanon, these efforts will
enable Iran to scout, recruit, and control terrorist operatives. The aim
here will be to pressure the United States and its allies to remove
their military forces from Iraq, and thereby allow a government
more sympathetic to Iran to emerge.
As for Libya, Iran’s Mullahs are concerned about how much
Qaddaﬁ might tell the United States and the IAEA about what illicit
nuclear technology Iran might have gained from Libya, Pakistan, and
others. Recent unconﬁrmed reports indicate Iran has been arming
the Libyan Combat Islamic Group at camps in southern Iran; this is
an organization Qaddaﬁ expelled from Libya in the late 1990s and
the United States expelled from Afghanistan in 2001. If true, these
reports suggest how Iran might try to leverage Qaddaﬁ’s behavior.
Iran also has a history of supporting terrorist activity in Saudi
Arabia. Although only roughly 10 percent of Saudi Arabia’s
population is Shia, this sect constitutes an overwhelming majority of
the population living in Saudi Arabia’s key northern oil-producing
region. Any terrorist action anywhere in Saudi Arabia, though, tends
to raise questions about the general viability of the Saudi regime and
the security of the world’s largest oil reserves. Historically, after a
major terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia, markets worry, the price of
oil increases, and Iran’s own oil revenues, in turn, surge upward.
The reason is simple: Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest reserve
oil production capacity (roughly 7 million barrels a day). Damage
Saudi Arabia’s ability to ramp up production or to export what
it can produce (or merely raise doubts about the current Saudi
government’s continued ability to protect these capabilities), and you
effectively cripple the world’s capacity to meet increased demand for
oil internationally. Terrorism in Saudi Arabia, in short, provides Iran
with a quick, effective way to manipulate international oil prices.
This cannot help but garner Iran greater leverage in getting the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to support
its long-ignored calls to increase oil prices. It also will help Iran garner
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increased European and Asian regard for its calls for more ﬁnancial
support, investment, and advanced technology. Iranian progress on
these fronts is likely to be fortiﬁed by Tehran’s offers of oil rights to
European states, Russia, and China. This, in turn, will help keep the
current regime in power longer, will further reduce U.S. inﬂuence in
the region, and will make action in the UN Security Council (UNSC)
against Tehran far less likely.3
Yet, another way Iran could drive up oil prices is by threatening
free passage of oil through the Straits of Hormuz or by engaging in
naval mining in the Gulf and other key locations, using its surface
ﬂeet of fast boats or its smaller submarines as it did in the late
l980s. Iran already has deployed anti-shipping missiles at Qeshm,
Abu Musa Island, and on Sirri Island, all of which are in range of
shipping through the Strait. It has also occupied and fortiﬁed three
islands inside the shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz―Abu
Musa, The Greater Tunbs and the Lesser Tunbs. Given that one-ﬁfth
of the world’s entire oil demand ﬂows through the Straits (as well
as roughly a quarter of America’s supply of oil) and no other nation
has fortiﬁed its shores near Hormuz, an Iranian threat to disrupt
commerce there would have to be taken seriously by commercial
concerns (e.g., insurers and commodity markets) and other nations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
What are the chances of Iran credibly making these threats? If the
United States and its friends do little more than they already have,
the odds are high enough to be worrisome.
What more should the United States and its friends do?
Ultimately, nothing less than creating moderate self-government
in Iraq, Iran, and other states in the region will bring lasting peace
and nonproliferation. This, however, will take time. Meanwhile,
the United States and its friends must do much more than they are
currently to frustrate Iran’s efforts to divide the United States, Israel,
and Europe from one another and from other friends in the Middle
East and Asia; and to defeat Tehran’s efforts to use its nuclear
capabilities to deter others from taking ﬁrm action against Iranian
misbehavior.

10

This is a tall order, one that will require new efforts to:
• Signiﬁcantly increase the diplomatic costs of Iran ever
deploying nuclear weapons or of any of its neighbors following
Iran’s model of “peaceful” nuclear activity by getting the
international community to insist on a tougher view of the
NPT.
• Make Russia, Iran’s key nuclear partner, a willing backer of
U.S. and European efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions,
and a backer of nuclear restraint in the Middle East more
generally.
• Reduce the vulnerability of Middle Eastern oil and gas
production and distribution systems to Iranian-backed
terrorist attacks that could signiﬁcantly increase energy
prices.
• Force Iran into choosing between backing free passage of
energy commerce in and out of the Gulf or becoming an
outlaw in the eyes not just of the United States, but of Europe
and Asia.
• Strengthen U.S. and allied support of Israel by cooperating
on a positive Middle Eastern nuclear restraint agenda that
Tel Aviv could pace by deeds (rather than negotiation) and
highlight the problem of large nuclear facilities located in Iran
and the Middle East more generally.
How might these goals be achieved? First, by exploiting or
leveraging:
• The desire of all nations to produce some result from the
upcoming NPT Review Conference in May 2005 to strengthen
the NPT and increase its inﬂuence.
• French proposals to the EU and the NPT Review Preparatory
Committee to make withdrawal from the NPT difﬁcult and
EU sanctions likely for any nation that the IAEA cannot ﬁnd
to be in full compliance with the NPT.
• Russia’s long-standing interest in securing a nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States to secure Russia’s
backing to strengthen nuclear restraints internationally.
11

• Oil producers’ anxieties to increase the security of Saudi oil
production and distribution systems from possible terrorist
attacks.
• Tehran’s desire to secure multinational guarantees to enhance
Iran’s security and increase its access to critical European high
technology imports.
• Israel’s clear regional lead in advanced nuclear capabilities.
• Europe’s desire to play an active role in promoting nuclear
nonproliferation in the Middle East.
Speciﬁcally, these levers could be pulled by taking the following
steps:
1. Clarify what is peaceful under the NPT. The United States and
other like-minded nations should use the occasion of the NPT review
conference in May 2005 to convene a series of follow-on meetings
dedicated to reevaluating under what circumstances speciﬁed forms
of nuclear power should be considered to be “peaceful” and thus
protected by the NPT. These meetings should take into account
the latest information regarding the spread of covert centrifuge
and reprocessing technology, bomb design, and the availability of
separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In addition, they
should raise the questions of what nuclear materials and activities can
be safeguarded in a manner that will detect potential violations early
enough to achieve the IAEA’s and the NPT’s goal of “preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.” This set of international gatherings,
which should meet periodically in anticipation of the next NPT
review conference in 2010, should also evaluate how increased use of
free market competitions and private ﬁnancing could help identify
uneconomic, suspect nuclear activities. These meetings could be
held under IAEA or UNSC auspices. If this proves to be impractical,
though, the United States and other like-minded nations should
proceed on their own (much as the Proliferation Security Initiative
was promoted) to hold these meetings with as many like-minded
nuclear power and large nuclear research reactor-capable nations as
possible.
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2. Establish country-neutral rules for NPT violators. The United
States and its allies should build on France’s recent proposals that
the UNSC adopt a set of a country-neutral rules for dealing with
NPT violators, such as Iran and North Korea, which would stipulate
that:
a. countries that reject inspections and withdraw from the
NPT without ﬁrst addressing their previous violations must
surrender and dismantle their large nuclear capabilities (i.e.,
large research and power reactors and bulk handling facilities)
to come back into compliance. Until the UNSC unanimously
agrees to drop this ban, violators would lose the right to
acquire nuclear technology under the NPT (a ban against
exporting such help to these nations would be imposed), and
international ﬁnancial institutional support for major projects
within their borders would be suspended.
b. countries that violate their safeguards obligations under the
NPT and that the IAEA cannot ﬁnd to be in full compliance
should no longer receive nuclear assistance or exports from
any other country until the IAEA Board of Governors is able
to unanimously give them a clean bill of health.
c. countries that build new, large nuclear fuel-related facilities
that cannot be justiﬁed economically and monitored in
a manner that can assure timely warning of diversion of
enough nuclear material to make a bomb, should not receive
nuclear assistance or exports from another country until the
IAEA Board of Governors is able to unanimously agree that
the project in question is economically imperative or capable
of being safeguarded to provide timely warning of potential
diversions.
The idea in passing these resolutions would be to make it clear to
both Iran and its neighbors that violating the NPT as Iran or North
Korea have done will have consequences for their nuclear programs
and for continued international ﬁnancial institution support.
Diplomatically, this will help the United States and its allies identify
and treat Iran and North Korea in a country-neutral manner, not
as an equal in negotiations, but as legally branded violators of the
NPT.
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In addition, the United States should encourage the EU, and short
of this, the governments of Italy, Germany, and France, to threaten
to sanction Iran’s nuclear misbehavior by holding up their exports
of machinery and materials to Iran, which make up a vast majority
of all the imports Iran takes in. The continued ﬂow of these exports
is critical to the maintenance of Iran’s economy.
3. Offer Russia a U.S. nuclear cooperative agreement. To help
secure the support for these resolutions from Russia, the United States
should offer Moscow a nuclear cooperative deal that Moscow has long
sought. This deal would allow Russia to store U.S. origin spent fuel
from Asia and Europe and pocket 10 to 20 billion dollars in revenues
from this business. For nearly a decade, U.S. progress on this deal has
been stymied in the United States because of Russian unwillingness
to drop its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Russia, meanwhile, insists
that its cooperation with Iran is peaceful. Moscow has made it clear,
however, that it would suspend its nuclear cooperation with Tehran
if asked to do so by a resolution of the IAEA or the UNSC. If the
country-neutral rules described above were passed, Russia would
not have to announce that it was permanently dropping nuclear
cooperation on Bushier, only that it was temporarily suspending
nuclear cooperation with Iran as required by the resolution. Any
resumption of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation that violated
the resolution, however, would jeopardize continued U.S. consent
to send additional U.S. origin spent fuel, which should continue to
require case-by-case approval by Washington (as is normally the
case) under any nuclear cooperative agreement the United States
strikes with Russia.
4. Reduce the vulnerability of the Saudi oil production and
distribution system by building additional capacity. In a study
conducted for NPEC by energy researchers at Rice University, two
key vulnerabilities in the Gulf oil production and distribution system
in Saudi Arabia were identiﬁed. The ﬁrst is an Iranian threat to close
the Straits. Such a threat, Rice analysts argue, could be signiﬁcantly
reduced by upgrading and complimenting the trans-Saudi Arabian
Petroline, which would allow 11 million barrels a day to be shipped
to ports on the Red Sea. This could be done with technical upgrades
to the trans-Saudi Arabian line and by bringing the Iraqi-Saudi
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pipeline (Ipsa-2) back on line. To do the later would require an
agreement with Baghdad. The cost of the entire project is estimated
to be $600 million. Assuming the worst―a complete closure of the
Straits of Hormuz―this bypass system is estimated to be capable of
reducing the economic impact to the United States to a loss of only
1 percent of gross domestic product. This ﬁgure could be reduced
even further if additional pipelines were built from Abu Dhabi to
ports in Oman. There are a number of ways in which these projects
could be ﬁnanced. Given the high price of oil and the large revenue
streams high prices are now generating, the best time to ﬁnance such
construction is now.
The second vulnerability Rice researchers identiﬁed is the major
oil processing facilities located at Abqaiq. If terrorists were to attack
these facilities, the loss could be as high as several million barrels a
day of production. Work needs to be done to detail how best to reduce
this vulnerability but, again, the time to address these concerns (and
ﬁnance their ﬁxes) is now when oil prices are high. In the longer run,
of course, the steady rise in energy prices is likely to produce both
increased conservation and new alternative sources of energy that
will reduce U.S. and allied reliance on Gulf oil and gas.
5. Call on Iran to agree to a Montreux Convention to demilitarize
the Straits of Hormuz and an agreement to limit possible incidents
at sea. One of the constant complaints of Iranian diplomats is that
the United States and other major powers are unwilling to negotiate
directly with Iran to guarantee its security. Certainly, the United
States is loath to negotiate directly with Iran’s representatives for fear
that this would give its current revolutionary government greater
support than it otherwise would have. More importantly, after
having been disappointed so many times, Washington ofﬁcials are
rightly skeptical that Tehran is serious about reaching substantive
agreements. The Council on Foreign Relations recently highlighted
this problem in a report on Iran, which eschewed attempting any
grand bargaining with Tehran. Several of America’s key European
allies and other inﬂuential interest groups, however, are inclined
to negotiate, if at all possible, incrementally. This suggests that the
pressure for talks will persist and that, in some fashion, they will
continue. Where should such negotiatons be focused? One sensible
area, which unlike nuclear and human rights matters (where it is
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in Iran’s interest to hide its hand or lie and where negotiating with
Iran would only lend greater legitimacy to the current regime’s bad
policies), is demilitarizing and guaranteeing free passage through
the Straits of Hormuz and agreeing to naval standards of behavior
in and around the Gulf. Securing a Montreux-like agreement for the
Straits of the sort in place for the Dardanelles and an incidents at sea
agreement like that the United States secured with the Soviets during
the Cold War would be in Iran’s interest. An agreement regarding
Hormuz could assure multipower guarantees to prevent any foreign
nation from closing the straits (through which nearly all of Iran’s
own oil exports ﬂow). It would require submarines―including U.S.,
Israeli, French, and British special forces vessels―to surface before
entering or exiting the Straits. It ultimately (after initial sounding
talks with key European nations) would entail negotiations with the
United States.
On the other hand, such an agreement would also be in the
interest of the United States and its allies. It would require Iran to
demilitarize all of the islands and coast it has fortiﬁed with artillery
and antishipping missiles near or adjacent to the Straits. It would
give additional international legal grounds for military action
against Iran if it should threaten to close the Straits (by moving
Iranian military systems beyond an agreed demilitarized zone, the
agreement would help give timely warning of Iranian efforts to
cheat and allow superior allied air and reconnaissance capabilities
a clear shot at identiﬁable ground or sea movements). Finally, it
would serve as a conﬁned, limited set of talks, the progress of which
could be used as a barometer of Iranian seriousness in negotiations
generally. Similar beneﬁts could be secured with an incidents at sea
like agreement with Iran that might include provisions to restrict
any nation’s ability to covertly mine key waterways in or near the
Gulf.
6. Encourage Israel to initiate a Middle East nuclear restraint
effort that would help isolate Iran as a regional producer of ﬁssile
materials. Israel should announce that it will unilaterally mothball
(but not yet dismantle) Dimona, and place the reactor’s mothballing
under IAEA monitoring. At the same time, Israel should announce
that it is prepared to dismantle Dimona and place the special nuclear
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material it has produced in “escrow” in Israel with a third trusted
declared nuclear state, e.g., the United States. It should make clear,
however, that Israel will only take this additional step when at least
two of three Middle Eastern nations (i.e., Algeria, Egypt, or Iran)
follow Israel’s lead by mothballing their own declared nuclear
facilities that are capable of producing at least one bomb’s worth of
plutonium or highly enriched uranium in 1 to 3 years. Israel should
further announce that it will take the additional step of handing over
control of its weapons usable ﬁssile material to the IAEA when:
a. All states in the Middle East (i.e., the three mentioned above)
dismantle their ﬁssile producing facilities (large research
and power reactors, hexaﬂuoride, enrichment plants, and all
reprocessing capabilities).
b. All nuclear weapons states (including Pakistan) formally
agree not to redeploy nuclear weapons onto any Middle
Eastern nation’s soil in time of peace.
Such arms restraint by deed rather than negotiation should avoid
the awkwardness of current Middle Eastern arms control proposals
that would have Israel enter into nuclear arms talks with states that
do not recognize it and have it admit that it has nuclear weapons―a
declaration that would force Israel’s neighbors immediately to justify
some security reaction including getting bombs of their own.
7. Back these diplomatic-economic initiatives with increased
U.S.-allied anti-terrorist, defense, naval, and nuclear nonproliferation cooperation. A key derivative beneﬁt of pursuing the
proposals described above is their potential to frustrate Iran’s efforts
to divide the United States from its friends and to deter them from
acting against the worst of what Iran might do. Speciﬁcally, it would
be useful to:
• Have the United States canvass the EU, international ﬁnancial
institutions, and other nations about their willingness to back
an Israeli nuclear restraint initiative of the sort described above.
Clearly, it will make little sense for Israel to launch a nuclear
restraint initiative if other key nations merely dismiss it. To
help determine its prospects for success, the United States
ought to talk with its key allies in Europe and elsewhere to
guage their willingness to back the proposal described. Would
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the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other EU nations
see the proposal as a positive step that other Middle Eastern
nations should be encouraged to follow? Would they be
willing to announce that they would be prepared to provide
any Middle Eastern nation that matched Israel’s actions
help in funding non-nuclear energy systems and smaller
research reactors (that cannot make a critical weapon’s worth
of material in anything less than a decade)? Construction of
these facilities might begin once dismantlement commenced.
Would international ﬁnancial institutions, meanwhile, be
willing to announce that they would put on hold further
loans to states that subsidize or invest in uneconomical large
research, desalination, or power reactors and other nuclear
bulk handling facilities in the Middle East? If so, Washington
should consult with Israel and, assuming Israel’s willingness
to proceed, announce that America will use existing U.S.
cooperative threat reduction efforts to commence securing
escrowed Israeli nuclear material and converting this material
into appropriate storable form on a schedule that Israel will
set.
• Increase the level and tempo of allied naval exercises in an around
the Persian Gulf. These exercises should emphasize mineclearing, protection of commercial shipping, nuclear export
and import interdictions, and reopening the Straits under
a variety of “seizure” scenarios. The exercises should be
conducted with as many other interested Gulf and non-Gulf
nations as possible.
• Increase international cooperation to help Iran’s neighbors secure
their borders against illicit commerce and illegal immigration.
One of the key problems facing Iran’s neighbors (especially
Iraq and Turkey) is the threat of terrorists and illicit nuclear
imports and exports transiting into and out of their territories.
Cooperative efforts to secure these borders could be made
a part of a larger international effort to help European and
other states protect their borders and shores as well against
illicit strategic weapons-related imports or leakage. This
effort should be made an integral part of President Bush’s
Proliferation Security Initiative.
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• Consider ways to share the beneﬁts of turn-key missile defense and
reconnaissance systems in the Middle East in a manner that would
avoid compromising these systems. The utility of missile defense
and reconnaissance cooperation with friendly nations is
clear enough. The dangers of sharing more than one are less
obvious but no less real.4
As noted in the overview, none of these proposals can guarantee
Iran will not go nuclear. Assuming the United States continues to
stick by its key friends in the Middle East, though, these measures
will give Iran and its neighbors much greater cause to pause in further
violating the NPT. More importantly, they will go a long way toward
frustrating Iran’s efforts to divide and deter the United States and its
major allies from taking ﬁrm actions against the misdeeds Iran would
otherwise be tempted to do once it becomes nuclear ready. Finally,
and most important, these proposals, if implemented, are much
more likely in the near-term to restrain Iran’s nuclear enthusiasm
and that of its neighbors than any effort to bargain over Tehran’s
nuclear capabilities, or to try to bomb them. In the end, however,
only Iran’s eventual transition to more moderate self-rule will afford
much chance for lasting, effective nonproliferation. Until then, the
suggestions noted above are our best course.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. For background, see Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carlisle, PA: U.S.
Army War College, 2004, at http://www.npec-web.org/pages/checkiran.htm.
2. For a discussion of how best to reduce the risks associated with power
reactors see NPEC’s detailed technical analysis, Victor Gilinsky, et al., A Fresh
Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors, at http://www.npecweb.org/projects/NPECLWRREPORTFINALII10-22-2004.pdf.
3. The current Iranian regime thrives on corruption and central planning, both
of which require ever larger amounts of cash.
4. For a detailed discussion of these issues and how best to manage them, see
NPEC’s commissioned research, “Missile Nonproliferation and Missile Defense”
and “Controlling Unmanned Air Vehicles: New Challenges,” at http://www.
npec-web.org/published/hl_761.pdf and http://www.npec-web.org/projects/uavs.pdf,
respectively.
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PART II
TEHRAN’S NUCLEAR ENDEAVORS:
WHAT’S THE WORRY?

CHAPTER 2
ARAB SECURITY RESPONSES TO A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN
Richard L. Russell
The current American and international attention on Iran’s
suspected nuclear weapons aspirations is high, but Tehran’s belated
admissions and continued maneuvering with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may, in the medium to longer
runs, allow Iran to press ahead with a clandestine nuclear weapons
program. Tehran probably looks to the North Korean model in
which Pyongyang ostensibly conformed to the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) to politically diffuse any international or American
resolve for preemptive military action to stem North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program. After establishing a minimal nuclear
deterrent, North Korea was able to publicly withdraw from the
NPT and announce its nuclear weapons capabilities to up the ante
for any consideration of American-instigated military action against
the hermit kingdom. Tehran also can look closer to home to Iraq’s
unsuccessful bid for nuclear weapons in the run up to the 1990-91
Gulf war. Saddam managed to remain in good standing with the
NPT, while harboring an enormous nuclear weapons infrastructure
that would have produced a nuclear weapons arsenal had Saddam
not provoked international military intervention with his invasion
of Kuwait. The lessons from North Korea and Iraq underscore for
Iran how it is possible to continue working on nuclear weapons even
with the presence of IAEA inspectors on the ground, while parlaying
“compliance” with the NPT safeguards against international
military action against suspected nuclear weapons-related sites and
infrastructure.
Iran’s conﬁdence that it can pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons
program under the watchful eye of the IAEA may be bolstered by
American preoccupation with Iraq. The American military is stretched
thin with operations against insurgents in Iraq and would be poorly
suited to undertake yet another ambitious military campaign against
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neighboring Iran. American political legitimacy also is strained over
the course of events in Iraq. Moreover, domestic and international
conﬁdence in the quality of American intelligence is in doubt after an
apparently less than stellar performance against Saddam’s Iraq. For
all of these reasons, Iran might calculate that the Americans are illprepared to move militarily against its nuclear weapons program.
Public and policy debate on Iran has focused on Tehran’s bid
for nuclear weapons, but signiﬁcantly less attention is paid to the
regional consequences if Iran is eventually successful in evading
IAEA safeguards and acquiring nuclear weapons. To the extent that
regional reaction to Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons or its eventual
possession of nuclear weapons is addressed, it is devoted largely to
the dilemmas for American and Israeli policy. While Iran straddles
the Middle East and South Asia, the major powers in South Asia—
Pakistan and India—already have nuclear weapons, and their security
perception is likely to be less startled by Iran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons than those in the Arab world. Parenthetically, Islamabad
appears to have cast aside any long-term strategic concerns about
Iranian nuclear weapons in favor of short-term ﬁnancial windfalls
from aiding Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
But Arab states too will face new security challenges and burdens
if faced with Iranian nuclear weapons capabilities. Authoritative Arab
debate and discussion of the impact of Iranian nuclear weapons has
not yet surfaced and probably should not be expected. Arab states,
for all intents and purposes, still consider the public debate and
discourse of national security policies to be taboo. Notwithstanding
the arrival of satellite television and cable news programs, Arab
public discussion of national security is muted, and what little
does get aired publicly is intellectually superﬁcial and resembles
platitudes rather than hardheaded strategic analysis.
In light of the paucity of public sources, a great deal of analytic
speculation, as well as analysis based on off-the-record conversations
with ofﬁcers and diplomats from the region, are required to answer
the question, “How will Arab states react and respond to a nuclearready Iran?” This chapter sets the analytic scene by examining Arab
threat perceptions of Iran writ large. The chapter assumes that most
regional states believe that over the next 5 to 10 years Iran could
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readily and rapidly have nuclear weapons, even if Tehran does not
make a formal policy declaration or detonate a nuclear device to
demonstrate its nuclear power status. The chapter examines Arab
perception of American and Israeli security, which is intertwined
intimately with Arab contemplation of Iranian nuclear weapons
capabilities. The chapter then discusses likely courses of action by
Arab states nearest Iran in the Persian Gulf, as well as Arab states
geographically located farther aﬁeld in the Levant and northern
Africa. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the options and
limitations for U.S. policy in stemming political-military pressures on
Arab states to redouble their weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and delivery system programs in the aftermath of a suspected or
demonstrated Iranian nuclear weapons stockpile.
ARAB THREAT PERCEPTION OF IRAN
Arab states traditionally have worked to balance Iranian power
in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Most of the Arab states, with
the notable exceptions of Syria and Yemen, politically, economically,
and militarily backed Iraq in its war with Iran out of concern that
Iranian forces threatened at various stages in the 1980-88 war to
overwhelm Iraqi forces, thus gaining a strategic foothold in southern
Iraq from which Tehran could exercise a stranglehold on Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. Such a course of events would have positioned Tehran
to better export its then revolutionary zeal to undermine moderate
Arab states throughout the region and to dominate the regional
distribution of power.
The Iran-Iraq war depleted Iranian political, military, and
economic power and reduced the acuteness of Arab threat perception
of Iran during the 1990s. The substantial American military presence
in the region as a legacy of the 1990-91 war to monitor and deter any
renewed Iraqi military ambitions in the Gulf, reassured Arab Gulf
states that neither Iraq nor Iran would be able to mount an ambitious
military campaign to upset the regional balance of power. Iran’s
election in 1997 of President Khatami, who was widely perceived
as a moderating political inﬂuence in Tehran, dampened Iran’s zeal
for exporting the Islamic revolution and led to a further easing of the
Arab threat perception of Iran.
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The American ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq may
have diminished further Arab concern about Iran’s ability to leverage
its geopolitical mass to dominate the Gulf. Arab states are in awe, if
only privately, of American military capabilities that they witnessed
slash through the massive Iraqi forces widely regarded as the most
formidable Arab military forces in 1990. Arab military forces too
must be impressed with the relative ease with which American and
British forces smashed through Iraq to occupy Baghdad. Arab states
must calculate that as long as American forces occupy Iraq, Tehran
would not dare to undertake any conventional military operations to
challenge the Gulf distribution of power. Indeed, many Arab ofﬁcers
and diplomats today are more concerned about American political
and military intentions in the Gulf than they are about Iran in its
weakened political, military, and economic condition.
The public disclosures in 2002 and 2003 about the scope and
sophistication of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is just beginning
to seep into the strategic calculations of Arab diplomats, ofﬁcials,
and military ofﬁcers. The Arab states have been slow to perceive the
strategic threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons. As Judith Yaphe
observes, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, “have shrugged off
dire predictions of the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.”1
The author’s discussions with a wide array of senior military
ofﬁcers and diplomats from the Middle East reveal a fairly commonly
held view that Iranian nuclear weapons would have a stabilizing
effect on the region. These ofﬁcials and ofﬁcers observe that Israel
and the United States both have robust nuclear weapons capabilities
while Arab states do not, and only one Muslim state, Pakistan, does.
They reason that Iranian nuclear weapons would have salutary
effects on regional security because Tehran’s nuclear arsenal would
“balance” Israeli and American nuclear weapons. The implicit
assumption of this line of reasoning is that Israel and the United
States have political, military, and economic ambitions in the region
that could only be checked by Muslim nuclear weapons, even if in
the hands of the Farsi-speaking Islamic regime in Tehran.
The superﬁcial reasoning behind this Arab strategic thought may
reﬂect the equivalent of an intellectual “knee jerk” reaction. As time
passes and the reality of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons comes
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into sharper focus, Arab diplomats and ofﬁcers are more likely to
come to grips with the dilemmas posed by a nuclear-armed Iran.
They will have to worry that American security backing of Arab
states may lessen in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons. Arab
security policy ofﬁcials would have to concede that the United
States might be less willing to come to Arab states’ aid in the event
of a future regional crisis in which Iran wields nuclear weapons.
Had Iraq had nuclear weapons in 1990, for example, the risks and
potential costs of an American military campaign to liberate Kuwait
would have been greater and might have led the United States to
accept Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait as a ﬁat accompli. In a future
regional contingency, the Iranians could make limited land grabs
in the Persian Gulf―whether against Iraq, Kuwait, or the United
Arab Emirates―and hope to hold American conventional forces
at bay with the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons. Iranian nuclear
weapons too would afford Tehran the titular leadership role in
the Gulf and give it substantial political sway with the Arab Gulf
States.
Arab states also will have to worry that Iran’s possession of
nuclear weapons will embolden Tehran to revert to a more aggressive
foreign policy. The clerical regime might calculate, for example,
that it could give more material assistance and lessen restrictions
on Hezbollah to engage in operations against Israeli and American
interests. The Iranians have supported Hezbollah operations against
American forces as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy to push the
Americans out of the Gulf, most notably in assisting Saudi Hezbollah
attacks against the Khobar Towers. Tehran might calculate that it
could support an even more ambitious unconventional terrorist
campaign against American forces in the Gulf and the smaller Arab
Gulf states that host American forces if it has a nuclear weapons
arsenal. Tehran might assess that, even if its hand is exposed, the risks
of American military retaliation would be minimal, given Iranian
nuclear weapons. If push came to shove, Tehran could use nuclear
weapons against American military assets or hosting countries in
the region with Iranian ballistic missiles, or clandestinely insert them
into the United States to directly target American cities and citizens.
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ARABS WEIGHING AMERICAN AND ISRAELI REACTIONS
Scratching the analytic surface of the dilemmas posed by Iranian
nuclear weapons will lead Arab defense planners to contemplate
American and Israeli security policies. For Arab states, the United
States and Israel are the “bulls in the china shop” whose actions will
have to be gauged in mapping out Arab reactions to Iranian nuclear
weapons. How the United States and Israel behave toward an Iran
armed with nuclear weapons will affect their security policies and
strategies.
Arab ofﬁcials already are alarmed at what they see as an American
precedent for waging preemptive or preventive war. While American
security studies scholars are careful to distinguish preemptive war as
moving militarily ﬁrst in a crisis against an adversary, and preventive
war as moving to stop an adversary from growing too powerful,
particularly with nuclear weapons, Arab ofﬁcials appear to use these
terms in conversations in English interchangeably. Arabs worry that
the United States will move militarily against Iran either before or
after Iran acquires nuclear weapons by using its military position in
the Gulf to bring forces to bear against Iran.
The Arab states worry that they will be caught in a crossﬁre in an
American military campaign against Iran. The Saudis, for example,
may hope that the ending of the American military footprint in
Saudi Arabia will lessen the potential for Saudi Arabia to become
embroiled in a future conﬂict with Iran. The Saudis, after all, resisted
the investigation of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed
numerous American servicemen out of fear that it would uncover
Iranian ties to the operation and put the Kingdom in the middle of
an American-Iranian conﬂict. The Gulf states, particularly Saudi
Arabia, also worry that American military operations against Iran
would give the Americans potentially too great an inﬂuence over the
global oil market.
The Arab states will be concerned about Israeli preemptive or
preventive military action. The Arab regimes especially will worry
that Israeli military operations against Iran―whether by air or sea―
would spark street demonstrations that could spark public resentment
against Arab regimes. Despite their worst fears in the run up to
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the 2003 war against Iraq, “the Arab street” was muted. But Arab
regimes will worry that Israeli military action against Iran would
prove to be more volatile politically than American military action
against Iraq had been. Arab military ofﬁcers and diplomats have a
hard time, though, understanding Israel’s perception of geographic
vulnerability and the severe security demands that Iran’s acquisition
of nuclear weapons would have on Israeli defense policy.
The Arab world has a begrudging respect for Israeli air power, in
particular due to its prowess demonstrated in the Arab-Israeli wars,
air battles with Syrian aircraft in struggles over Lebanon, the air
strikes against Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters
in Tunis, and the preventive air strikes against Iraq’s nuclear reactor.
The mystique of Israeli air power, however, probably is larger than
reality in the case of Iran, which is located a far reach from Israeli
airspace.2 Depending on the ﬂight route, Israeli aircraft would have
to violate Jordanian, Syrian, Iraqi, or Saudi airspaces to strike Iranian
targets. While some speculate that Israel could gain basing support
to launch aircraft from Turkish bases, Ankara’s unease with working
with the Americans vis-à-vis Iraq shows how squeamish the Turks
are over relations with their southern neighbors. The Israeli air force’s
ability to generate sorties for a sustained air bombardment of Iranian
nuclear weapons-related facilities, moreover, pales in comparison of
that of the United States which enjoys wide access in the Persian
Gulf, both in host countries and based on aircraft carriers.
Tel Aviv, for its part, will try to work closely with Washington
on the shared threat from Iran’s nuclear weapons. In November
2003, the head of the Israeli intelligence service, the Mossad, told
the Israeli Knesset that Iran’s nuclear weapons program represented
“the biggest threat to Israel’s existence since its creation” in 1948.3
The Israelis would be relieved to have the Americans carry the lion’s
share of the burden for working diplomatically and, if necessary,
militarily to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons drive.
THE GULF NEIGHBORHOOD
The policy plate of U.S. security ofﬁcials is already overﬂowing with
its current load of security responsibilities, and the contemplation or
implementation of yet another formidable security task represented
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by moving militarily―even in a limited air campaign―against Iran’s
nuclear weapons infrastructure may simply be one bridge too far
for American policymakers. Should the United States be unable or
unwilling to use military actions against Iran’s nuclear weapons
program, Tehran will likely acquire nuclear weapons sooner rather
than later. How, then, are Arab states likely to react in the next 5 to
10 years to a suspected or demonstrated Iranian nuclear weapons
stockpile and robust ballistic missile inventories as delivery means?
Arab Gulf states will feel the Iranian threat most acutely. Iraq, for
example, will continue to see Iran as the largest and most formidable
national security threat in the region regardless what shape, form, or
nature the post-Saddam government in Baghdad eventually takes. A
relatively transparent, moderately disposed government in Baghdad
probably would want American military reassurance to shore up
its security vis-à-vis Iran. The Iraqis might be amenable to residual
American and international ground and air forces hosted in Iraq.
The Iraqis might want a proﬁle small enough to minimize charges by
political opposition that the Iraqis are subservient to the Americans,
but large enough to serve as a “trip wire” to deter Iranian military
ambitions against Iraq, particularly as Iraq’s new armed forces are
just taking root. The American presence in Iraq also would reassure
Iraqis that the Iranians could not parlay their nuclear weapons for
political coercion against Iraq.
The Iraqis, too, probably will want force projection capabilities
to deter Iranian military activities as well as to strike Iran in the
event that deterrence fails. The residual American and international
presence in Iraq might work to dampen Iraqi interests and ability
to restart ballistic missile programs to match Iran’s ballistic missile
capabilities. The Iraqis, though, probably would press the United
Stats and the West for advanced air force capabilities to project power
and to compensate for not resuming ballistic missile endeavors.
Parenthetically, while much public discussion has centered on the
size and nature of Iraq’s post-Saddam army, little debate has touched
upon the legitimate air power needs of the future Iraq.
Over the longer run, the withdrawal of American and international
forces from Iraq probably would heighten Iraqi fears vis-à-vis Iran’s
nuclear weapons arsenal. Even if Iraqi conventional forces evolve
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into relatively modern, professional, and capable forces―albeit in
fewer numbers than the forces during Saddam’s rule―the Iraqis will
be under strong pressure to contemplate resurrecting Iraq’s nuclear
program to counterbalance Iran’s nuclear weapons inventory.
From Baghdad’s perspective, Iran could parlay its nuclear weapons
advantage to politically coerce Iraq. The Iranians, for example, could
embark on an aggressive campaign to support Iraqi Shia opposition
in the south or challenge the Shat al Arab, calculating that Baghdad
would be deterred by Iranian nuclear forces from undertaking
conventional military reprisals across the border. The Iraqis would
have to worry that, should they seek to strike conventionally against
Iran, Tehran could resort to tactical nuclear weapons to destroy Iraqi
forces on the battleﬁeld.
A Turkish decision to acquire nuclear weapons in response to
Iran’s nuclear arsenal would further increase Iraq’s incentive to
resurrect its nuclear weapons programs. A deterioration in TurkishAmerican relations, coupled with failed efforts to gain entry into the
EU, over time could lead Ankara to be substantially less conﬁdent in
NATO’s resolve to come to Turkey’s defense in the event of a military
contingency with Iran. The Turks might then calculate that they need
to have their own, independent nuclear deterrent as a hedge against
Iran’s nuclear forces, as well as future nuclear weapons aspirants to
Turkey’s southern borders.
Saudi Arabia has worked to restore diplomatic ties with Tehran
that were ruptured by the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq
war, but Tehran’s possession of nuclear weapons is likely to cause
discomfort in the kingdom. While the restoration of normal diplomatic
relations appears on the surface to ease tensions, neither the Saudis
nor the Iranians have abandoned their traditional aspirations to be
the most inﬂuential nation-state in the Gulf. The Saudis are likely to
view Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as a substantial Iranian
effort toward politically and militarily dominating the Gulf. The
Saudis probably would suffer a sense of political humiliation that
the Iranians have the political prestige or reputation for power that
accompanies nuclear weapons.
Iranian nuclear weapons would add already substantial
political-military incentive for Saudi Arabia to pursue its own
nuclear weapons capabilities. The Saudis have limited conventional
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military capabilities to defend their large geographic space from
outside threats, the most serious of which, Iran and Iraq, could be
armed with nuclear weapons. The Saudis worried in the Iran-Iraq
war that Iranian forces would defeat Iraqi forces in southern Iraq
to threaten Kuwait and the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. The
Saudis would have to worry that a nuclear-armed Iran could again
militarily threaten the Gulf. The Saudis, too, would have to worry
about the foreign policy orientation of the future government in
Iraq and hedge against the specter of Iraq in the long run, tapping
its technical expertise to resurrect a nuclear weapons program. The
Saudis also harbor deep mistrust of Israel and resent Israeli military
prowess and nuclear weapons capabilities.
The Saudis, too, have a wary eye on the military power of the
United States. The Saudis have been shaken by post-September 11,
2001, events. They were shocked both by signs of formidable domestic
political opposition against the Saudi regime and internationally by
the anger in the United States over the stark, if belated, recognition
that Saudi Arabia was a hotbed for al-Qaeda. The political backlash
in the United States must have heightened Saudi concern that
the United States could one day pose a threat to the Kingdom.
Although this concern is never uttered, Saudi ofﬁcials remember
that the Kingdom was vulnerably dependent on the United States
for its survival in the 1990 war. It would not take too much Saudi
imagination to appreciate that the United States, with its 500,000
troops then stationed in Saudi Arabia, could have forcibly taken
over the Kingdom in a couple of days. The Saudis today probably
worry that that United States could, in the future, “overreact” to an
al-Qaeda attack against American interests with retaliatory strikes
or military occupation in Saudi Arabia, much as the Americans have
done in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A Saudi nuclear weapons capability would work strategically
to shore-up Saudi insecurities vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear weapons
capabilities, but also against potential hostile actions in the longer
run from Israel, Iraq, and the United States. The Saudis have already
taken several steps in this direction. In the 1980s, unknown to the
United States, they secretly negotiated for and purchased intermediate
range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. According to Anthony
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Cordesman, the Saudis purchased 50-60 CSS-2 missiles, 10-15 mobile
launchers, and technical support from China.4 The missiles would
be ideal for delivering nuclear weapons, but poorly suited for the
delivery of conventional munitions because they are very inaccurate
and too limited in numbers in the Saudi arsenal to be used in the
massive missile barrages with the conventional weapons necessary
to compensate for inaccuracies. The missiles, moreover, were sold
from Chinese operational nuclear force inventories. Although Beijing
and Riyadh claim that the missiles in Saudi Arabia are armed with
conventional weapons, no American or international observers have
been allowed by the Saudis to inspect and independently verify
Chinese and Saudi claims.5
The international revelations in 2003 about the scope and depth of
Iran’s nuclear weapons-related activities have brought to the public
domain reports of Saudi contemplation of nuclear weapons with the
assistance of Pakistan. The British newspaper, the Guardian, reported
that Saudi ofﬁcials have admitted that, in light of Iran’s nuclear
weapons program and the post-September 11 security environment,
the Kingdom is considering a variety of national security policy
options, one of which is the pursuit of nuclear weapons.6 Other press
reports allege that then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
traveled to Pakistan in October 2003 and secured a secret agreement
with President Pervez Musharraf, under which Pakistan will provide
the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap
oil.7 Naturally, Pakistani and Saudi ofﬁcials deny these reports, but
both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have national interests consistent
with such a course of actions. Pakistan needs money to support its
military competition with India, while Saudi Arabia needs a deterrent
to compete with Iran and Israel, and as a hedge against a distancing
of security ties with the United States.
While a body of circumstantial evidence suggests that Saudi
Arabia has the interests, means, and intentions to lean toward a
nuclear weapons option, there is little to suggest that the smaller
Gulf Arab states are as far along in their strategic thinking as Saudi
Arabia. To greater and lesser degrees, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman gauge a threat from Iran in
general. Yemen, on the other hand, takes great reassurance from its
geographic separation from Iran and sees little to no direct military
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threat coming from Tehran. Yemen’s security preoccupation, despite
Iranian nuclear weapons in the Gulf region, will continue to be its
neighbor to the north, Saudi Arabia.
The richer small Arab Gulf states have the ﬁnancial wherewithal
to purchase nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but they
would face obstacles in moving along such a strategic path. China
and Pakistan, for example, probably are more willing to press the
envelope of risk with international and American backlash for public
discovery of clandestine WMD-related dealings in exchange for the
strategic prize of security ties with Saudi Arabia, the richest and one
of the three major states in the Gulf balance of power, but they might
be less willing to take these risks for the sake of security ties with
the smaller Gulf states. The Chinese and Pakistanis might be more
concerned with the operational security of any clandestine WMD
cooperation with the smaller Arab Gulf states, recognizing that they
need strong ties with the Americans that would increase the risk of
public exposure. The Saudis, in contrast, have proven themselves
adept at keeping secrets from the Americans. While Saudi Arabia
may calculate that it could survive the international and American
opprobrium that would accompany revelations of a Saudi nuclear
weapons program, the smaller Arab Gulf states would have to
worry that exposure of nuclear weapons aspirations would alienate
their security backers―namely the United States and Saudi Arabia―
which are the cornerstones for ensuring their autonomies from the
larger states of Iraq and Iran.
Small Gulf Arab state efforts to develop their own nuclear fuel
cycles and nuclear power plants under the guise of civilian electric
power generation would be a long and expensive undertaking. Such
a course of action, moreover, might set off international alarm bells
in light of Iran’s successful exploitation of this route for acquiring
nuclear weapons. The small Arab Gulf states might be less able than
Iran to ride out international criticisms of ostensible civilian nuclear
power infrastructure; they are far more dependent on critical trade
and security from the West than Iran and therefore more vulnerable
to the effects of international economic sanctions and ruptures in
bilateral security arrangements, particularly with the United States,
Britain, and, to a lesser extent, France. The small Gulf Arab states, too,
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would have to worry that their nascent nuclear power infrastructure
would be vulnerable to preventive and preemptive attacks from
larger regional powers.
The notable exception to this line of reasoning might be the UAE,
which perceives the Iranians as a threat more acutely than their Gulf
Arab counterparts. The UAE still harbors resentment toward the
Iranians for their occupation of the contested territories of Greater
and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands.8 The UAE might calculate
that Iran’s nuclear weapons will reduce, if not eliminate, what little
incentive Tehran has to negotiate a settlement to the island disputes,
as well as embolden Tehran to take even more assertive actions
against the UAE.
The UAE has demonstrated a willingness to spend top dollar for
defense as evident in procurement of combat aircraft from France
and the United States, as well as Scud missiles from North Korea.
The UAE blindsided the United States when Dubai purchased ScudB missiles from North Korea in 1989, according to Simon Henderson.9
Dubai is suspected of having six Scud-B launchers.10 The UAE might
see its Mirage 2000 and its F-16 aircraft as ideal nuclear weapons
delivery systems and could turn to Pakistan for technical assistance.
These aircraft and well-trained UAE pilots could readily navigate
the Persian Gulf to hold at risk Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure
at Bushier and major naval facilities at Bandar Abbas. The UAE,
moreover, has demonstrated willingness to purchase controversial
weapons systems such as Scud missiles and suffer economic sanctions
as a consequence. The Chinese and the Pakistanis might be willing
to undertake the risk of exposure for substantial economic reward
to assist the UAE in developing nuclear, chemical, or biological
payloads for its combat aircraft or ballistic missiles.
THE LEVANT NEIGHBORHOOD
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will have security
repercussions for Arab states beyond the immediate Persian Gulf area.
Syria and Egypt are geopolitically central to Middle Eastern security
and will see their interests most directly affected by Iran’s nuclear
weapons power. Concerns about the prospects of Syrian or Egyptian
nuclear weapons programs, however, have been muted in part due
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to the economic weaknesses of both states. Common wisdom holds
that nuclear weapons programs often are prohibitively expensive
undertakings that put the nuclear weapons option beyond the grasp
of many nation-states with poor, if not dysfunctional, economies,
such as Syria and Egypt.
A cursory look at reality shatters that common assumption. Two
of the world’s poorest and most ineffective economies in Pakistan and
North Korea illuminate the stubborn fact that countries with an expert
technical elite and the determination to siphon off scarce ﬁnancial
resources from their economies can defy reasonable assumptions
and establish nuclear weapons programs. Pakistan and North Korea
are estimated to have 2002 per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
of $462 and $903, respectively.11 Egypt and Syria have estimated
2002 per capita GDPs of $1,190 and $1,100, respectively,12 which puts
Cairo and Damascus on a richer footing than both Islamabad and
Pyongyang. And like Pakistan and North Korea, Syria and Egypt
have black market means for making funding streams for clandestine
nuclear weapons programs. With the Pakistani and North Korean
nuclear weapons histories in mind, one should not be too conﬁdent
in dismissing futures in which the poorly performing economic
states of Syria and Egypt embark on nuclear weapons programs.
Syria, at least initially, might take some solace from Iran’s
nuclear weapons stocks. Damascus is increasingly isolated and in
a weakened regional security position. It is encircled by states that
enjoy strong security relationships with the United States; Israel to
the southwest, Jordan to the south, Iraq to the east, and Turkey to
the north. Syria, while the reigning inﬂuence in Lebanon, has only
Iran to cooperate with in regional politics against the other regional
powers inﬂuenced by the United States. In the short term, Damascus
might welcome Iran’s nuclear weapons as a means to bolster, by
association, its marginal regional power.
Over the longer run, Syria probably would come to see the negative
strategic consequences of Iranian nuclear weapons. If, in response to
Iranian nuclear weapons, Turkey and Iraq pursue nuclear weapons
options, Syria will see its power position in the region deteriorate even
further.13 Turkish or Iraqi nuclear weapons will add to the already
strong Syrian strategic incentive to pursue nuclear weapons because
Damascus views Israel as its most formidable security threat.
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The Syrian regime is isolated politically and might calculate that
it has no other means to ensure its survival other than a nuclear
deterrent. Damascus might calculate that it has no alternative to
running the risk of Israeli military action in the near and medium
terms in order to achieve a margin of security in the longer run
under a nuclear umbrella. The Syrians have a rudimentary nuclear
infrastructure upon which to build.14 But aside from the formidable
technical obstacles for acquiring the fuel cycle infrastructure to
support a nuclear weapons program, Damascus would have a major
challenge keeping its nuclear program secret to avoid provoking
Israeli preemptive or preventive military action either against
Syria’s clandestine nuclear weapons infrastructure or against the
regime itself. Tel Aviv probably could not tolerate Syrian possession
of nuclear weapons, and, unlike the case of Iran, Israel has more
than sufﬁcient military capabilities needed to wage a sustained air
campaign to damage Syrian political, military, and economic nodes
signiﬁcantly.
Syria could respond more readily to accelerated regional nuclear
weapons proliferation by strengthening its “poor man’s nuclear
weapon option.” The Syrian conventional military is dying on the
vine since it lost its principal military backer with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Today, Syria’s conventional military is less capable on
the battleﬁeld than the Iraqi military of the 1991 war. The Syrian
military is a thoroughly political institution unable to compete
with Israel’s military on the battleﬁeld. Damascus compensates for
conventional military inferiority by relying on chemical, and perhaps
biological, weapons and ballistic missiles to deter Israeli military
action. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton testiﬁed
to a House hearing in September 2003 that Syria has “a stockpile of
the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic
missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more
toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX.” Bolton also stated
that Syria “is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons
capability” and expressed concern about Syria’s nuclear activities,
noting that Russia and Syria “have approved a draft program on
cooperation on civil nuclear power.”15 Damascus probably will
redouble efforts in the chemical and biological weapons arenas to
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shore up its weak deterrent capabilities against Israeli, Turkish, Iraqi,
and Iranian conventional and nuclear forces in the distant future.
The Syrians would have to depend on their substantial ballistic
missile forces to deliver chemical or biological weapons against
regional threats because of the uncertainty over their air force
capabilities. Only Syria’s ballistic missiles would stand a chance of
penetrating Israeli airspace, probably even with the deployment of
the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense system which cannot be
entirely foolproof. Syria’s air force would be an unreliable means to
deliver WMD payloads, given the exceptionally poor performance
of Syrian aircraft and pilots against Israeli forces in the air battles of
the 1980s in which Israel downed some 80 Syrian aircraft without
a loss of one Israeli. The Syrians have 18 Scud-B launchers with
200 missiles, 8 Scud-C launchers with 80 missiles, and an unknown
number of Scud-D missiles.16
The Syrians appear to be working on modernizing their ballistic
missile forces in ﬁts and starts. “Syria tested a 700-kilometer range
Scud-D on September 23, 2000, following a successful test of Israel’s
Arrow missile defense system.”17 Syria also could look to acquire
more modern, mobile, reliable, and accurate ballistic missiles such as
the M-9―whether from China directly, or indirectly from Pakistan.
Syrian President Bashir has yet to demonstrate much prudence in
regional politics and might be persuaded by Syria’s old guard military
that new missiles will bring Syria greater security and inﬂuence visà-vis Israel. Tel Aviv might, in turn, shatter that Syrian assessment
and judge that such a change of the status quo is unacceptable and
militarily move against Damascus, particularly since Damascus is
in a profoundly weaker position in the Middle East than it had been
during the Cold War.
Egypt is geographically farther from Iran and does not feel
the direct Iranian military threat as acutely as those states located
closer. Nevertheless, Cairo is likely to view Iran’s nuclear weapons
as another blow to the Egyptian worldview as the leader in the
Arab and Islamic worlds. As journalist Nicholas Kralev observes,
“Egyptian politicians, intellectuals, and journalists are worried that
their country is losing its status as a major regional player in the
Middle East.”18 The blow to Egyptian prestige because of Iran’s
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nuclear weapons status may not be sufﬁcient in and of itself to alter
Egypt’s restraint from a nuclear weapons program, but it adds to an
already large pile of incentives to pursue nuclear weapons.
Egypt had incentive to contemplate nuclear weapons well before
Iran’s nuclear weapons come to the foreground in regional politics.
The Egyptians, notwithstanding the peace treaty with Israel, have
long resented Israel’s nuclear weapons program that they see as a
substantial source of Israeli political leverage over Egypt and the
other Arab states. Cairo has long pressed diplomatically for a nuclear
free zone in the Middle East as a means to negotiate away Israel’s
unilateral nuclear weapons advantage in the region. Cairo has long
warned that it could reconsider its nuclear weapons restraint if the
Israelis indeﬁnitely refuse to negotiate for a nuclear free zone.
Egypt does have a nuclear power infrastructure upon which to
begin a program with military applications. In the 1970s, Egypt may
have debated pursuing nuclear weapons, but the peace treaty with
Israel, aid from the United States, and limited ﬁnancial means derailed
a policy in this direction.19 Nevertheless, the Egyptians have a nuclear
research center with a Soviet-supplied two megawatt research reactor
that started in 1961, and an Argentine-supplied 22 megawatt light
water reactor that started in 1997.20 The Wisconsin Project estimates
that the Argentine reactor gives Cairo access to bomb quantities of
ﬁssile material, possibly enough plutonium to make one nuclear
weapon per year.21 If the Egyptians were to embark on a nuclear
weapons program based on its nuclear power infrastructure, they
would have to move gingerly much as the Syrians to reduce the risk
of Israeli military action. Cairo, however, might judge that it would
face less of a risk from Israeli military action than Syria because of
Egypt’s security relationship with the United States. Cairo could also
calculate that Tel Aviv would be loath to undertake military action
that would threaten the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and risk the
return of hot wars between Arab states and Israel.
The Egyptians, much like the Syrians, also could redouble their
“poor man’s nuclear weapon” option. The Egyptian military in the
1980s modernized its chemical warfare agent production facilities
to manufacture the nerve agents and even cooperated with Iraq on
chemical weapons; in 1981 Iraq gave Egypt $12 million to expand
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Egypt’s chemical agent production facilities and, in return, Cairo
assisted Baghdad in the production and storage of chemical weapons
agents.22 And the Egyptians could undertake similar modernization
efforts of their suspected biological warfare capabilities. “In 1996,
U.S. ofﬁcials reported that by 1972 Egypt had developed biological
warfare agents and that there was no evidence to indicate that Egypt
has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian
capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist.”23
Egyptian and Syrian pursuit of the “poor man’s nuclear option”
might prove in the end to be only stopgap measures. The Egyptians
and Syrians, drawing lessons from the 1991 and 2003 wars against
Iraq, might conclude that nuclear weapons are inherently greater
sources of deterrence than chemical and biological weapons. The
Iraqis had robust chemical and biological weapons inventories in
1991, and the United States believed that Baghdad had retained some
of these capabilities in the run-up to the 2003 war. The American
campaign against Saddam probably has shaken Egyptian and Syrian
conﬁdence in the deterrence value of chemical and biological weapons
because the U.S. perception of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons
stores was insufﬁcient to deter the United States from waging a
war against Baghdad. Israeli, American, and Iranian possession of
nuclear weapons might pressure Syria and Egypt to pursue nuclear
weapons as the ultimate guarantor of their securities.
The Egyptians appear to be continuing efforts to modernize
their ballistic missile forces, which could be used as a foundation
for a nuclear weapons deterrent posture. The Egyptians probably
already have on hand at least 24 Scud B/C launchers with about 100
missiles.24 The Wisconsin Project assesses that the long-standing
relationship with North Korea has given Egypt the capability to
indigenously produced Scud-B missiles, and Cairo is developing
Scud-C missile production capabilities.25 In August 2002, Slovak
authorities revealed that two North Korean agents based in Slovakia
were procuring millions of dollars of ballistic missile components
for Egypt. Although the North Korean agents ﬂed the country before
Slovak authorities could arrest them, remaining documents showed
that between 1999 and mid-2001, they ordered more than $10 million
worth of equipment and supplies for Egypt, to include items that
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suggest that Cairo is trying to acquire a ballistic missile with a range
of about 1,500km.26 The Egyptian ballistic missile program, which has
escaped much international scrutiny, has beneﬁted from substantial
North Korea assistance, which Cairo might eventually tap to support
a nuclear weapons program such as warhead designs to carry on top
of Egypt’s ballistic missiles.
Egypt’s interest in ballistic missiles with longer ranges than the
Scud is long-standing. In the 1980s, Egypt cooperated with Iraq and
Argentina on the Condor missile program. The United States in 1988
revealed that the Egyptians turned to Argentina for production help
and Iraq for funding in a $3.2 billion Condor-2 project intended to
provide Egypt and Iraq each with 200 solid-fuel ballistic missiles
comparable to the American Pershing II nuclear delivery system.27
Intense U.S. diplomatic pressure, as well as the 1990 Gulf war, forced
the collapse of the program. Cairo might be rekindling its efforts
to procure longer range missiles, calculating that U.S. attention is
diverted elsewhere.
A series of scenarios could be envisioned in which Egypt could
embark on a nuclear weapons program in earnest. If American grant
assistance were cut signiﬁcantly, the lifeblood for Egypt’s conventional
military modernization would evaporate and put more pressure on
Cairo to compensate with comparatively cheaper investments in
unconventional weapons. A continuing political deterioration over
the Israel-Palestinian conﬂict, Arab street backlash over American
military occupation of Iraq, popular Egyptian uprisings against the
Mubarak regime, or Mubarak’s death all could work to reduce Cairo’s
responsiveness to U.S. diplomatic pressure below what was the case
when Egypt abandoned the Condor missile program. Cairo could look
to nuclear weapons acquisition as a means for the political prestige
needed to shore-up Egypt’s domestic security situation and sagging
political stature in the Arab world. Egypt might look to Pakistan
as a model in this regard; a poor state, but one in which popular
support for the nuclear program worked to Musharraf’s political
advantage at home and abroad. Arguably, Pakistan beneﬁts from
more international attention and American assistance than would
have been the case had Pakistan not had nuclear weapons. Cairo
also could calculate that only nuclear weapons could bring sufﬁcient
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political pressure on Israel to engage in serious arms control talks,
much as they had between the Americans and Soviets during the
Cold War.
AMERICAN POLICY AVENUES
The United States will have leverage and inﬂuence over Iraqi
responses to Iranian nuclear weapons inventory as long as American
and international forces play critical roles inside Iraq, but, over the
longer run, that inﬂuence will subside and the incentives for Iraq to
resume ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs will grow
stronger to balance growing Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear
forces. The smaller Gulf Arab states, moreover, might be supportive
of Iraqi efforts in this direction because they would see Iraq as a
geopolitical counterbalance to Iranian and Saudi power much as
they had during the 1980-88 Gulf war.
To stem this course of events, the United States will have to
bolster Iraq’s force projection capabilities by providing assistance in
building a modern, capable air force to compensate for Iraqi restraint
in resurrecting Iraqi ballistic missile programs. The Iraqis will
have legitimate security demands for force projection capabilities
against Iran’s growing ballistic missile forces. The Iraqis also will
need American and international security reassurance in continued
linkages to western militaries to ensure that Iraqi conventional forces,
while smaller than Iranian forces, are more capable in conventional
military operations to deter Iranian ambitions. The Iraqis, too, will
need international security reassurance to dampen the powerful
incentive to pursue nuclear weapons to counterbalance Iran’s nuclear
weapons inventory.
The United States should be forward-leaning in diplomatic
efforts to stem Egyptian and Saudi incentives to pursue nuclear
weapons options. The United States is bound to have more leverage
over Egypt, which beneﬁts from substantial American military and
economic assistance. As Jon Alterman observes, “the $1.3 billion in
military aid that the United States provides annually is useful as
the present regime distributes patronage in the armed forces. U.S.
economic aid, just under $800 million annually and slowly declining,
also helps the regime consolidate its patronage networks.”28
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Egypt demonstrated sensitivity to U.S. diplomatic and political
pressure that ended its Condor ballistic missile program in the late
1980s. The Egyptians, however, probably calculate that the United
States has a short attention span and is easily distracted by other
global events, especially today in Iraq and Afghanistan. In light of
Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the United States needs to squeeze
Egypt’s ballistic missile program and potential nuclear weapons
aspirations back on to the policy agenda. The United States needs
to speak ﬁrmly and directly with the Egyptians and challenge the
country on the activities of its ballistic missile forces, which could be
the platform for nuclear weapons delivery in the future.
American leverage against Saudi Arabia will be less than is the case
with Egypt. The Saudis by no means depend on American economic
support or largesse for the modernization of the Saudi military. Still
though, the Saudis continue to see the United States as a strategic
backdrop that could potentially again bolster the Kingdom in a
future contingency. The United States needs to leverage the security
reassurance it gives to the Saudis to gain access and Saudi updates on
the status of CSS-2s. The United States should argue that the Saudi
military beneﬁts from access to American military facilities, and that
the Saudis should reciprocate by allowing U.S. ofﬁcials to inspect
on a bilateral basis Saudi military facilities, missiles, and warheads,
and to speak with Saudi personnel. Such efforts would give the
United States a better understanding of the Saudi infrastructure, as
well as underscore the potential negative consequences of the Saudis
undertaking a bid for nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles.
The possession of nuclear weapons in Egypt and Saudi Arabia
would be particularly troubling given the potential for political
instability in these countries over the longer run. Both countries have a
burgeoning demographic bulge of young and unemployed men who
will be vulnerable for recruitment by domestic―especially militant
Islamic―political opposition. Egypt in the past has had its armed
forces penetrated by Islamic militants, witness the assassination of
President Sadat during a military parade, and might again suffer from
Islamic militants in military ranks who might have knowledge and
access to nuclear weapons inventories. The same case could be made
of Saudi Arabia. While these scenarios would not appear likely in the
near term, they might not appear so hypothetical in 15 or 20 years.
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These scenarios underscore the imperative of American statecraft to
try to head off the Egyptian or Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons
in the near term to avoid being saddled in the future with unstable
regimes politically struggling against militant Islam opposition both
inside and outside the gates of power, much as the United States
faces today with respect to Pakistan.
Syria will require more use of coercive diplomacy that entails
the threat of force than the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, if the
United States is to discourage Syria from undertaking the nuclear
weapons route. The Syrians have demonstrated a stubborn resistance
to conciliatory measures from outside as well as a propensity to put
their near-term interests over longer-term strategic interests. The
Syrians, for example, appear to have rendered logistics assistance for
Iraqi regime exodus from Iraq after the 2003 war, as well as facilitated
the travel of Jihadists from the region into Iraq to ﬁght American
occupation forces. The United States needs to reafﬁrm directly to
Syria that it is an isolated regime squeezed between powers―Israel,
Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq―which are more favorably disposed to
American than Syrian strategic interests. Damascus needs to know
directly and clearly that the initiation of a nuclear weapons program
would not be tolerated and the American or Israeli military forces
could wreak havoc on Syria’s limited infrastructure and obsolete
conventional forces, the destruction of which would leave the ruling
regime wobbly.
Rather than procure their own nuclear weapons capabilities,
the smaller Gulf Arab States might seek to use a set of overlapping
security arrangements to acquire a rough, if minimal measure, of
deterrence against the Iranian nuclear weapons threat. Iranian
nuclear weapons could act as a further catalyst for Arab Gulf States
to nurture their security relationships with the United States. Kuwait,
Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar might increase the already substantial
security links that have bloomed with the United States since the
1991 Gulf war. These states see security ties with the United States
as critical to ensure their autonomies from the major regional states
of Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. If they were to become wedged
between nuclear powers in Iran―and subsequently in Iraq and Saudi
Arabia―the small Arab Gulf states might try to get themselves more
closely tied with American conventional deterrence as well as under
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a potential American nuclear umbrella. The small Arab Gulf states,
moreover, would need to hedge their bets and simultaneously work
to nurture ties with Saudi Arabia and Iraq to counterbalance Iranian
aspirations for dominance in the Gulf.
The small Arab Gulf states will be looking to secure a protective
coverage of American nuclear deterrence. They will seek to leverage
their hosting and support of American conventional forces in the
region for American security guarantees that an American nuclear
forces deterrent will be leveraged against Iranian nuclear capabilities.
Gulf States might ask the United States for a contemporary rendition
of the “Carter Doctrine,” in which the United States made a veiled
threat to respond with nuclear weapons in the event that the Soviet
Union made a military bid for warm water Gulf ports. President
Carter announced in January 1980, in response to the Soviet Union’s
invasion of Afghanistan and closer proximity to the Persian Gulf,
that “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of
the United States of America; any such an assault will be repelled
by any means necessary, including military force.”29 Although the
United States might opt to couch a policy that applies to the whole
region―as the Carter Doctrine had―the Arab Gulf states are unlikely
to be able to coordinate among themselves a coordinated pitch to the
United States. The United States, though, would be well-advised to
steer clear of a renewed Carter Doctrine that imprudently relies on
nuclear weapons. The Carter Doctrine made strong strategic sense,
but because the United States at the time lacked the conventional
force projection capabilities to make good the threat against Soviet
forces, the doctrine amounted to a veiled American threat to resort
to nuclear weapons.
The United States would be better off offering ballistic missile
defense coverage than a new grand doctrine with veiled threats of
American nuclear retaliation for military disruptions to the Gulf
balance of power. The Gulf States with the experience of the 1991
and 2003 Gulf Wars have grown accustomed to beneﬁting from the
provision of American ballistic missile defense coverage. And Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons undoubtedly will increase the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ sense of vulnerability because
one nuclear tipped Iranian missile could decimate the government,
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ruling families, and societies of the smaller GCC states that, in some
respects, have more in common with ancient city-states than modern
nation-states. The United States might look to the GCC states for
ﬁnancial assistance to offset the research, development, procurement,
and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems in the region,
whether land- or sea-based. While sea- and land-based American
ballistic missile defense systems are unable to provide strategic
defense protection of the United States with its large landmass, they
are capable of providing strategic protection to small states such as
Qatar and Bahrain.
The Arab Gulf states and the United States would have advantages
in drawing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into
the Gulf to shore-up deterrence against a nuclear-ready Iran. From
the Gulf state perspective, encouraging greater European security
involvement in the Gulf via NATO is a potential means to hold in check
what they perceive as assertive “unilateral” American diplomacy
and statecraft vis-à-vis Iran. From the American perspective, NATO
involvement potentially would give U.S. endeavors aimed at
countering Iran at least a cloak of multilateral legitimacy. NATO’s
European members, moreover, have recently shown more interest
in Alliance involvement in the greater Middle East―particularly in
Afghanistan―in no small measure to help repair the damage done
to the trans-Atlantic relationship due to bitter French and German
opposition to the war in Iraq. Washington should parlay European
interest in repairing security ties to the United States to move NATO’s
traditional focus on continental Europe to the greater Middle East,
with a concentrated focus on dealing with a nuclear-ready Iran.
NATO involvement should complement rather than replace the
U.S. role as the premier security broker in the Persian Gulf. Despite
a recent upswing in European interest in the Gulf, the worldviews of
European capitals remain focused on security issues in and around
Europe. The Europeans are all too willing to let political and military
problems in the Middle East fester, to step aside and let the Americans
carry the lion’s share of the region’s political-military burdens, and
to eagerly criticize American policy for failing to deliver a “perpetual
peace” to the troubled region. While NATO’s European members
devote considerable attention to political pomp and circumstance,
their military capabilities are seriously eroding, leaving them with
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little to no means to project military power into the Gulf.30 The Gulf
States understand that NATO can help politically contain American
power, but, if push comes to shove in a future military contingency
in the Gulf, only the Americans have the military power needed to
act.
The United States today―unlike its European allies―does not lack
the conventional means to project power in the Gulf as demonstrated
in the wars of 1991 and 2003 against Iraq. And the United States
would be wise strategically to tap that reputation for power to
reassure partners in the region―in order to dampen incentives
for exploring the nuclear weapons option―with ballistic missile
defenses and conventional military means. The United States, with
its preponderance of conventional forces, could threaten to remove
the regime in Iran should nuclear weapons be used against American
forces and regional partners. The reliance on conventional deterrence
will underscore internationally the lack of usability of nuclear
weapons, a mindset that, in turn, would dampen regional interest
and prestige linked to nuclear weapons acquisition. Conversely, the
American threat of nuclear weapons response in kind would heighten
the importance and prestige of nuclear weapons and contribute
to incentive for nuclear weapons proliferation. In the event that
nuclear deterrence fails, the United States would have to make good
on its nuclear threat and retaliate with nuclear weapons to cause
most likely the end of the regime in Tehran, but at the unacceptable
moral cost of thousands to millions of innocent Iranian civilian lives.
Massive and tightly targeted conventional force retaliation offers a
profoundly more moral and strategically effective deterrent because
the threat is more credible than nuclear weapons response in light of
the American restraint in inﬂicting civilian casualties in numerous
conﬂicts since the end of the Cold War.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND AMBITIONS
OF IRAN’S NEIGHBORS
Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd
INTRODUCTION
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been suspected of pursuing
nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s. Over the past 2 years, these
suspicions have intensiﬁed due to revelations about Tehran’s past
failures to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of
signiﬁcant nuclear activities and facilities. The most serious failures
have involved neglecting to declare extensive work on uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation―the two routes to producing
weapons-grade material for nuclear weapons.
Iran’s failure to live up to the both the letter and spirit of its
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA has prompted a serious
deterioration in assessments of when Tehran could acquire nuclear
weapons. It has been suggested that the time frame for Iran “going
nuclear” could now be as early as 2005-07.1 Such assessments have
not gone unnoticed in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, and concern
is growing about the potential response of some of its neighbors, in
particular whether Tehran’s behavior could prompt other regional
actors to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Four countries, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria, stand out in this respect due to their
relative proximity to Iran and because there are suspicions that they
have all, at one time or another, been interested in acquiring nuclear
weapons. Although beyond the scope of this chapter, it is recognized
that if one or more of these countries acquired, or came close to
acquiring, a nuclear weapons capability, then this would inﬂuence
nuclear deliberations in other countries, both within and beyond the
Middle East and North Africa. If Egypt went nuclear, for example,
this probably would inﬂuence nuclear decisionmaking in Algeria.
Moreover, although the chapter does not examine the current case of
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Iraq in relation to Iran, it is recognized that, in the long-term, a postSaddam government could feel sufﬁciently vulnerable to consider
acquiring nuclear weapons to counteract a future nuclear-armed
Tehran.
Drawing purely on open sources, this chapter seeks to cast some
light on the nuclear capabilities and ambitions of Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. In addition to generally available sources,
the authors utilize original Arabic and Turkish language sources and
information derived from various scientiﬁc and technical journals/
proceedings. For each country, an assessment is made of current
nuclear capabilities, including various elements of the fuel cycle that
could potentially be used to support the development of nuclear
weapons. Attention is also given to the drivers of potential nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in the
countries concerned, and potential nuclear delivery systems.
An analysis of available open sources revealed relatively little
about national intentions regarding the acquisition of nuclear
weapons―both in general terms and, more speciﬁcally, in response
to the current Iranian nuclear crisis. The lack of pertinent information
in this respect appears to stem primarily from the political sensitivity
of the issue and the relatively closed and nontransparent nature of
the societies involved, with the exception of Turkey. In contrast, it
did prove possible to develop a fairly detailed picture of the various
elements of the fuel cycle currently in existence or being developed in
the four countries, as well as their potential nuclear delivery options.
Although it is assessed that each country currently lacks the technical
capacity to build a nuclear weapon, it is essential to note that open
sources rarely will provide the complete picture. This is particularly
the case with regard to the most sensitive aspects of nuclear weapons
development―uranium enrichment, plutonium separation, and
weaponization―which are subject to the greatest secrecy. Moreover,
revelations throughout 2004 about the role of Pakistani scientist A. Q.
Khan in illicitly supplying nuclear technology to Libya and Iran, raise
the concern that other countries also may have beneﬁted from this
clandestine proliferation network. For example, Libya’s acquisition
of technology and assistance via the network prior to December 2003
had enabled Pakistan to begin to initiate a step change in its nuclear
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weapon program. Moreover, Khan is known to have made business
trips to numerous other countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria, although it is not known what the Pakistani scientist actually
did on these visits.2
SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia does not possess a nuclear weapons capability and,
based on an assessment of available open sources, the Kingdom
does not appear to possess the necessary technical infrastructure
to develop one indigenously, bar signiﬁcant infusions of external
assistance. However, there are some suspicions that Saudi Arabia
has considered the nuclear option and even sought to purchase
nuclear weapons from abroad, notably from Pakistan. This despite
the country’s non-nuclear weapon status and commitments under
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which Riyadh signed in 1988.3
However, the Kingdom has yet to conclude a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.4
Beyond the nuclear realm, there is “no conﬁrmed evidence”
that Saudi Arabia has a chemical or biological weapons program.5
Indeed, the Kingdom long has denied any intention to acquire WMD
of any type and, similar to Egypt, has called for an agreement to
make the Middle East a WMD-free zone.6 In Autumn 2002 Prince
Naef bin Ahmed Al-Saud, a colonel in the Saudi Armed Forces with
responsibilities for strategic planning, noted that “Proliferation must
be seen in terms of regional realities: the Israeli monopoly in nuclear
weaponry, deﬁance by Pakistan and India of nonproliferation
regimes, and reported efforts by both Iraq and Iran to develop
nuclear capabilities.”7 At least one Saudi newspaper has expressed
concern about Iran’s nuclear intentions by noting that, “the danger
will include countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.”8
Speculation about the Kingdom’s potential interest in acquiring
nuclear weapons goes back to the 1980s. Saudi Arabia originally
signed the NPT in 1988 to address concerns that it wanted to arm
its newly acquired DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBM) with nuclear warheads. The missiles had been acquired
from China at some point between 1986 and 1988. The transfer
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was signiﬁcant because it provided the Kingdom with the longestrange ballistic missiles (2,700-2,800km) outside the Permanent Five
members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Indeed, the
DF-3 gave Saudi Arabia the capability to strike targets throughout and
beyond the Middle East. Moreover, the missiles had been withdrawn
from Chinese service as nuclear delivery systems, although they
reportedly were modiﬁed prior to shipment as non-nuclear capable
systems.9 Despite suspicions that Saudi Arabia planned to arm the
missiles with unconventional warheads, Riyadh claimed it had no
intention to do so.
In early September 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
said that “there might be Saudi money involved” in Libya’s nuclear
weapons program, but this had not been conﬁrmed.10 There has
been much greater speculation about a potential nuclear link with
Pakistan. Since the 1980s, there have been suspicions that Saudi
Arabia has paid, or wanted to pay, Pakistan to conduct research
and development of nuclear weapons. These suspicions have been
based in part on the history of defence cooperation between the
two countries including, for example, the training of Saudi pilots
and naval collaboration. In recent years, suspicions have been fed
by several visits to Pakistan by Saudi ofﬁcials. In 1999, a team of
defence ofﬁcials visited Pakistan’s enrichment and missile assembly
facilities at Kahuta where they were briefed by A. Q. Khan, the
father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.11 In 2002, the son
of Crown Prince Abdullah was reportedly an invited guest at the test
ﬁring of Pakistan’s 950-mile range Ghauri nuclear-capable missile.12
More recently in October 2003, it was alleged that Abdullah visited
Pakistan and concluded a secret agreement on “nuclear cooperation”
to cover nuclear technology in return for cheap oil. However, Saudi
Arabia has denied this allegation.13 Recent revelations about the
role of Khan in proliferating nuclear technology to several states
of concern has further fueled suspicion about the Saudi-Pakistan
nuclear connection.14 Indeed, Khan has travelled to Saudi Arabia in
the past, although it is not known what he actually did during his
time in the Kingdom.15
Prince Naef argued in 2002 that, “Saudi Arabia does not accept
the notion that a Pakistani bomb is an Islamic bomb. Instead, national
interest is regarded as the most likely factor affecting how nuclear
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capabilities will be used. Nevertheless, regional competition increases
concern among Saudis over the spread of WMD and ballistic missiles.
Moreover, despite the lack of evidence that Riyadh may be pursuing
a nuclear option, some speculate on the possibility.”16 Indeed, it
was reported in September 2003 that Saudi Arabia was conducting
a strategic review including deliberations related to the potential
acquisition of nuclear weapons. The review appears to be the result of
a growing perception of strategic vulnerability prompted by several
interrelated factors, including: the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program
and intentions, the lack of international pressure to address Israel’s
nuclear arsenal, general regional instability in the Middle East, and
the deterioration of relations with the United States since September
11, 2001 (9/11), including concerns about the reliability of U.S.
security guarantees and the American nuclear umbrella. Although
it is not known whether a decision has yet been made, the strategic
review reportedly is considering three potential options on the
nuclear front: (1) acquiring nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes;
(2) maintaining an alliance or entering into a new alliance with an
existing nuclear weapon power; and (3) seeking an agreement for a
Middle East free of nuclear weapons.17
Nuclear Capabilities.
The national nuclear authority in Saudi Arabia is the King
Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) in Riyadh.18
KACST describes itself as “an independent scientiﬁc organization
of the Saudi Arabia Government”19 which provides “scientiﬁc and
technological advice” and conducts “applied research programs
and joint research activities with other international scientiﬁc
institutions.” KACST assists the private sector in applied research
for promoting agricultural and industrial development and funds
research projects in universities such as studies of alternative energy
resources and sewage water treatment.20
The Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) was established
within KACST in 1988 with the aim of adapting the nuclear sciences
and technologies and utilizing them “in support of the economic,
industrial and agricultural plans of the Kingdom.” The objectives of
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AERI include drafting a national atomic energy plan and supervising
its implementation; conducting research in the ﬁeld of nuclear
technologies; identifying manpower requirements in the area of
atomic energy research; and training and developing manpower
in the area of atomic energy research.”21 To do this, the institute
has several departments: a Radiation Protection Department;
an Industrial Applications Department; a Nuclear Reactors and
Safety Department; and a Materials Department.22 The institute
has programs that focus on industrial applications of radiation and
radioactive isotopes, nuclear power and reactors, nuclear materials,
and radiation protection.
A review of available open sources generated the following
observations related to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear capabilities.
Uranium Resources. The U.S. Geological Survey makes no reference
to uranium resources in its 2001 report on Saudi Arabia’s mineral
sector.23 However, it is evident that the Kingdom has conducted
research into uranium prospecting, mining, and milling. In 1986, the
IAEA approved a technical cooperation agreement with KACST and
the Nuclear Engineering Department of King Abdul Aziz University
to provide “training for the application of neutron capture techniques
in in-situ mineral exploration.” The agreement covered prospecting,
mining and analyzing raw nuclear materials.24
Saudi Arabia does not appear to be involved in the recovery of
uranium from phosphate rock. However, relevant research has been
conducted in this area in the past. In 1987, for example, an academic
currently at King Abdul Aziz University wrote a Ph.D. thesis on
“The Separation and Determination of Rare Earths in Phosphate
Deposits from the North of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”25 Saudi
Arabia’s phosphate mines are operated by the Ma’aden mining
company,26 which was founded in 1997 to become the focal point of
the country’s minerals sector. Ma’aden operates mines at Al Hajar,
Al Sukhaybarat, and Bulgah which produce gold and silver. A
mine at Mahad Ad Dabab produces copper, gold, and silver; and a
mine at Al Amar produces copper, zinc, and gold. The company is
carrying out exploration programs in the Al-Jalamid and Umm Wual areas.27
Nuclear Power. Saudi Arabia does not possess a nuclear power
reactor. However, the Kingdom has certainly demonstrated an
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interest in nuclear power since at least the late 1970s. The IAEA
approved a technical cooperation project in 1978 on nuclear energy
planning with the Atomic Energy Department, Ministry of Petroleum
and Mineral Resources, in Saudi Arabia. The aim was to establish
“training and research institutions with regard to the introduction
of nuclear power in the country.”28 It is evident that the Kingdom’s
interest in nuclear power has focused, at least partially, on its potential
application in the desalination of seawater.29 Indeed, researchers
from AERI and the Nuclear Engineering Department of King Abdul
Aziz University recently conducted research into the role of nuclear
desalination in Saudi Arabia.30 In 2001, the IAEA approved a technical
cooperation agreement with AERI on transferring and enhancing
national capabilities and skills “in modern forecasting techniques for
the development and regular updating of future energy demands
and optimal expansion plans for the power sector.”31
Reprocessing, Spent Fuel and Waste Storage. Although Saudi Arabia
does not appear to possess a reprocessing capability, the AERI has
four laboratories of potential relevance in this ﬁeld. These include
laboratories for physical separation, chemical separation, radio
chemistry, and radioactive isotopes and chemical separation.32
Saudi Arabia does not have a spent fuel and waste storage
capability. However, AERI is responsible for controlling radioactive
waste disposal “in all installations that use radioactive material”
and is reported to be preparing national regulations for radioactive
waste disposal.33 In 1995, the IAEA approved a technical cooperation
agreement with AERI to establish a “comprehensive radioactive
waste management program covering regulations, storage, and
treatment.” The agreement covered safety issues and technologies
related to radioactive waste management.34
Research Reactor. Saudi Arabia does not have a research reactor.
However, it should be noted that the IAEA has provided extensive
assistance to develop nuclear research and applications in the
Kingdom.35 According to one source, Saudi Arabia opened a nuclear
research centre in a desert military complex at Al-Suleiyel, near AlKharj in 1975.36
Delivery Capabilities. Saudi Arabia’s potential nuclear delivery
capabilities include both ballistic missiles and aircraft. Saudi Arabia
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possesses 40-60 DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBMs, which can carry payloads of
up to 2,500kg. The DF-3 is a single stage missile with a circular error
probable of 1km. The missiles are reportedly deployed at two sites
located 500km (al-Sulaiyil) and 100km (al-Joffer) south of Riyadh.37
The missiles had been withdrawn from Chinese service as nuclear
delivery systems, although they reportedly were modiﬁed prior to
shipment as non-nuclear capable systems.38 Their current status is
unknown. According to one recent report, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
“have arranged a deal by which Pakistan will provide Saudi Arabia
with nuclear technology in return for cheap oil,” and the Kingdom
will also acquire a new generation of Chinese-supplied long-range
missiles with a range of 4,000-5,000km.39 In terms of ﬁghter and
ground attack aircraft, Saudi Arabia is reported to possess 50 F-15s
(with 75 on order), 91 F-15C/D Eagles, 24 Tornado ADVs (F Mk3), 92
Tornado IDs, approximately 64 F-5E/Fs and 10 RF-5Es.40
EGYPT
Egypt acceded to the NPT in 1981 and its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered into force in 1982 (INFCIRC 302).41
However, the country has been critical of the nuclear nonproliferation regime primarily because of Israel’s possession of
nuclear weapons. In a debate at the UN General Assembly in
late September 2003, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher
said, “It is unacceptable that Israel’s possession of such weapons
should remain a reality that some prefer to ignore or prevent the
international community . . . from facing it squarely and frankly.”42
According to the Wisconsin Project, Egypt strongly opposed efforts
to extend the NPT indeﬁnitely in 1995. 43 Despite this lack of faith
in the nonproliferation regime, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
frequently has proposed the creation of a WMD-free zone in the
Middle East as a way to address the nuclear threat posed by Israel
and the wider challenge of proliferation.44
Throughout 2003-04, it appears that Egypt has, in its public
statements, continued to be much more concerned about Israel’s
nuclear arsenal than Iran’s recent nuclear activities. As the Egyptian
Foreign Minister said after John Bolton visited Egypt in June
2003, “Talks with the American ofﬁcial dwelt on Israel’s nuclear
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arms.”45 Moreover, Egyptian-Iranian relations appeared to improve
signiﬁcantly in late 2003 when negotiations were initiated over the
resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.46
In 2004 and early 2005, several media reports claimed that
Egypt has been working on a clandestine nuclear program. These
have included a few reports about potential “Egyptian links” to
Libya’s nuclear program in the past. One report even referred to
“evidence uncovered by a British-U.S. team of nuclear inspectors”
working in Libya which conﬁrmed “an exchange of nuclear and
missile technology between Libya and Egypt in late 2003.”47 Ofﬁcials
reportedly stated that the evidence conﬁrmed suspicions of a 3-yearlong secret trade between Cairo and Tripoli in strategic weapons
obtained from North Korea.48 Egyptian links with Libya in the
nuclear ﬁeld are believed to go back to the early 1970s. According to
Shyam Bhatia writing in 1988, a link developed between Libya and
high calibre Egyptian nuclear scientists in the early 1970s. This link
reportedly resulted in the transfer of manpower and ideas to Libya.
Bhatia wrote that Egypt explored the possibility of using Libyan
money to keep up the momentum of research and development
at Egypt’s nuclear center at Inshas and other locations, and both
Qadhaﬁ and Nasser reportedly gave this project their personal
backing. However, Libyan-Egyptian cooperation was short-lived
because relations between the two countries deteriorated in the
mid-1970s when it emerged that Libya had backed a plot against
Egyptian President Sadat.49 Relations between the two countries
later had recovered sufﬁciently to enable joint research in nuclearrelated ﬁelds including personnel exchanges.50
In addition to the alleged link with Libya, it was reported in
November 2004 that the IAEA was looking into why plutonium
particles had been discovered near a nuclear facility in Egypt.51
This was followed in January 2005 by a report that, according
to diplomats, the IAEA “has found evidence of secret nuclear
experiments in Egypt that could be used in weapons programs.”52
A report by the IAEA Director General to the Agency’s Board of
Governors dated February 16, 2005, and leaked into the public domain
shortly thereafter, subsequently conﬁrmed that Egypt, indeed, had
possessed undeclared materials and conducted undeclared activities
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at its Inshas Nuclear Centre near Cairo. The materials and activities
related to uranium extraction and conversion, the irradiation of
uranium targets, and reprocessing. The key ﬁndings of these IAEA
investigations related to Egypt are included in the sections below.
Nuclear Capabilities.
The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) is at the center of
the country’s civilian nuclear program and the main AEA nuclear
research center is located at Inshas near Cairo. Egypt has conducted
a considerable amount of nuclear relevant research. A review of
available open sources generated the following observations related
to Egypt’s nuclear capabilities.
Uranium Resources. The AEA Nuclear Materials Authority has
undertaken various technical co-operation projects with the IAEA
on uranium exploration since 1989.53 However, Egypt appears to
have placed an emphasis on extracting uranium from phosphates as
opposed to mining uranium itself. For example, IAEA investigations
in 2004 revealed that Egypt’s Nuclear Materials Authority (NMA)
had conducted a project to separate uranium at a Phosphoric Acid
Puriﬁcation Plant at Inshas, although “it was never able to work as
designed for the separation of uranium.” It was also discovered that
the NMA currently has “a program for heap leaching of uranium
ore in the Sinai and Eastern deserts.” The Egyptian authorities have
claimed that “none of the uranium ore concentrate produced as a
result of its leaching activities has been of a purity and composition
that required it to be reported” to the IAEA.54 In 1990, the AEA began
a technical cooperation program with the IAEA titled, “Potential for
yellowcake production.” The objective was to provide expert services
to undertake a prefeasibility study to assess the potential of two sites
for a pilot plant.55
Conversion, Enrichment, and Fuel Fabrication. The IAEA noted
in February 2005 that investigations in 2004-05 had revealed that,
prior to Egypt’s Safeguards Agreement taking force in 1982, it
imported nuclear material and conducted uranium conversion
activities, using some of this material at Laboratories in the
Nuclear Chemistry Building at Inshas.56 According to the Egyptian
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authorities, the experiments were designed within the “framework
of staff development for the front end of the fuel cycle.” Initial IAEA
investigations have discovered that Egypt failed to include in its ﬁrst
report to the Agency in 1982 “approximately 67 kg of imported UF4,
3 kg of uranium metal (some of which had been imported, and some
of which had been produced from imported UF4), approximately
9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, and small amounts of
domestically produced UO2, UO3 and UF4.”57
In January 2005 it had been reported that, according to diplomats,
the IAEA “has found evidence of secret nuclear experiments in Egypt”
involving the production of “various components of uranium.” The
Egyptians reportedly have produced “several kilograms of uranium
metal and of uranium tetraﬂuoride―a precursor to uranium
hexaﬂuoride gas.” According to the diplomats, the work appears
“to have been sporadic, involved small amounts of material, and to
have lacked a particular focus,” indicating that it was “laboratory
scale” and “not directly geared toward creating a full-scale program
to make nuclear weapons.”58 The experiments reportedly were
conducted mainly during the 1980s and 1990s, but there may also be
evidence suggesting that some experiments “were as recent as a year
ago.”
Egypt does not appear to have an established enrichment program
but research has been performed on relevant processes. For example,
scientists at Cairo University have researched the chemical exchange
process as a method of uranium isotope enrichment.59 Moreover,
research has been conducted at the University of Alexandria on
multicomponent isotope separation in asymmetric cascades, which
could potentially be used in uranium enrichment using aerodynamic
methods.60
The AEA has a Fuel Manufacturing Plant to produce the nuclear
fuel necessary for the operation of the Agency’s multipurpose reactor.
According to the AEA: “The starting material is uranium hexaﬂuoride
(UF6) gas, 19.75 percent enrichment. This is converted into U3O8
through treatment with ammonia and water in special chemical
reactors. This is followed by ﬁltration and thermal treatment to get
the appropriate particle size of U3O8. The oxide powder is mixed
with aluminium powder and cold-pressed under 4.5 tons/cm2 into
compacts, which are then cladded with sheets of aluminium 6061
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alloy, and sealed by welding all around.”61 The plant can produce
two fuel elements per month, which is sufﬁcient for the continuous
operation of the reactor. According to the Wisconsin project, Egypt
had plans to build a larger fuel fabrication plant in the mid 1990s
with help from Germany.62 However, these plans do not yet appear
to have come to fruition.
Nuclear Power. Egypt does not have any nuclear power reactors.
The Egyptian government has shown interest in starting a civilian
nuclear power program since the 1960s. The Federation of American
Scientists states that in the mid-1970s, the United States pledged to
provide Egypt with eight nuclear power plants, and the necessary
cooperation agreements were signed. This project was cancelled in
the late 1970s after the United States unilaterally revised the bilateral
agreements and introduced new conditions that were unacceptable
to the Egyptian government.63
Interest in nuclear power reactors has continued, and Egypt has
carried out several relevant research programs. In 2001, the AEA
began a technical cooperation project with the IAEA entitled, “Human
Resource Development for Nuclear Power Project Preparation
and Project Management.” The project’s objective was to “transfer
knowledge, information, and experience related to the development
of human resources for planning and implementing a nuclear power
project for electricity generation and/or desalination.”64 It was
reported in September 2002 that an Egyptian government minister
had announced the country’s intent to build a nuclear power plant
on the north coast of Egypt, although no details of the plan were
available.65 Indeed, initial negotiations reportedly were underway in
2001 with Russia, after Egypt requested information about Russia’s
atomic energy industry. According to General Director of Russia’s
Atomenergostroi Viktor Kozlov, contracts may be signed as early as
2006.66 Although new plans have not yet been announced, the media
reported that Egypt has held negotiations with both China and
Russia over the construction of nuclear power plants.67 However, it
was reported later in 2004 that the likely site for a nuclear power
plant, Dabba, was about to be turned into a tourist resort.68
Reprocessing, Spent Fuel, and Waste Storage. It has emerged as a
result of recent IAEA investigations that in the late 1970s, Egypt
concluded a number of contracts with a foreign company to construct
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a laboratory (the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant) for conducting
“‘bench scale radiochemistry experiments’ involving the separation
of plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel elements of the 2 MW
research reactor.” According to Egyptian authorities, the experiments
were motivated by plans to construct eight nuclear power plants and
to develop expertise in the nuclear fuel cycle.69
In 1987, Egypt subsequently performed “acceptance tests
using unirradiated uranyl nitrate in chemical reagents” at the
Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant. The uranyl nitrate had been blended
with a solution acquired from the dissolution of domestically
produced scrap UO2 pellets (estimated total weight of 1.9 kg of
uranium compounds). However, Egypt failed to report to the IAEA
both the materials and their use in test.70
The reason offered by Egypt for not including the Hydrometallurgy
Pilot Plant in its initial declaration to the IAEA in 1982 is that it “had
not considered it to be a facility since it was being constructed only
to carry out bench scale radiochemistry experiments.” The IAEA
believes the plant constituted a nuclear facility, given its intended
purpose and design capabilities, and Egypt should have informed
the Agency “as early as possible prior to the introduction of nuclear
material into the facility.” 71
Further undeclared activities took place between 1990 and 2003.
Egypt informed the IAEA in December 2004 that, between 1990 and
2003, 16 experiments had been performed, “involving the irradiation
of small amounts of natural uranium in its reactors to test the
production of ﬁssion product isotopes for medical purposes.” Twelve
experiments involving a total of 1.15g of natural uranium compounds
took place at the 2MW research reactor between 1990 and 2003. Four
experiments involving 0.24g of natural uranium compounds took
place at the 22MW reactor between 1999 and 2000. Nine thorium
samples also were irradiated in the 2MW reactor. Moreover, the
irradiated targets “had been dissolved in three laboratories located
in the Nuclear Chemistry Building” although Egypt claims that
“no plutonium or U-233 was separated during these experiments.”
According to the Egyptian authorities, similar experiments were
performed before its Safeguards Agreement took force, and between
1982 and 1988, but that it has been unable thus far to locate relevant
source documentation with respect to such experiments.” 72
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Egypt also informed the IAEA in December 2004 that it had not
included in its initial Safeguards report imported “unirradiated fuel
rods containing uranium enriched to 10% U-235 and some of which
had been used in experiments” at the Nuclear Chemistry Building
prior to its Safeguards Agreement taking force. The experiments
were reported to have involved “laboratory scale testing of fuel
dissolution in anticipation of the development of a reprocessing
laboratory.”73
Egypt currently is constructing a new Radioisotope Production
Facility at Inshas for the separation of radioisotopes from uranium
enriched to 19.7 percent in U-235 to be irradiated at the 22MW
reactor. However, the Egyptian authorities have informed the IAEA
that no nuclear relevant equipment yet has been acquired for the
facility. According to the IAEA, the decision to construct the facility
should have been conveyed to Vienna “no later than 1997 when it
undertook to provide early design information for new facilities.”74
Research Reactors. Egypt commissioned its ﬁrst research reactor,
the 2MW Soviet-supplied ET-RR-1 in 1961.75 A second, the 22MW
open pool Multi-Purpose Reactor (MPR), was commissioned in 1997.
The MPR, supplied by the Argentine company, INVAP, is designed
to produce radioisotopes for industrial and medical applications, as
well as research on neutron physics and training personnel.76 Both
reactors are located at Inshas and are under IAEA safeguards.
It is reasonable to assume that, based on standard operating
levels, the MPR will produce about 22g of plutonium per day of
operation. Assuming that the MPR runs for 300 days a year (if in
heavy service), it would produce 6.6kg of plutonium per year. The
Fatman nuclear bomb used by the United States in 1945 used 6.5kg
of plutonium.77
Delivery Capabilities.
Egypt’s potential nuclear delivery capabilities include both
ballistic missiles and aircraft. Egypt has a range of ballistic missiles
both in its inventory and under development. Egypt is reported to
have nine SCUD-B launchers78 and slightly over 100 SCUD-B missiles.
The inventory also reportedly includes approximately 90 Project
T missiles, with a range of 450km and a payload of 985kg.79 Other
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ballistic missiles apparently are being developed. There are reports
that Egypt has developed an enhanced SCUD-C missile, with a range
of 550km and a 500kg payload. Furthermore, Egypt reportedly signed
an agreement with North Korea in 2001 to purchase the 1000kmrange Nodong system. 80 These reports have not been conﬁrmed. It
is also reported that Egypt is developing the Vector missile with a
range of 800-1,200km and a 450-1,000kg payload.81 In March 2004, it
was reported that evidence was uncovered by a British-U.S. team of
nuclear inspectors working in Libya that, “an exchange of nuclear
and missile technology between Libya and Egypt” took place “in late
2003.”82 Egypt possesses seven squadrons of ﬁghter-ground attack
aircraft (including Mirage 5E2) and 22 squadrons of ﬁghter aircraft
(including F-16A and D, Mirage 2000C and 5D/E, and MiG-21).83 It
would appear that the range of combat aircraft available to Egypt
would provide Cairo with a theoretical capability to deliver nuclear
weapons.
TURKEY
Turkey’s ratiﬁcation of numerous nonproliferation agreements
commits the country to the application of nuclear technology for
purely peaceful purposes. These commitments include the NPT,
IAEA Safeguards (including the Additional Protocol) and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).84 Although the country
does not possess a nuclear power reactor, the Turkish Atomic Energy
Authority (TAEK) conducts a considerable amount of research in the
nuclear ﬁeld and operates one research reactor.85
In the recent past, Turkey has shown considerable interest
in establishing a civil nuclear power sector to alleviate energy
shortfalls. The country is a net energy importer because it is not
rich in energy resources. For example, Turkey imported 62 percent
of its energy requirements in 2001. Turkish government ofﬁcials
believe this ﬁgure will increase by about 8-10 percent annually up to
2010, which will necessitate an installed power production capacity
of approximately 46GW.86 In 2002 and 2003 there were calls from
national newspapers,87 and even the head of the TAEK,88 for Turkey
to initiate a nuclear power program in order to reduce energy
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imports. The Turkish government demonstrated a renewed interest
in nuclear power in 2004. In November 2004, Turkish Minister of
Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi Guler said Turkey should be
producing 4,500MW of nuclear power beginning in 201289 with three
nuclear power plants.90
There is no evidence in available open sources that suggests
Turkey has a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, given the openness
of Turkey’s nuclear research program, small uranium reserves,
and lack of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it is difﬁcult
to believe that Ankara could develop a weapons program in the
near future. Although some allegations have been made about the
potential proliferation threat posed by Turkey, it is important to note
that most have been voiced by Greek ofﬁcials and focused on alleged
nuclear cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan. For example,
following a military coup in Turkey in September 1980, military
leaders of Turkey and Pakistan reportedly exchanged a series of
ofﬁcial visits, which prompted Greek Prime Minister Papandreou
to accuse Pakistan of expecting Turkey “to act as a trans-shipper of
material for a nuclear bomb” and likely to “reciprocate by proudly
sharing the nuclear bomb technology with Turkey.”91 Moreover,
following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests an article in the
Turkish daily “Radical” reported that then Pakistan Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif offered Turkey cooperation on nuclear weapons by
stating, “Let’s work together on nuclear weapons.”92
Ankara certainly has reacted with concern to Iran’s recent
activities in the nuclear ﬁeld. Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul noted
in November 2003 that Iran’s efforts to export its own revolution,
its contradictory attitude towards terrorism, and its policies towards
Armenia and Azerbaijan are not in line with Turkey’s interests, and
make it difﬁcult for Ankara to develop bilateral relations with Tehran.
Moreover, he noted that Iran might be working on the production of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, which would threaten
the whole region.93 As Larabee and lesser note, a nuclear-armed Iran
“could dramatically change the security equation for Turkey and
could have broader consequences for military balances elsewhere
on Turkey’s borders.”94 However, it was reported on November
19, 2004, that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul had told
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journalists in Ankara that Turkey wanted the Middle East to be a
region free of nuclear weapons. With regard to American concerns
over Iran’s nuclear activities, Gul said he expected caution on both
sides, adding that Iran had a “long-standing place in the region. It
would probably be very cautious. So we expect the problem to be
resolved eventually.”95 It would appear, then, that there may be a
substantial difference of opinion between the Foreign and Defence
ministries in Turkey in terms of threat perceptions related to Iran.
Although Turkish and Israeli military and civilian ofﬁcials
appear to have discussed “joint threats” as part of their strategic
cooperation,96 it is not known to what extent Iran and its nuclear
ambitions have featured in their discussions.
Nuclear Capabilities.
It appears that almost all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle have
been examined in Turkey except uranium enrichment. The Çekmece
Nuclear Research and Training Centre is in charge of these activities,
which are conducted by a network of nuclear-related research centers
and laboratories based at government facilities and universities.
Uranium Resources. It was reported in November 2004 that Hilmi
Guler had said that Turkey has 230,000 tons of thorium reserves and
9,200 tons of uranium reserves. Moreover, Guler noted that, while
current technology in Turkey was more suited to uranium, thorium
would be considered in the future.97 Indeed, preliminary work has
been conducted to survey, analyze, and determine the feasibility of
using the country’s natural thorium resources to fuel a future nuclear
power industry in Turkey. Moreover, TAEK initiated a feasibility
study on uranium extraction from phosphoric acid in the early 1980s,
with assistance from the IAEA. According to the IAEA database on
technical cooperation, this work is still active and may not yet be
complete.98 TAEK is working with ETI Holding and the Directorate
General of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA) on rare soil
elements and the development of thorium extraction/puriﬁcation
technology.99
Conversion, Enrichment, and Fuel Fabrication. Turkey appears to
have one facility capable of engaging in conversion activities, a fuel
pilot plant at the Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre.
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The extent of the facility’s work remains unclear.100 Moreover,
while Turkey does not appear to have any enrichment capabilities,
some potentially relevant research has been conducted at Turkish
universities.101
Turkey has experimented with nuclear fuel fabrication on a
laboratory scale. Relevant experiments have been conducted at several
universities in Turkey, with research undertaken to understand the
properties of nuclear fuel and the process of fuel fabrication. Dr.
Gungor Gunduz, Department of Chemical Engineering, Middle East
Technical University (METU), has participated in numerous projects
with the TAEK and supervised student projects in this ﬁeld.102
Fuel fabrication experiments and uranium analysis studies have
also been conducted in the Department of Chemistry, Cumhuriyet
University.
Nuclear Power. Although Turkey does not have a nuclear power
plant, the country has shown an interest in nuclear power ever since
U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in
December 1953. However, it was not until the mid-1990s that Turkey
made its most deﬁnite attempt to initiate a civil nuclear power program.
In 1996, following additional feasibility and exploration work
conducted by the Korean Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI), Turkey
invited bids to construct a nuclear power plant at Akkuyu. By the
end of 1997, three competing vendors were negotiating with Turkey
for the deal: AECL (Canada), Nuclear Power International (NPI)―
which included Germany’s Siemens and France’s Framatome―and
the U.S. Westinghouse Electric Co. However, Turkish Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit announced in July 2000 that the Akkuyu project had
been cancelled, blaming it on the International Monetary Fund’s
demands on Turkey with regard to its domestic economic policies.
The country’s nuclear power program was shelved indeﬁnitely, and
TAEK recommended Turkey’s concentration on the development of
natural gas and hydroelectric options until at least 2015.103
The Turkish government began to demonstrate a renewed interest
in nuclear power in 2004. In May 2004, Guler reportedly said that
technical studies continued on nuclear power plants, Turkey would
“soon get in touch with the countries producing such power plants,”
and that things are at the speciﬁcations of contract stage. According
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to Guler, the government wants to involve the private sector in all
kinds of investment in the energy sector, but the government could
invest itself where necessary.104 During a visit to Brazil in October
2004, Turkish Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan was due to hold talks
with ofﬁcials in Sao Paolo and Rio de Janeiro on economic relations.
The meetings were expected to focus in part on cooperation in many
ﬁelds including nuclear energy.105
Guler said in November 2004 that Turkey should be producing
4,500MW of nuclear power from 2012.106 The Turkish Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources also issued a statement in November
2004 noting that nuclear power was one of the most important
alternative energy sources for Turkey. According to the ministry,
Turkey is one of the few developing countries that possesses the
infrastructure to transfer and to develop nuclear technology.107
According to a report dated November 19, 2004, Guler said Turkey
was planning to construct three nuclear power plants, and they
would be on-line after 2011. Guler said that domestic resources
were insufﬁcient to meet the country’s energy requirements, and an
energy shortage could occur if no measures are taken. According to
Guler, Turkey plans three nuclear plants to prevent such a shortage.
The goal is to generate 8-10 percent of the country’s energy needs
using nuclear power plants. Guler said that the plan is to fuel the
plants with uranium, and that current technology in Turkey was
more suited to uranium, altough thorium would be considered as a
fuel in the future.108
Reprocessing, Spent Fuel, and Waste Storage. Since the late 1980s,
academics and government scientists in Turkey have worked both
at home and abroad on studies to determine the most effective
method for reprocessing spent fuels.109 For example, a research
project involving the Nuclear Engineering Department of Hacettepe
University and the TAEK Nuclear Safety Department established
feasible ﬂow sheet calculations for using the solvent extraction process
to reprocess thorium based spent fuel.110 The project was carried out
in anticipation that Turkey may eventually build a thorium-based
HTR reactor.
The majority of Turkey’s radioactive waste classiﬁed as lowlevel is produced by the country’s single research reactor, several
research centers, and radiological sources in universities, hospitals,
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and industries. The waste is collected, treated, and stored at the
Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility of the Çekmece
Nuclear Research and Training Centre.111
During negotiations to build a power reactor at Akkuyu, Turkey
started to plan for an interim storage facility to accommodate spent
fuel. Negotiations were initiated with Bulgaria and Hungary in
1997 to establish a regional interim storage facility or repository in
south Eastern Europe―potentially in a remote location in Turkey.
The site would have served as an interim storage facility or potential
repository for spent fuel from the planned Akkuyu power reactor
and reactors in Bulgaria and Hungary.112 Given the cancellation of
the Akkuyu project, negotiations with these countries are not likely
to continue.
Research Reactors. Turkey has one operational research reactor.
The ITU-TRR is a 250 kw TRIGA Mk II reactor, which was supplied
by General Atomics and went critical in 1979.113 The reactor is located
at the Istanbul Technical University, operated by the Institute for
Nuclear Energy, and licensed by TAEK. Turkey’s ﬁrst research
reactor, the 1MW TR-1 located at Çekmece Nuclear Research and
Training Centre, was shut down in 1977.114 The country’s second
research reactor, the TR-2, a 5MWth upgrade of the TR-1, was
shutdown in 1995.115
Delivery Capabilities.
Turkey’s potential nuclear delivery capabilities include both
ballistic missiles and aircraft. Turkey is reported to be developing a
satellite launch vehicle (SLV) similar to the French Ariane SLV, which
could potentially form the basis of a theoretical nuclear missile. The
project is scheduled for completion by 2010 at the earliest, if the
rocket and the satellite are completed simultaneously. The Rocketan
Corporation has begun production activities related to the rocket
under the supervision of the Turkish Aviation Institution. Other
organizations involved include the Turkish Armed Forces, the Middle
East Technical University, Istanbul Technical University, and the
Turkish Scientiﬁc and Technical Research Institution. No decision yet
has been reached on the location of the launch site, which is expected
to be situated on the Turkish coast.116 Turkey is believed to have 120
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MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), with a range
of 160km and a payload capability of 450kg.117 The Turkish Air Force
has a range of combat aircraft including 223 F-16 ﬁghter aircraft (193
F-16C and 30 F-16D); 87 F/NF-5A/B ﬁghter ground attack aircraft;
and 170 F-4E aircraft (88 ﬁghter ground attack, 47 ﬁghters, and 35
recce).118 In addition, the air force now has some 100 Israeli Popeye-1
air-launched standoff missiles, with a range of 100km and a payload
of 360kg. One hundred more may be delivered by Israel, and there
are plans to co-produce, with the Israeli ﬁrm, Rafael, Popeye-2 airlaunched standoff missiles, with a 350km range and a payload of
360kg.119
SYRIA
Syrian President Bashar Assad effectively admitted in an interview
published in January 2004 that his country has developed chemical
and biological weapons as a last resort defence against Israel.120
Indeed, it has long been known that Damascus possesses a substantial
chemical warfare capability and a more limited biological weapons
capability.121 From a review of available open sources, however, it
does not appear that Syria is pursuing seriously the development of
nuclear weapons. Moreover, it appears that Syria does not currently
possess the infrastructure and personnel necessary to establish a
nuclear weapons program, bar signiﬁcant infusions of external
assistance.122 This assessment reﬂects Syria’s non-nuclear weapons
status under the NPT,123 which has been subject to IAEA veriﬁcation
since the country’s Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 407) took force
in 1992.124 Syria has not concluded an Additional Protocol with the
IAEA or signed the CTBT.125
The U.S. National Intelligence Council noted in December 2001
that the American intelligence community “remains concerned about
Syria’s intentions regarding nuclear weapons.”126 The country’s
limited infrastructure includes a nuclear research center at Dayr
Al Hajar127 and a small Chinese-supplied research reactor under
IAEA safeguards. In May 1999, Damascus signed a “broad nuclear
cooperation agreement” with Russia covering the construction
of a small light-water research reactor, which will be subject to
IAEA safeguards.128 Syria and Russia have also approved “a draft
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cooperative program on cooperation in the civil nuclear power
ﬁeld.” It has been assessed by U.S. intelligence that, “In principle,
broader access to Russian expertise provides opportunities for Syria
to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue
nuclear weapons.”129 In 2004, there were reports alleging that Syria
may have acquired centrifuge enrichment technology from the A. Q.
Khan network.
In March 2004 an agreement reportedly was signed between Syria
and Iran on defense and military cooperation.130 Both Syria and Iran
confront a similar strategic situation and appear to recognize that they
have a vested interest in cooperating with each other to retain their
political independence. Both countries are united against Israel in
support of the Palestinians, Hezbollah, and Lebanon. Moreover, they
were both rivals of the Iraqi Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, and
both currently fear American hegemony and intentions in the region
due to their own WMD ambitions and support for terrorism.131
Nuclear Capabilities.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is at the center of Syria’s
civilian nuclear program. A review of available open sources
generated the following observations related to Syria’s nuclear
capabilities.
Uranium Resources. Syria has conducted signiﬁcant work to
examine the feasibility of exploiting phosphatic rock to recover
uranium. The country is rich in phosphatic rock deposits and produces
around one-ﬁfth of the phosphate rock mined in the entire Middle
East.132 In 2001, Syria mined over 2.04 million tons of phosphate.133
Syria operates a uranium recovery micro-pilot plant at Homs.134
The plant was designed to be the precursor for a pilot plant and an
industrial scale plant, with potential operations such as reﬁning,
conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication.135 However, a study,
conducted to determine whether the technology used for extracting
uranium from phosphoric acid produced at Homs could be
industrialized, found that it was not feasible ﬁnancially.136 Damascus
signed a tripartite contract with the IAEA and an unnamed entity in
1996 to improve its technical capabilities to recover uranium from
triple superphosphate.137
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Several Syrian experts reportedly have spent time at Ranstad
Mineral in Sweden, a facility that extracted uranium for enrichment
purposes between 1997 and 2002. Although the IAEA reportedly
sponsored some of the visits, according to the facility’s owner, Bengt
Lillja, the Syrians made additional trips “on their own.”138
Conversion, Enrichment, and Fuel Fabrication. Syria does not appear
to have conversion, enrichment, or fuel fabrication capabilities.
However, there were various reports in 2004 related to Syria’s
potential acquisition of enrichment related technology from the A.
Q. Khan network. According to one report in August 2004, American
ofﬁcials believe that Syria received “an unspeciﬁed number” of P1
centrifuge components “in what could be the most signiﬁcant step”
in the country’s “nascent nuclear weapons program.” According to
the ofﬁcials, Firas Tlas, son of Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Tlas,
became a customer of A. Q. Khan in 2001. The components and other
nuclear equipment reportedly were ordered by the Saddam regime in
Iraq via Syria, and deliveries may have continued after Saddam’s fall
in April 2003.139 In May 2004, however, it was reported that the U.S.
intelligence community was divided on the issue of whether Syria
had received technology from the clandestine network.140 Moreover,
a January 2004 report in The Washington Post noted that, although
network middlemen from South Africa, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sri Lanka, and elsewhere allegedly offered their services to Syria, the
deals never apparently transpired.141
Moving beyond the centrifuge allegations, Syria does operate
a Cyclon-30 cyclotron which was provided by Belgium’s Ion Beam
Applications (IBA).142 IBA also supplied a cyclotron of the same
model to Iran, which analysts suspect may have been used to research
uranium enrichment.143 The AEC had asked for IAEA assistance in
1996 to build a cyclotron facility at its Nuclear Medicine Centre.
The project was approved by the IAEA, and construction of the
facility began in 1997. The stated aim is to produce radioisotopes for
medical purposes.144 It should be noted that personnel at the AEC are
also conducting research on CO2 lasers, which could potentially be
applied to laser isotope separation and therefore enrichment.145
Nuclear Power. Although Syria does not have a nuclear power
reactor, it has long viewed nuclear energy as a viable source to meet
Syria’s future energy needs. Damascus performed a feasibility study
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in the early 1980s with help from the IAEA to identify the requirements
for a potential power program,146 and since the late 1980s has actively
sought to acquire a nuclear power capability. Syria initiated a plan in
1988 to build six nuclear power reactors by the late 1990s capable of
producing 6,000MW at a cost of $3.6 billion. Although Belgium, the
Soviet Union, and Switzerland were approached for assistance, the
plan came to nothing as a result of ﬁnancial and technical issues.147
In 1990, for example, Syria asked the Soviet Union if it could buy up
to four VVER-1000 power reactors and the associated fuel.148
Russia and Syria signed a Comprehensive Cooperation
Agreement in 1997 under which Russia reportedly will build two
nuclear reactors in Syria, although it is unclear whether they will
be for research or power production.149 Syria’s continuing interest in
nuclear power was demonstrated in 2001 when the IAEA agreed to
provide assistance for another project to assess the potential role of
nuclear power in the country.150
One potential application of nuclear power in Syria is desalination.
The AEC is involved with Damascus University in a program to
develop desalination technologies in conjunction with the Scientiﬁc
National Commission for Water Desalination, based at the Higher
Institute of Applied Science and Technology, Damascus.151
It was subsequently reported in 2003 that Russia and Syria had
entered negotiations for the construction of a $2 billion nuclear
facility in Syria. Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy conﬁrmed that
discussions were underway to supply a nuclear power plant and a
nuclear desalination plant, but no agreement had been reached.152
However, the Russian Foreign Ministry denied that such discussions
had taken place.153
Spent Fuel and Waste Storage. There do not appear to be any spent
fuel storage facilities in Syria, although the AEC is currently planning
to construct a waste processing facility. To this end, the AEC recently
established a Radioactive Waste Management Division to collect,
treat, and store naturally occurring radioactive waste from Syria’s
mining, oil, and natural gas sectors.154
Research Reactor. Syria’s single 30kw research reactor―the SRR1 (Syrian Research Reactor, Syrian Miniature Neutron Source
Reactor)―was provided by China along with 90 percent enriched
uranium fuel. The reactor is located at the Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear
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Research Centre near Damascus, and went critical in 1996. It is used
for basic and applied research and training reactor operators.155 Syria
and Russia have reportedly signed an agreement for the provision
of a 25MW light-water pool-type research reactor to be housed in a
new research centre.156
Delivery Capabilities.
Syria’s potential nuclear delivery capabilities include missiles
and aircraft. Syria has several hundred SCUD-B, SCUD-C and SS-21
missiles, according to The Military Balance157 and the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD).158 DoD states that Syria continues to acquire
SCUD-related equipment and materials from Iran and North Korea,
including considerable assistance from Pyongyang in producing
SCUD-C missiles. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, Syria may have
some SCUD-D missiles with a range of 650km.159 Syria allegedly has
tested a SCUD-B with a warhead designed to disperse VX nerve
agent.”160 Damascus is also said to be attempting to develop a
capability to arm ballistic missiles with biological warheads, although
this has not been veriﬁed.161 Since 1999, it is thought that Syria has
worked on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development
and production capability with external assistance from abroad,
including Iran. In addition, DoD claims that foreign equipment and
assistance for Syria’s liquid-propellant missile program has come
from North Korean entities, as well as Chinese and Russian ﬁrms.
According to DoD, these developments are part of Syria’s efforts to
acquire a modern, solid-fueled, short-range missile.162 Syria possesses
10 squadrons of ﬁghter-ground attack aircraft (including Su-24, Su22 and MiG-23 BN) and 16 squadrons of ﬁghter aircraft (including
MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25 and MiG-29A, and Su-27), according to The
Military Balance 2003-2004.163 The combat aircraft available to Syria
would provide Damascus with a theoretical capability to deliver
nuclear weapons.
CONCLUSION
The Iranian nuclear crisis has resulted in concerns about the
potential response of some of Iran’s neighbours, in particular
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whether Tehran’s behavior could prompt other regional actors to
consider acquiring nuclear weapons. Within this context, the chapter
sought to shed some light on the nuclear capabilities and ambitions
of four key countries in Iran’s immediate neighbourhood: Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria. These countries were singled out
due to their relative proximity to Iran and because there have been
suspicions that they have all been interested, at one time or another,
in acquiring nuclear weapons. For each country, an assessment was
made of current capabilities, including the various elements of the
fuel cycle that could potentially be used to support nuclear weapons
development and potential nuclear delivery systems. Attention
also was given to the drivers of potential nuclear and other WMD
programs in the countries concerned.
An analysis of available open sources revealed relatively little
about national intentions in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria
regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons―both in general terms
and more speciﬁcally with regard to the current Iranian nuclear crisis.
The lack of pertinent information in this respect appears to stem
primarily from the political sensitivity of the issue and the relatively
closed and nontransparent nature of the societies involved, with the
exception of Turkey. In contrast, it was possible to develop a fairly
detailed picture of the various elements of the fuel cycle currently in
existence or being developed in the four countries, as well as their
potential nuclear delivery options. It is assessed that each country
currently lacks the technical capacity to build a nuclear weapon,
barring signiﬁcant infusions of external assistance. However, the
recent exposure of Egypt’s undeclared materials and activities is a
signiﬁcant cause for concern―not just in its own right, but in terms
of whether it is indicative of a broader trend in the region already
demonstrated by the Iran and Libya cases. Indeed, given that A.
Q. Khan has previously visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, it
is quite possible that, in addition to Iran and Libya, these countries
also may have secretly acquired sensitive nuclear technology and
expertise from this clandestine proliferation network in the past.
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CHAPTER 4
TURKEY, IRAN, AND NUCLEAR RISKS
Ian O. Lesser
INTRODUCTION
Turkey is among the countries most exposed to proliferation
developments in the Middle East. New disclosures regarding Iran’s
nuclear ambitions, and Tehran’s apparent commitment to proceed
with more extensive IAEA inspections and safeguards, comes
at a time of general ﬂux in Turkey’s strategic environment and
in the country’s foreign and security policy outlook. For some 50
years, Turkey has lived with nuclear weapons on its borders and
deployed on its territory. Although not a nuclear state, and unlikely
to become one, nuclear forces and doctrines have been part of the
security calculus of the modern Turkish republic for the majority
of its existence. But only since the Gulf War of 1990-91, and with
increasing attention over the past few years, have Turkish planners
and policymakers begun to view the combination of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and the means for their delivery at longer
ranges as a proximate threat to the security of the country.
In the context of a foreign and security policy that is, at base,
conservative and multilateral, the Middle East is one region where
Ankara has been prepared to think and act more assertively. The
prospect of one or more nuclear or near-nuclear states on Turkey’s
Middle Eastern borders is now a signiﬁcant factor in Turkish strategic
thought. But in the nuclear realm, Turkey retains a strong preference
for multilateral approaches, imbedded in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)—and to an increasing extent, European—
policies. The NATO (really the United States) nuclear guarantee has
been the cornerstone of an approach that still owes much to Cold
War patterns. Only very recently have Turkish strategists begun to
contemplate a capacity for deterrence and response that goes beyond
Alliance arrangements.
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Turks worry about the reliability of both NATO and U.S.
commitments to Turkish defense in Middle Eastern contingencies,
and Turkey will be strongly affected by changes in Alliance strategy,
missions, and cohesion, all of which are in ﬂux. If the European Union
(EU) does open formal accession talks with Ankara, as most Turks
hope, the European part of this equation is set to grow in importance.
While the defense dimension of Turkey’s relations with Europe has
been less prominent (and sometimes strained), this too is set to grow
in prominence as the EU focuses more heavily on extra-European
challenges, including proliferation.
Could Turkey act more radically, outside multilateral
arrangements, to meet risks posed by a nuclear-ready Iran? The short
answer is yes, but it is not very likely. Could Turkey “go nuclear”?
Again, the answer is yes, but it is most unlikely. The key in both
cases would be a sharp deterioration in the quality of Turkish defense
cooperation with the West, and a sense that Turkey was being left to
go it alone in a dangerous geo-strategic setting. Overall, the existence
of a nuclear-ready Iran poses some direct risks to Turkish security—
and many indirect but highly consequential ones. Implications for
U.S. and Western policy abound.
This chapter explores the contours of Turkey’s perceptions and
potential responses to a nuclear-ready Iran. Section One discusses the
Turkish strategic context, both regional and functional. Section Two
assesses relations with Iran in the context of proliferation challenges,
including the effect on wider regional dynamics. Section Three treats
the range of possible Turkish responses to a nuclear or near-nuclear
Iran, and external inﬂuences on Turkish choices. Section Four offers
conclusions and policy implications.
SECTION ONE: THE TURKISH STRATEGIC CONTEXT
Turkey is a security-conscious society in which territorial defense
and internal security remain priorities for the political class, the
military, and the public. Broadly, the Turkish strategic culture displays
several key characteristics that shape Ankara’s approach to the
challenge of a nuclear Iran, and relations with allies on proliferation
matters. These characteristics include a pronounced sensitivity to
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questions of national sovereignty (far higher the modern norm in
Europe), a low threshold of tolerance for national insecurity and
threats to the “homeland,” a high threshold for intervention outside
the country, and a willingness to act massively and decisively when
this threshold is crossed (e.g., Cyprus in 1974 and more recent cross
border actions in northern Iraq). Foreign policy debates in Ankara
are also characterized by an historic tension between the Ataturkist
tradition of nonintervention, even isolation, and demands for
more active regional engagement. Turkey shares many of these
characteristics with the United States.1
A Conservative Approach.
Turkish perceptions regarding Iran and proliferation issues are
affected by a deep tradition of conservatism in foreign and security
policy.2 As a former imperial power, Turkey takes its regional role
seriously, and Turkish strategists like to take the long view. Often,
this puts them somewhat out of step with their Western counterparts.
As an example, despite the transformation of western relations
with Russia since the end of the Cold War, Turks have retained a
very wary approach to Russian power and geopolitical aims. They
have remained highly sensitive to the nuclear aspects of Russian
doctrine, and Russia’s role in places like the Balkans and Cyprus—at
a time when it has become fashionable to down-grade or dismiss
the Russian factor in Europe and even Eurasia. In historical terms,
Turkey has seen Russia as its primary geo-strategic competitor.
Turkey’s relations with Arab neighbors in the Middle East have been
colored by the experience of empire, including its collapse, leaving
a legacy of mutual difﬁdence and mistrust. Iran, by contrast, has
been a relatively stable and predictable neighbor, with no history of
conﬂict with Ottoman Turkey or the Turkish republic.
Turks—like many others—have been relatively slow to adapt
their security thinking to new risks, although this dimension of
Turkey’s conservatism in external policy is changing under pressure
of new regional realities, and a new constellation of actors in the
policymaking process. Turkey’s very signiﬁcant conventional
military strength, with the second largest military establishment
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in NATO, an increasingly modern force structure, and a growing
capacity for power projection beyond its borders, is an important
element in the country’s perception of regional risks.3 One the one
hand, Turkey’s overwhelming conventional superiority vis-á-vis its
Middle Eastern neighbors, and its NATO membership, are obvious
and very potent deterrents to aggression in relations with Iran, Iraq,
and Syria. On the other hand, like their counterparts in Israel and
the United States, Turkish strategists worry that their conventional
superiority compels regional adversaries to adopt unconventional,
asymmetric strategies. This can take the form of support for terrorism
and insurgency, as with Syria’s past support for the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), or the threat to use chemical, biological, or
even nuclear weapons against Turkish population centers or bases.4
Like other NATO allies, much Turkish thinking about nuclear
forces and doctrine derives from Cold War experience. For 50
years, Turkey was a key forward location for intelligence and early
warning on Soviet strategic forces and a base for potential nuclear
operations against the Soviet Union. Nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles
based in Turkey were traded away during the Cuban missile crisis,
but Turkey continued to host tactical nuclear forces deployed in a
NATO context. Turkish strategists remain attuned to shifts in Russian
nuclear forces and doctrine. Even as Turkish-Russian political
and economic relations have expanded dramatically over the past
decade, security relations have remained tenuous, and Turks have
been among the most sensitive of NATO members on the question
of the re-nuclearization of Russian military doctrine.
Changing Perceptions of WMD Exposure.
Given the extraordinary extent of Turkey’s exposure to WMD
and missile risks emanating from the Middle East—easily the most
pronounced in NATO—some analysts express surprise that Turkey
did not signal its concern about proliferation issues earlier and more
forcefully.5 As general concern about WMD in the Middle East grew
among Western and Israeli strategists, even prior to the Gulf War,
Ankara remained relatively unconcerned, adopting a “surprisingly
nonchalant attitude” toward the threat.6 Several explanations can
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be offered for this stance. First, a perception of substantial strategic
depth, with the main Turkish population and economic centers at
some distance from Middle Eastern borders.7 Obviously, as the range
of missiles deployed in the region has increased, this perception
has waned. Second, in line with Cold War thinking and prior to the
troubling experience of the Gulf War in 1990, Turkey assumed that
the NATO security guarantee was relevant and more than sufﬁcient
to deter regional, unconventional threats. Third, the Turkish security
elite, like the Turkish elite in general, has preferred to focus on
European and transatlantic issues, holding Middle Eastern problems
at arms length wherever possible.
Turkish military planners noted with concern the exchange of
missile strikes during the so-called “war of the cities” during the
Iran-Iraq war. But the Gulf War of 1990 was the real watershed in
Turkish strategic perceptions regarding WMD and missile risks.8
The war also had a negative effect on Turkey’s assumptions about
the predictability of the NATO security guarantee in “out-of-area”
contingencies. Despite threats from Baghdad, Turkey was not
targeted by Iraq in its Scud missile campaign. Nonetheless, the Ozal
government’s active role in the Gulf War coalition and the extensive
air operations conducted from Incirlik Air Base, could well have
made Turkey a target for retaliatory attack. During the run-up to
the war, Turks were dismayed by the slow and contentious allied
response to Ankara’s request for NATO air defense reinforcements
(an experience repeated in the months before the 2003 Iraq war). The
Scud attacks on Israel and in the Gulf made a strong impression on
the Turkish military, who took away the lesson that Turkey’s large
but rather out-dated military establishment required substantial
modernization, including the ability to address WMD and missile
risks from Iraq, Iran, and, above all, Syria.
From the early 1990s, Turkey’s small cadre of strategic analysts
outside the government, including academic observers and
journalists, began to pay increased attention to WMD and missile
risks. At the ofﬁcial level, the response remained largely rhetorical.
Turkey was never a particularly enthusiastic supporter of the United
Nations Special Commission’s (UNSCOM) work in Iraq, although
Ankara clearly beneﬁted from the military containment of Baghdad.
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With proximate reasons for conﬂict, Syrian chemical and improvedScud programs remained the leading concern. Iran’s nuclear and
missile ambitions were seen as a more distant risk—linked more
closely to American interests and behavior than to Turkish-Iranian
dynamics.
Growing attention to the WMD problem was reﬂected in changes
to Turkey’s air defense strategy, which for the ﬁrst time (1993)
included the concept of countering medium-range missiles and
potential nuclear arsenals deployed in countries to the south and
east, with “countering” a matter of forward planning for enhanced
early warning and missile defense procurement. The Turkish mix
of active and passive defense against WMD envisioned reliance
on NATO assets for deterrence, hardening of military targets and
command and control, and bolstering the ability to locate and attack
mobile targets (a tough problem, even for far more capable allies). The
informed public debate noted the importance of the issue, largely as
reﬂected through American and Israeli analyses, but was generally
dismissive of Turkey’s own missile defense strategy.9
As noted above, the general perception of threat from Iran and
Iraq has been low. Turks in general have not shared the American
concern regarding nuclear and missile risks emanating from either
country, largely because Turkish observers ﬁnd it difﬁcult to imagine
circumstances under which Iran or Iraq would employ such weapons
against Turkey—except in retaliation for American intervention
launched from Turkish bases. Turkey does have pronounced
stakes in the future of Iran and Iraq, but these turn on questions of
instability, consequences for Kurdish separatism affecting Turkey,
the role of the region’s Islamists in Turkish politics, and access to
energy. The question of direct, state-to-state conﬂict has not loomed
large in Turkish perceptions, in stark contrast to a far more unstable
relationship with Syria.
The Israeli Factor.
Arguably, a leading factor in elevating Turkish attention to WMD
risks, and Iranian WMD risks in particular, has been the development
of a broad-based strategic relationship with Israel. Israel is an active
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participant in Turkey’s defense modernization program, and there
is an impressive degree of collaboration on training and intelligence
sharing, including surveillance and possible responses to nuclear
and missile threats. More broadly, there has been a substantial
convergence in strategic perception and regional risk assessment,
driven by increased dialogue and objective factors. This strategic
relationship has been encouraged by Washington, but has its origins
in Turkish and Israeli interests. In some cases, Turkey sees Israel as
an alternative and perhaps more reliable supplier of defense goods
and services than the United States or the EU. Iran’s nuclear and
missile capabilities are central to Israel’s strategic outlook, and this
has certainly reinforced the issue in Turkish thinking (the potential
for Turkish-Israeli cooperation in strikes against Iran’s nuclear
facilities are discussed in Section Four). Neither the Islamist Erbakan
government of the mid 1990s, nor the current government led by
Prime Minister Erdogan, with its “recessed” Islamic roots, has
interfered signiﬁcantly with Turkish-Israeli relations—a portfolio in
which the Turkish military continues to play a leading role.
The Iraq War—and A More Diverse Security Debate.
The recent experience of the War in Iraq has focused Turkish
attention ﬁrmly on the problem of northern Iraq, where Turks across
the political spectrum perceive substantial stakes. The key variable
here is the potential emergence of an independent Kurdish state out
of the chaos in Iraq, and the effect this might have on Turkey’s own
Kurdish separatists. A secondary factor is Turkish afﬁnity for Iraq’s
Turcomen, although this, too, is seen through the lens of the ethnic
power balance in northern Iraq. Turks have been, and remain, less
interested in the issue of WMD in Iraq, and tend to share European
skepticism regarding the accuracy of pre-war intelligence (despite
the fact that Turkish sources contributed to this intelligence, and
Turkish analysts were no less convinced of Iraq’s WMD capabilities
than their opposite numbers in Europe and the United States).
That said, the risk of chemical or missile attacks on Turkish
territory certainly ﬁgured in the public debate about cooperation
with the United States prior to the war. The net effect was to reinforce
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the sense that Turkey had a stronger stake in regional stability than
in regime change with an unpredictable neighbor. The failure of
bilateral negotiations over access to Turkish facilities in the spring of
2003—a close run thing—had multiple sources.10 Turkish concerns
about WMD exposure, and lackluster backing from NATO, played a
small but measurable role in this calculus of cooperation.11
Today, Turkey’s perception of nuclear and missile risks is shaped
by an increasingly diverse national debate on security questions.
The outlook of the Turkish General Staff still counts heavily, of
course. But independent analysts and a vigorous private media
now play a key role—and public opinion counts. The new elites,
from cosmopolitan business circles to more traditional elements
associated with the current AKP government, tend to be less security
conscious and more heavily focused on domestic reform. Their views
on external issues, including proliferation, are inﬂuenced heavily by
international debates and, to an ever-increasing extent, by attitudes
in Europe. Absent a direct threat to Turkish security, Turks across the
political spectrum are now as likely—perhaps more likely—to frame
policy toward Iran and its WMD capabilities in European rather
than American terms. Barring a sharp deterioration in relations with
the EU, the desire to stay in the European mainstream will be a key
factor in Turkey’s approach to a nuclear-ready Iran in the years to
come. The result may be pronounced tension between an Israeli and
American-inspired hard line on proliferation matters, and a softer,
“diplomacy ﬁrst” approach ﬂowing from Brussels. These disparate
approaches could be brought into line if the EU begins to take
proliferation risks more seriously.
SECTION TWO: VIEWS OF IRAN, ITS NUCLEAR
AMBITIONS, AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS
In a region which Turks are inclined to treat as a source of risk
rather than opportunity, relations with Iran have been essentially
stable, with little of the propensity for assertiveness evident in
relations with Syria.12 Both states have traditionally seen each other as
status quo powers, and pre-revolutionary Iran had much in common
with the secular, modernizing, western-oriented society Ataturk
had promoted in Turkey. Turks often refer to their “dangerous
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neighborhood” in the Middle East, but are also quick to note that
Turkey and Iran lack a recent history of armed conﬂict. As a broad
generalization, Turks take Iran seriously as a society and as a regional
power, something that cannot be said for Turkey’s approach to Syria,
Iraq, or the Arab Gulf states. Iran and Israel are treated as peers in the
Middle East; Syria, Iraq, and the Arab states of the Gulf are not.13
Sources of Turkish Concern.
This relatively favorable view of Iran has been slow to change
since the Iranian revolution. Only within the last few years have
elements of the Turkish security establishment come to see Iran as
a serious challenge, and even today there are strong countervailing
interests in improved relations. The sources of Turkish concern are
straightforward. First, Turkey’s secular elites, including the military,
increasingly have been concerned about the export of Islamic
radicalism from Iran. This concern is driven by Iranian ﬁnancial and
other support for activists abroad, and the ebb and ﬂow of Iran’s
support for international terrorism. An Iranian hand is sometimes
seen in the construction of Turkish religious schools (where Saudi
backing has certainly played a larger role) and the ﬁnancing of
Islamist movements. In reality, these are marginal factors on the
Turkish political scene. But those inclined to worry about secularism
in Turkey, including harder-line elements in the military and
Kemalists of the old school, tend to see Iran as an internal security
threat.
Second, Iran is a key player with regard to the Kurdish issue in
its regional setting, and relations on Kurdish matters continue to
be a leading barometer of Turkish-Iranian relations as a whole. The
history here is largely one of cooperation against a common fear of
Kurdish separatism, but the vagaries of PKK/Kurdistan Workers/
Labour Party (KADEK) deployments have led to periodic frictions.
When the expulsion of the PKK from Syria forced Kurdish insurgents
to operate from bases in Iran, Ankara responded forcefully, and the
Turkish air force reportedly struck PKK camps inside Iran in July
1999.
Third, as noted earlier, Turkey increasingly has been concerned
about the inﬂuence of WMD and missile proliferation on the security
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environment, its own regional freedom of action, and that of its
alliance partners. Iraq and Syria have also been part of this equation,
and the WMD capabilities of these countries generally have been
seen as posing a more proximate risk to Turkey. In the case of Syria,
the regime’s support for the PKK, against a background of frictions
over territory and resources, actually brought the two countries to
the brink of a military clash in 1998. Recurring Western military
intervention in Iraq, and the use of Incirlik Air Base for Operation
NORTHERN WATCH, made the possibility of Iraqi retaliation on
Turkish soil an ongoing concern. In terms of its WMD capabilities
and missile reach, Iran may have posed a more serious threat on
paper, but few Turks worried about a clash with Iran in which WMD
might become a factor—there was little rationale for conﬂict on either
side. Indeed, Turkish economic interests in Iran, including access to
natural gas, have been a strong countervailing factor.
Sources of Iranian Concern—and Improved Ties.
On the Iranian side, there are also some concerns regarding
Turkey, although none have risen to a level posing a risk of direct
conﬂict. Under conditions of instability in Iran, Turkey could chose
to foment separatism among ethnic Turks in Azerbaijan, although
Ankara, with its own concerns about national integrity, has been
wary of supporting separatist movements elsewhere, whether in
Chechnya or Kosovo—despite some internal pressures to do so.
Iran has also been troubled by the presence of Iranian opposition
groups in Turkey, including elements of the Mujahiddin-i Khalq.
Turkish secularism and membership in the Western strategic “club”
surely trouble Iranian conservatives. More speciﬁcally, Turkey
could facilitate American or Israeli intervention in Iran, including
the provision of intelligence, bases, and over-ﬂight rights for strikes
against Iranian nuclear or missile facilities. But on the whole, Iranian
decisions regarding strategy and force structure, including nuclear
and missile programs, are almost certainly driven by other factors.
Over the past year, Turkish-Iranian relations have improved
considerably (as have Turkish relations with Syria), with four
high-level Turkish visits to Iran, and six from Iran to Turkey. The
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bilateral dialogue has spanned economic and educational matters,
as well as the critical question of policy toward Kurdish groups in
northern Iraq. Iranian nuclear and missile programs do not seem
to be part of this agenda, although Turkey has been supportive of
EU-led efforts to forestall new UN-sponsored sanctions over WMD
matters.14 Observers attribute this improvement in Turkish relations
with Tehran (and Damascus) to several factors, from the desire for a
concerted approach to northern Iraq, to the more open attitude of the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to engagement
with Iran. Not least, Ankara has followed the lead of Europe in its
own more active engagement of both states over the past year.15
Effect of a Nuclear-Ready Iran on Turkish Interests
and Regional Dynamics.
A nuclear-capable or near-nuclear Iran would pose both direct
and indirect challenges to Turkish interests. In direct terms, a
functioning Iranian nuclear arsenal, coupled with Iranian short and
medium-range missiles, would pose a much more dramatic and
politically salient threat to Turkish security, going well beyond the
current rather amorphous sense of WMD threat. An open Iranian
nuclear capability would place immediate pressure on Turkey’s
slow-moving missile defense plans, and would probably compel
Ankara to press for a much more direct NATO (and EU) stance
regarding Article V and other commitments in Middle Eastern
contingencies. Exposure to a nuclear arsenal on Turkey’s borders
would not be a new phenomenon for Turkey—Turks have lived
with the reality of Soviet and Russian nuclear power for decades—
but it would immensely increase the sense of insecurity in an already
security-conscious society. In the absence of a predictable Western
security guarantee, Ankara might also consider acquiring deterrent
capabilities of its own, although the prospect for this is complicated
and politically risky for Turkey.
Given the paucity of proximate ﬂashpoints in Turkish-Iranian
relations, the consequences of a nuclear Iran are likely to be felt more
heavily across a range of wider geopolitical interests (i.e., interests
beyond the defense of Turkish territory per se). First, a nuclear Iran
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would acquire new strategic weight in its relations with Ankara,
among others. This could greatly complicate Turkish diplomacy over
Kurds, energy, and other issues that have been at the center of the
bilateral agenda. In a less easily measured way, it might also affect
Turkey’s relative regional standing, with implications for relations
across the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even the
Balkans.
Second, a nuclear Iran would severely complicate Turkey’s
security relationships with Washington, Israel, and Europe. A new
nuclear threat to Turkish territory, however theoretical, might
encourage a convergence of strategic perception among those most
affected by this development. In practical terms, however, Ankara
will confront a series of new security dilemmas. Turkey’s sense of
regional exposure, and the need to “live” with neighbors, however
unpalatable, is already a strong inﬂuence on the calculus of defense
cooperation, as seen on numerous occasions since 1990, and as shown
quite clearly in 2003. The potential for nuclear retaliation on Turkish
territory would revive questions of alliance vulnerability, coupling,
decoupling, and “singularization” familiar from the late Cold War.
Given the near-term potential for Western and Israeli
intervention in Iran, these would not be theoretical considerations
for Ankara. Indeed, the very existence of a nuclear arsenal in Iran
would immediately raise the likelihood of and stakes surrounding
intervention—at least until Iran acquired a sufﬁciently credible
nuclear capability to deter a conventional ﬁrst strike. At which
point a very different calculus would emerge, with Turkey playing
a role analogous to Germany during the Cold War. Under these
conditions, Turkish strategists would need to consider whether a
nuclear confrontation between Iran and the West would likely to be
fought over their heads—possible if Iran developed ballistic missiles
of intercontinental range—or on Turkish territory. The prospect
would surely reopen doctrinal debates about nuclear strategy within
NATO, at a time when the Alliance is contemplating a formal role in
security across the “greater Middle East.”
Turkey would not be alone in confronting these new dilemmas.
For some time, southern European members of NATO have faced the
reality of increasing exposure to retaliation from regimes across the
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Mediterranean. Southern Europe and the Mediterranean, the least
nuclear of theaters during the Cold War, have emerged as leading
centers of nuclear and other WMD risks in the current strategic
environment. With Libya’s decision to dismantle its WMD and
missile inventory, the center of gravity for this “southern exposure”
has shifted to the eastern Mediterranean, where Iranian, Syrian, and
Egyptian arsenals continue to shape NATO and EU perceptions of
WMD risk.
Third, the advent of a nuclear Iran, and the possibility of a regional
arms race embracing Turkey, could affect military balances and
perceptions beyond the Middle East. Russia might feel compelled to
respond, technically or doctrinally, to a nuclear Iran, with negative
implications for the security of Turkey (unless the Russian response
came as part of a concerted approach with the United States and
Europe). Similarly, new nuclear and missile capabilities in Iran
could have a cascading effect on security balances in the Balkans and
the Aegean, where Greece is highly sensitive to changes in Turkish
force structure and strategy. This effect has already been seen in the
context of Turkish defense modernization (e.g., new air refueling
tankers, airborne warning and control systems [AWACS], and
army tactical missile systems [ATACMS]) aimed at Middle Eastern
contingencies; it might also inﬂuence the Greek and Turkish interest
in moving ahead with mutual and balanced force reductions, now
being discussed.
Finally, Turkey could become an even more prominent focus
of Western concern as a transit route for the “leakage” of nuclear
materials and technology. Turkey is already at the center of police
and intelligence cooperation regarding the interdiction of nuclear
contraband. A nuclear capable Iran would raise the specter of another
marketplace for nuclear technology, along the lines of Pakistan.
The existence of such a market on Turkey’s borders would make
Turkey an even more essential security partner for the United States
and Europe, but might also reinforce existing European wariness
regarding the security “baggage” Turkey brings to the table. Which
raises a larger question of deep interest to Turkey: Will the EU want
to acquire a formal border with Iraq, Syria, and a nuclear armed
Iran? This is a question Turks would prefer not to have as part of the
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equation in relations with Europe at a time of critical decisions on
Turkey’s EU candidacy.
Under conditions of increased risk from a nuclear Iran, Turkey
would have a very strong stake in the development of more active
NATO and EU approaches to nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
and missile defense. Ankara has been a leading proponent of
multilateral initiatives in this area, especially those oriented toward
the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Over the past few years, and
with increasing urgency since 2003, NATO and the EU have placed
proliferation issues higher on their agendas. The new European
Security Strategy (the “Solana” document) identiﬁes proliferation as
a leading concern, and the EU now has in place an “action plan” on
WMD.16 The new, tougher EU approach to proliferators can be seen
in recent policy toward Iran and especially Syria, in which trade and
cooperation negotiations clearly have been linked to progress on the
WMD front (another likely rationale for Libya’s recent disarmament
moves).17 As Turkey enters a critical phase in its relations with the
EU, looking toward the formal opening of accession negotiations in
2005, it is likely to see a growing and very welcome tendency to take
nuclear proliferation more seriously in Brussels.18
NATO has had a series of initiatives in this area since the ﬁrst Iraq
war, and has devoted signiﬁcant resources to improving intelligence
sharing and command and control in WMD-related contingencies. But
for both organizations, the improvements are largely in the realm of
strategic concepts and doctrine, rather than capabilities. Confronted
with a speciﬁc new nuclear threat from Iran, Turkey, like the United
States and Israel, will focus on practical, operational responses rather
than enhanced debate about the problem. Turkish policymakers will
have the opportunity to encourage Alliance attention to nuclear
risks and possible responses at the NATO summit in Istanbul in June
2004.
SECTION THREE: POSSIBLE TURKISH RESPONSES
AND POLICY INFLUENCES
Revelations regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear program,
and the apparent Iranian commitment to enhanced International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, have not yet produced a
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measurable response from Ankara, although Turkish policymakers
are clearly supportive of pressure on Tehran over nuclear matters, at
least in a multilateral context. But how might Turkey respond to the
advent of an openly nuclear Iran, or an Iran that declares itself bent
on acquiring nuclear weapons regardless of international sanctions?
The range of possible Turkish responses is wide, from “denial”—
ignoring the threat—to the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent of its
own.
The critical context for Turkish decisionmaking in this sphere
will be the extent and character of Turkish security ties—with the
United States, within NATO, and with European partners. Internal
political developments may also have a bearing on Turkish choices.
But the perceived relevance and predictability of the country’s
alliance relations will be the overwhelmingly important inﬂuence on
Turkey’s response.
Denial and Decoupling.
Turkey could respond to a nuclear-ready Iran simply by denying
the signiﬁcance of the risk. There is some precedent for this approach
in terms of Turkey’s relatively unconcerned response to proliferation
trends in Iraq and across the Middle East prior to the Gulf War of
1990. A credible nuclear capability in Iran would be more difﬁcult
for Turkey to ignore, even if the prospect of a military clash with
Iran remains very low. A nuclear-ready Iran threatens American
and Israeli strategic interests in ways that Ankara cannot ignore if
it is to maintain an effective security relationship with these critical
partners. Under conditions of ambiguity or dispute regarding Iranian
capabilities, Turkey might well opt for an assessment and response in
the European mainstream, which might well lean toward “denial.”
Turks who wish to minimize the nuclear threat from Iran will
do so by arguing that Turkey’s exposure comes about largely as a
result of American and Israeli policies, and the direct risks to Turkey
come via the prospect of American or Israeli intervention in Iran. In
this case, many Turks might seek to decouple the country’s security
policies from allies who bring more exposure than reassurance. But,
with the range of hard security challenges Turkey faces, in multiple
regions, it is unlikely that the current Turkish security establishment,
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even in light of public opinion, would be willing to jeopardize
Turkey’s overall deterrent posture to pursue a strategy of decoupling
in relation to Iranian risks.
Reinforced Conventional Deterrence.
The prospect of a nuclear-ready Iran would underscore existing
Turkish concerns about defense modernization and could accelerate
plans for improving the country’s early warning and missile
defense capabilities. Turkey might also seek to bolster its capacity
for locating and striking mobile targets, as well as its rudimentary
missile capability, currently limited to ATACMs and an exploratory
short-range missile program. Turkey might decide to develop and
press forward with an indigenous medium-range ballistic missile
program, bringing it into line with several of its Middle Eastern
neighbors. These efforts could be strengthened if Turkey proceeds
with reported plans to develop its own space launch vehicle for
military reconnaissance and commercial purposes by 2010.19 Turkey’s
alliance partners, especially Greece, might regard this with concern.
Russia, a reconstituted Iraq, and above all, Syria, would regard this
with alarm.
Rapid expansion of Turkey’s missile defenses would be a less
controversial and probably more useful approach. Turkey has already
gone some distance in this direction with plans to acquire Patriot
(PAC-3) missiles, and to participate in the Israeli Arrow and perhaps
the U.S.-led medium-range extended air defense (MEADS) program
with other European allies. Turkey is also a likely site for sensors and
boost-phase interceptors deployed as part of an American strategic
missile defense architecture.20
The scale of Turkey’s conventional forces and their increasing
capacity for regional power projection, coupled with new missile
and missile defense capabilities, surely would cause even a nucleararmed regional adversary to think twice about confronting Turkey.
That said, Turkish analysts are probably correct in their judgment
that the real source of nuclear risk to Turkey ﬂows from the strategic
decisions of others—the United States and Israel—regarding Iran.
Under these conditions, Turkey’s own capacity for conventional
preemption or response may not weigh heavily.
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The Nuclear Option.
Could Turkey go nuclear? This question has been raised from time to
time over the past 2 decades by Turks and others. The short answer is
probably “yes.” Given sufﬁcient time, Turkey probably would have
the technical wherewithal to develop a limited nuclear arsenal and
the means for delivering nuclear weapons in regional contingencies.
That said, the costs—material, and, above all, political—of pursuing
the nuclear option are almost certainly prohibitive for Turkey.
The calculus surrounding the nuclear option could become more
favorable only under drastically changed conditions, both internal
and external.
Turkey has been a party to the NPT since 1980, and an additional
safeguards agreement with the IAEA is also in force. The country’s
nuclear research facilities consist of the Cekmece Nuclear Research
and Training Center and a 250kw TRR research reactor at Istanbul
Technical University supplied by General Atomics in the late 1970s.21
Since the mid-1960s, Turkey has explored the idea of building one or
more nuclear power plants—even soliciting tenders for a 1,200MW
plant at Akkuyu Bay near Mersin. But for a variety of ﬁnancial and
environmental reasons, little progress has been made.22 Over the last
2 decades, Turkey’s growing energy demands have driven a variety
of new arrangements for importing oil and natural gas from Iran,
Central Asia, and Russia. These demands could well have justiﬁed
a nuclear power program, but the ﬁnancial instability of recent
years slowed the growth in energy demand and put an expensive
nuclear program out of reach. Apart from cost, the leading internal
impediment to nuclear power development in Turkey is now
environmental politics, as elsewhere in Europe (critics charge that
the proposed plant at Akkuyu is prone to seismic risks).
Concern about Turkish nuclear intentions has surfaced on a
number of occasions, notably in 1981, when Turkey was alleged to
have facilitated transfers of nuclear-related technology to Pakistan,
and again in 1992, when Senators Glenn and Symington led an effort
to halt aid to Turkey in light of allegations about Turkish-Pakistani
nuclear cooperation.23 Recent revelations regarding Pakistani nuclear
technology transfers to Iran, North Korea, and Libya raise the question
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of whether Pakistani scientists might have tried to sell nuclear designs
and equipment to Ankara. Greek analysts have produced several
studies exploring Turkish interests and capabilities in the nuclear
realm.24 Most of these pre-date the current détente between Athens
and Ankara, and most allege a Turkish interest in acquiring nuclear
material and technology from the Turkic republics of the former
Soviet Union. Ankara has been quick to deny these allegations. For
the most part, however, Greece and other neighbors with a stake in
Turkish nuclear developments have been at least as focused on the
environmental risks associated with civil nuclear power projects in
Turkey. Few regional analysts have taken seriously the prospects for
Turkey becoming a nuclear weapons state.
Pursuit of an independent nuclear capability would be a costly
long-term project for Turkey, given the lack of a substantial civil
nuclear infrastructure on which to build.25 Western partners would
not transfer the required technology outside the context of a civil
program (they have been reluctant to do so even in the context of power
projects), and all such transfers are now under intense scrutiny. As
an open, democratic society, it would be extraordinarily difﬁcult for
Turkey to pursue a clandestine weapons program. To do so openly,
to “break out” from NPT and technology transfer agreements would
mean estrangement from key Western allies—or worse. A nucleararmed Turkey would raise many of the same concerns associated
with a nuclear Germany or a nuclear Japan. It would probably mean
the end of Turkey’s EU ambitions, and could render the country a
pariah in NATO circles. In short, it is an inconceivable path under
current conditions.
Under what conditions might Turkey consider running these
very considerable risks to acquire a nuclear deterrent? Internal
politics could inﬂuence the attractiveness of a nuclear option, but
it would probably require a complete reversal of Turkey’s secular,
Western-oriented path—in short, an anti-western revolution. This
is extraordinary unlikely. Externally, some combination of highly
disruptive developments could make a nuclear option attractive, if no
more practical. A short list of such developments would include the
collapse of NATO and its nuclear-backed security guarantee; a deadend in Turkey’s EU candidacy; a formal collapse of the international
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nonproliferation regime and the rise of multiple new nuclear
weapons states; and the emergence of real, proximate ﬂashpoints in
Turkish-Iranian relations outside the nuclear realm—taken together,
regional and international anarchy as seen from Ankara.
Bilateral and Multilateral Responses.
Without question, Turkey’s preferred response to a nuclear Iran
will be multilateral. If there is a transatlantic consensus to act, either
to constrain or sanction Iranian nuclear plans, or to prevent the
production and deployment of nuclear weapons in a nuclear-ready
Iran, Ankara will most likely be supportive, diplomatically and
militarily. In the absence of a transatlantic consensus, the Turkish
calculus will be more complex and uncertain. With decisions
regarding EU accession talks looming on the horizon (and with other
obstacles such as Cyprus on the way to resolution), Ankara will be
wary of getting out of step with mainstream European policies, even
under pressure from the United States or Israel. The ideal approach
from the Turkish perspective would be a multilateral, UN-backed
action aimed at the nuclear disarmament of Iran, leaving in place
or even expanding the economic engagement of Tehran—essentially
the Libyan model.
If diplomatic pressure and new sanctions are ineffective in slowing
Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Iran reaches a more advanced “nuclear
ready” posture or actually prepares for the deployment of nuclear
weapons, Turkey might back an American or Israeli strike against
Iranian nuclear and missile facilities. Incirlik airbase could be put at
the disposal of U.S. air expeditionary forces. Intelligence gathered
from facilities in Turkey, as well as access to Turkish airspace for
transit and refueling, would facilitate greatly Israel’s ability to strike
Iran’s WMD infrastructure.26 Turkey’s increasingly capable air force
could also contribute to counternuclear operations or strikes against
Iranian missile sites of special concern (e.g., Shahab-3 launchers).
Participation in an Israeli or American strike would imply some
risks for Turkey, including the possibility of a preemptive or retaliatory
Iranian missile strike, possibly WMD-armed, on Turkish bases or
cities. Even Turkish support for stronger nuclear-related sanctions on
Iran could jeopardize cooperation with Tehran on issues of concern
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to Ankara. It could further complicate Turkey’s Kurdish policies,
and might spur Iranian meddling in Turkey’s religious politics, or
support for terrorism inside Turkey. On balance, however, Ankara
will most likely run some risks to assure that it will not confront a
nuclear Iran, with all that this would imply for longer-term Iranian
leverage over Ankara across the board. The political dilemmas may
be more difﬁcult for Turkey, especially in the absence of European
backing for military action against Iran. With European relations
in the balance, Ankara might well opt to observe the destruction
of Iranian nuclear facilities from the sidelines (perhaps with some
very quiet intelligence and logistical support) rather than risk the
political—and possibly real—fallout from active participation.
SECTION FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
After years of relative neglect of WMD risks emanating from
the Middle East, Turkey has begun to focus more seriously on these
risks, above all the prospect of new nuclear powers appearing on the
country’s borders. A nuclear or near-nuclear Iran would negatively
affect Turkish interests. Quite apart from the country’s physical
vulnerability to nuclear attack with missiles of increasing range and
accuracy, a nuclear-ready Iran would complicate Turkey’s regional
policies, many closely tied to internal security concerns. Ankara
already takes Iran seriously as a regional actor. A nuclear Iran would
acquire far greater strategic weight in its relations with Turkey, and
others. It is a development Turkey’s security elite and increasingly
active and well-informed public would prefer not to confront. This
analysis points to a number of conclusions about Turkey’s exposure
and potential responses, with some important policy implications
for the United States, Europe, and NATO.
First, Turkey’s relations with Iran lack obvious ﬂashpoints for
direct military confrontation. There are certainly sources of friction,
and these could worsen. But there is little risk of an overt clash
of the kind imaginable with Syria until quite recently. Few Turks
perceive a direct military threat from Iran. A nuclear Iran would
reduce Ankara’s regional freedom of action, but might not threaten

108

Turkish security directly in the near-term. The real effect on Turkish
interests—and it could be substantial—would be of a longer-term,
geopolitical nature.
Second, to the extent that Turkey does perceive a threat from
Iranian WMD and missile capabilities, it tends to be seen as a product
of American and Israeli confrontation with Iran, and possible
spillovers affecting Turkey. Turkish bases and population centers
would be exposed to the retaliatory consequences of intervention by
Turkey’s western partners. Turks have had to confront this reality
as part of their calculus of cooperation with Washington in Iraq; it
operates with equal force in relation to Iran. Turkish exposure, and
an inherent ambivalence regarding sovereignty compromises in
defense ties, means that Turkish cooperation in preventive action
against Iran cannot be taken for granted despite Ankara’s clear
interest in forestalling the emergence of new nuclear powers in the
Middle East.
Third, Turkey will be heavily affected by the strategies of others—
the United States, Europe, Israel, Russia—vis-à-vis a nuclearready Iran. The country is not well-placed to undertake unilateral
responses, and will exhibit a strong preference for multilateral
approaches that do not expose Turkey to risks in its overwhelmingly
important transatlantic and European relationships. Conventional
and unconventional responses to Iranian nuclear proliferation could
also have a cascading effect on strategic balances beyond the Middle
East, affecting Turkish relations with Russia, Greece and others.
Fourth, the critical external inﬂuences on Turkish decisionmaking
toward a nuclear-ready Iran are the perceived predictability of the
NATO security guarantee, including a credible nuclear component,
and Turkey’s continued integration in Europe. To the extent that the
NATO tie remains credible, Turkey’s leadership is likely to adopt a
measured response to Iranian risks. To the extent that the prospect of
EU membership remains alive, Ankara will be wary of policy options
that might jeopardize relations with Brussels and key European
partners. Turkey could well ﬁnd itself caught between more forward
leaning American and Israeli counterproliferation policies on the one
hand, and a more relaxed European approach on the other. This would
be a tremendously challenging situation for Turkey, whose security
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establishment, absent political considerations, might well prefer a
more aggressive stance. The solution would be the development of a
more assertive European approach to proliferation risks in Iran and
elsewhere—and there is evidence to suggest that this is emerging.
Fifth, the United States and Europe have a clear stake in
encouraging Turkey to take Iranian proliferation risks seriously, but
without pursuing dangerous and destabilizing unilateral options
in response. Turkey is inclined to pursue a measured path. In
doing so, Ankara will rightly seek reassurance regarding NATO’s
commitment to Turkish defense in Middle Eastern contingencies.
Turkish policymakers will look for evidence that NATO allies are
addressing the doctrinal and operational challenges implied by the
need to confront new nuclear and non-European risks. Turkey will
seek, and should get, arrangements for the more rapid deployment
of air and missile defense assets, and accelerated movement in the
area of theater missile defense, including joint projects with Israeli
participation. The June 2004 Istanbul Summit offers an excellent
opportunity to place nuclear and missile risks higher on the NATO
agenda and higher on bilateral agendas with Ankara.
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CHAPTER 5
THE DAY AFTER IRAN GETS THE BOMB
Kenneth R. Timmerman
Many analysts believe that a nuclear-ready Iran will act rationally
and respond positively to Western-style cost-beneﬁts analysis. Iran’s
clerical leaders are not suicidal, this argument goes, and do not seek a
military confrontation with either the United States or Israel, because
of the tremendous damage their country is likely to suffer.
Others argue that Iran has responded to classic deterrence in the
past, and can be deterred successfully in the future. They point to
the brief but brutal confrontation in November 1987 between the
U.S. Navy and Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces who were using
three offshore oil platforms as bases for harassment attacks against
shipping in the Gulf. The United States destroyed the oil platforms
and sank a number of Iranian ships, and Iran ceased its aggressive
tactics. A nuclear Iran may talk aggressively, but in practice it can be
contained and deterred.
But as I will argue in this chapter, this interpretation of Iranian
behavior overlooks key facts, among them:
• Iran’s motivation for seeking nuclear weapons;
• Iran’s long record of support for international terrorism,
including terror attacks against U.S. military targets in Beirut
(Marine Barracks, 1983) and Dahran (Khobar Towers, 1996);
and,
• The internal dynamics and core values of the regime.
DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC MOVES
Conclusion 1: Iran will not Give Up Its Nuclear Capabilities
through Negotiation.
After 16 months of intensiﬁed International Atomic energy
Agency (IAEA) inspections during which Iran agreed to suspend
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uranium enrichment and to stop building enrichment centrifuges, the
Iranian leadership decided to reverse course and resume enrichment
activities. On June 12, 2004, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi
announced that Iran “won’t accept any new [safeguard] obligations.
Iran has a high technical capability and has to be recognized by the
international community as a member of the nuclear club. This is an
irreversible path.”
Kharrazi essentially pointed to the red line, indicating that
Iran had no intention of abandoning its work to master the entire
nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining, milling, conversion, and
enrichment, to spent fuel reprocessing. “That somebody demands
that we give up the nuclear fuel cycle . . . is an additional demand,” he
said. “We can’t accept such an additional demand, which is contrary
to our legal and legitimate rights,” he said. “No one in Iran can make
a decision to deny the nation of something that is a source of pride.”1
That “pride” clearly does not stem from mastering civilian nuclear
technology, since Iran has been working in this area since its ﬁrst
U.S.-built research reactor went critical in November 1967.2
Similar statements about Iran’s nuclear intentions have been
made by Hasan Rohani, head of the Iran’s Supreme National
Security Council, and the regime’s chief nuclear negotiator; Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; and recently-elected leaders of
Iran’s Parliament, or Majlis. Even so-called “moderate” President
Mohammad Khatami said his country had no obligation to respect
the IAEA injunctions. “Nothing stands in the way” of renewed
centrifuge activity, he declared on July 15, 2004, shortly after Iran
broke the seals the IAEA had placed on key production equipment.
“We are not committed any longer to the promise to expand the
suspension to include building centrifuges because they [Britain,
Germany, and France] failed to keep their promise of closing Iran’s
dossier,” he said.3 On July 28, the IAEA reported that Iran had
resumed production of uranium hexaﬂuoride gas. That same day,
an IAEA Governing Board member state circulated a two-page
intelligence report alleging that “Iranian middlemen . . . are in the
advanced stages of negotiations in Russia to buy deuterium gas” as
a booster for thermonuclear warheads.4
Iran has insisted on mastering the fuel cycle even though its
insistence has caused delays and increased the cost of building the
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Bushier nuclear plant. To meet proliferation concerns, Russia initially
offered to deliver reactor fuel worth $30 million for Bushier over a
10-year period starting in 2001, taking the spent fuel rods back to
Russia for reprocessing.5 But Iran subsequently rejected the Russian
demand. In June 2003, the Russian government—eager to get paid and
to conclude additional nuclear deals with Iran—offered to guarantee
deliveries of nuclear fuel regardless of whether Iran acceded to the
“Additional Protocol,” a key IAEA demand. Finally, in October
2003, Russian defense minister Sergey Ivanov declared, during a
visit to Canada, that Russia would only supply the fuel if Iran made
good on its pledge to sign a contract for returning spent nuclear fuel
to Russia.6 By that point, Iran was unveiling to the IAEA its own
nuclear fuel fabrication and reprocessing capabilities, making the
whole question of Russian fuel deliveries and reprocessing moot.
Iran can be expected to continue this type of commercial nuclear
hardball with its suppliers. As it gains expertise and capabilities,
Iran could conceivably sever its commercial relationship with Russia
and operate the reactor on its own under IAEA safeguards, until it
decides to reprocess the spent fuel for a nuclear weapons arsenal.
Ignoring this recent history, a July 2004 Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR) Task Force on Iran report suggested a grand nuclear
bargain to the ruling clerics in Tehran. Under the CFR proposal,
Iran would be asked to commit to permanently ceasing all its enrichment
and reprocessing activities, subject to international veriﬁcation. In return,
the international community would guarantee access to adequate nuclear
fuel supplies, with assurances that all spent fuel would be returned to the
country of origin, and to advanced power generation technology (whose
export to Iran is currently restricted).7

But Tehran’s leaders have already rejected this approach; saying
“pretty please” won’t help. The Islamic Republic wants to retain
these capabilities because it wants to use the “legend” of nuclear
power to mask its break-out capabilities. Iran’s negotiating record
with the IAEA shows that the only nuclear bargain it ﬁnds of interest
is one that runs out the clock, playing on the delusions of the willfully
naïve and the appeasers until Iran has enriched enough uranium
for a modest arsenal. France, Britain, and Germany have further
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encouraged Iran toward intransigence by allowing it to break the
IAEA seals on centrifuge production equipment with impunity.
Conclusion 2: Iran will Leverage Its Friends and Suppliers.
The Islamic Republic has few real friends. Syria and Libya were
allies in its 8-year war against Iraq; and while Syria has remained
true, Libya has not. There are indications that Iran’s ruling clerics
fear what Qaddaﬁ will tell the United States and Britain about
their shared uranium enrichment procurement efforts, following
Libya’s unilateral decision in December 2003 to surrender its nuclear
weapons programs and equipment to the United States and Britain.
Unconﬁrmed reports suggest that Iran has been arming the Libyan
Combat Islamic Group at camps in southern Iran, after Qaddaﬁ
expelled the group from Libya in 1997. The group initially relocated
to Afghanistan, where it worked with al Qaeda, but relocated to Iran
after the United States expelled the Taliban regime in late 2001.8 A
nuclear-ready Iran will feel more brazen to “punish” Qaddaﬁ for
cooperating with the United States and Britain by supporting this
and other Libyan opposition groups. It also will reinforce ties with
Syria, using Syria as a transit point for arming Hezbollah in Lebanon
for stepped up attacks on Israel. It may be tempted to share weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) technologies with Syria.
If friends are few, suppliers are many. The Islamic Republic’s
military and strategic relationship with North Korea goes back to
the early 1980s and, because of the secrecy of both regimes, is not
well-known to the general public. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile program
was developed with North Korean, as well as Russian assistance.
Former Revolutionary Guards commander Major General Mohsen
Rezai was a key player in the military exchanges with North Korea,
and frequently traveled to Pyongyang to observe missile tests and
purchase equipment. Considered by regime insiders as a nationalist,
not an Islamist, Rezai’s continued involvement in Iran’s strategic
weapons programs is another indicator that all factions of the ruling
elite consider the acquisition of broad-based WMD capabilities critical
for the regime’s survival. In late June 2004, new reports surfaced
that Iran had been purchasing highly enriched uranium (HEU) from
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North Korea over the previous 2 years. A nuclear-ready Iran could
step up these purchases as a counter to international inspections or
surveillance of its own enrichment plants.
Russia has been a major supplier of conventional weapons and
nuclear and missile technologies. Indicators of Russia’s willingness to
help Iran’s nuclear weapons program ﬁrst surfaced nearly a decade
ago when President Yeltsin’s advisor for Ecological Affairs, Alexei
Yablokov, revealed that part of the $800 million nuclear deal signed
between Russia and Iran in January 1995 included a Russian offer
to supply a complete centrifuge enrichment plant.9 This was further
conﬁrmed when the complete text of the accord was published in
May 1995 by the Natural Resources Defence Council in Washington,
DC.
After intense U.S. criticism, President Yeltsin acknowledged
at the Moscow summit on May 10, 1995, that the agreement with
Iran contained military as well as civilian nuclear technology and
material, but insisted that it had been “concluded legitimately and
in accordance with international law and no international treaties
were violated in the process.” Yeltsin added that Russia was now
amenable,
to separate those two. In as much as they relate to the military component
and the potential for creating weapons grade fuel and other matters—the
centrifuge, the construction of shafts—we have decided to exclude those
aspects from the contract. So the military component falls away and what
remains is just a civilian nuclear power station with light water reactors,
which are designed to provide heat and power.10

Since that time, world attention has focused on Russia’s ongoing
negotiations with Iran over Bushier, not its involvement in the
Iranian centrifuge enrichment program or the supply of know-how
and expertise. In its public reports, the IAEA has pointedly excised
all references to the “foreign sources” of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment
and reprocessing equipment.
Russia’s role in helping Iran to design and build the nuclearcapable Shahab-3 missile is much better known and well-documented
than North Korea’s. On July 20, 2003, production missiles were
delivered to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, following
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a ﬁnal evaluation test that demonstrated that the Shahab-3 was
capable of launching a nuclear warhead to targets up to 800 miles
distant, bringing Israel and U.S. bases throughout the Middle East
into range. Top military and strategic advisors to Presidents Yeltsin
and Putin have argued that Russia’s long-term strategic interests are
best-served by a powerful Iran capable of checking U.S. power in the
Persian Gulf. Accordingly, Russia deﬁed U.S. pressure throughout
the mid and late 1990s by continuing to provide assistance to the
Iranian missile programs, despite U.S. sanctions and threats of a cutoff in space cooperation.11
Far from alienating Russia, a nuclear-ready Iran will exploit this
long-standing relationship in ways that on the surface could appear
contradictory. On the one hand, Iran might grudgingly agree to a
Russian cut-off in assistance to the Bushier nuclear plant—thereby
allowing Russia to appear “helpful” to Western nations seeking to
apply pressure on Iran to abandon its clandestine nuclear capabilities.
But at the same time, the Russian government could “wink and nod”
at “nongovernment actors” who provide nuclear assistance and
technology to Iran through grey market deals, just as they did with
Iran’s missile programs.
If the United States and its allies take Iran’s case to the United
Nations (UN), Iran will seek Russia’s support in preventing UN
Security Council sanctions or resolutions authorizing the use of
force. To achieve Russian cooperation, Iran’s leaders will offer
Russia commercial inducements (oil and gas development contracts,
industrial contracts, etc.) and strategic inducements, such as a pledge
not to support Islamic groups in Chechnya and elsewhere opposing
Russian rule. Iran played a similar game with noteworthy success
during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) rewarded Iran for its refusal to tolerate anti-Soviet
resistance activities by Afghan refugees with extensive covert arms
deliveries from the USSR and its surrogates. The Soviet-Iran arms
relationship emerged into the open in June 1989, when the two
countries signed a $1.9 billion arms transfer agreement that included
MiG 29 jet ﬁghters and T-72 tanks.12
Communist China is another key partner. China’s assistance
to Iran’s nuclear programs began with the supply of a subcritical
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“training reactor” in 1985. China has helped Iran exploit uranium
mines in Yazd province, giving Iran an unsafeguarded source of
nuclear material for enrichment; it has supplied milling plants, and
reportedly, a facility for producing uranium hexaﬂuoride gas for
enrichment centrifuges. Chinese assistance to Iran’s nuclear efforts
was so extensive by 1991 that President George H. W. Bush issued a
rare public rebuke to China’s leaders.13 Iran has now acknowledged
having built many of these facilities, and has opened some of them
to inspection by the IAEA, which has been careful in its public
reports not to name names or even identify the countries involved in
transferring critical technologies and design information.
A nuclear ready Iran will leverage trade for political support
from China as well—both to restrain the IAEA, and when that fails
and Iran’s case is referred to the UN, to veto UN Security Council
action.
Conclusion 3: Iran will Attempt to Drive a Wedge between Europe
and the United States.
Britain, France, and Germany have been trying since the fall of
2003 to convince Iran to abandon the most dangerous elements of its
previously undeclared nuclear program. European Foreign Ministers
have announced a series of “agreements” and “understandings” with
Tehran aimed at freezing Iran’s uranium enrichment, reprocessing,
and heavy water programs. In exchange, the Europeans have pledged
to block U.S. efforts to get the IAEA to refer Iran’s noncompliance
with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the UN Security Council
for eventual sanctions. So far, Iran has found excuses for not
respecting its commitments to the Europeans without any ill effects.
Even after the IAEA announced that Iran had broken IAEA seals on
its centrifuge production equipment in late July 2004, the Europeans
refused to cancel a scheduled negotiating session with the Iranians
in Paris.
The Islamic Republic has faced down Europe before. In 1997,
after a German court convicted the Tehran leadership of having
ordered the gangland murder of Iranian Kurdish dissidents at the
Mykonos restaurant in Berlin, the European Union (EU) recalled its

119

ambassadors from Tehran and issued arrest warrants for top Iranian
government ofﬁcials. Iran denied the verdict, refused to hand over
its ofﬁcials, and the EU sent its ambassadors back to Tehran a few
months later.
A nuclear-ready Iran will seek to turn Europe against the United
States and Israel, offering lucrative trade agreements and superﬁcial
concessions at the IAEA to win EU backing. As further inducements,
Iran could offer intelligence on terrorist groups operating in Europe
(some of which it may itself be funding), or even concessionary oil
supply arrangements. It could invite European journalists to tour its
nuclear facilities, as a demonstration of Iran’s peaceful intent. Should
Europe adopt a harder line and back U.S.-led sanctions or military
force, however, Iran could step up work on its Shahab-4 missiles, said
to have sufﬁcient range to target European capitols.
STRATEGIC AND MILITARY MOVES
Conclusion 4: The Regime’s Core Values will Drive It Ineluctably
toward Aggressive Military Action, Not Responsibility.
Until recently, U.S. policy toward Iran has been driven by
two underlying assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption was that there
were “moderates” within the ruling elite who sincerely wanted to
cooperate with the United States, and who had serious differences
with hard-liners in areas of critical U.S. interest14. The second was
that the United States could offer them sufﬁcient incentives (or inﬂict
enough pain on the hard-liners) to convince the clerics to change
those policies the United States found objectionable: in this case, to
freeze and ultimately abandon nuclear weapons development. For
nearly 2 decades, these assumptions have rarely been debated, let
alone challenged, except by a select group of analysts.
But as I have argued elsewhere,15 the drive to obtain nuclear
weapons and a broad spectrum of WMD capabilities is only one of
ﬁve goals that unite the ruling clerical elite. These are the core values
that form the bedrock of this regime, and will shape the actions of a
nuclear-ready Iran. The remaining four are:
1. Maintaining the Islamic Republic at all costs, starting with the
system of Velayat-e faghih (absolute clerical rule). Iran’s ruling clerics
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understand that their regime is increasingly unpopular at home. In
July 1999, students at universities across the country revolted. While
the regime has managed through heavy-handed repression to break
the back of organized opposition, the signs that trouble is brewing
just beneath the surface are many.
On the eve of the February 2004 parliamentary elections, 117
reformist members of Parliament resigned en masse to protest having
been barred from running. The reformers had been seeking a “kinder,
gentler” Islamic Republic, not an end to absolute clerical rule. The
resulting election sweep by hard-liners effectively marked the end of
the reform movement mirage. Iranian voters massively boycotted the
elections but as of yet have not managed to otherwise challenge the
regime, which has emerged emboldened from the election crisis.
At the same time, regime leaders fear foreign support for the prodemocracy movement, and increasingly view the proliferation of
satellite radio and television broadcasts into Iran from abroad with
alarm. As the United States contemplates providing support for the
pro-democracy movement, we must understand that Iran’s new
nuclear capabilities increase the stakes. A nuclear-ready Iran will not
stop at violently suppressing domestic dissent, but will actively seek
ways of lashing out at what it sees as the sources of that dissent: the
United States and Israel. Similarly, any outbreak of dissent inside
Iran, whether fueled by outside forces or not, will be blamed on the
United States and Israel.
2. Aggressive expansion of Iran’s inﬂuence in the Persian Gulf
region to become the predominant power, militarily, politically, and
eventually economically. The Islamic Republic has a long history of
using terror and subversion against neighboring states to achieve
its goals. With a real or virtual nuclear arsenal at its disposal, Iran’s
leaders may be emboldened to take more aggressive steps to assert its
pre-eminence and to weaken competitors. A few examples include:
Saudi Arabia. Iran will resist Saudi efforts to step up oil production
in order to lower world oil prices, and will want Saudi Arabia to
feel the heat of Iran’s new power. A nuclear ready Iran could feel
emboldened to step up its support for Saudi terrorist groups and
direct them to sabotage or otherwise attack Saudi oil installations,
should the Saudis refuse to decrease production.
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Iraq. The Iranian government pursued an aggressive campaign of
subversion against the Iraqi Governing Council following Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM. It supported renegade Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr,
beamed anti-American propaganda into Iraq on 42 Arabic-language
radio and television stations, and built a network of social services in
southern Iraq that bested those provided by the Coalition Provisional
Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). A nuclear-ready
Iran could step up subversion inside Iraq (attacks on oil installations,
U.S. and Iraqi forces), with the goals of scaling back Iraqi oil exports,
driving the United States to withdraw its troops, and preventing the
emergence of a strong central Iraqi government that could challenge
Iran.
Qatar. Iran is competing with Qatar to attract international
investment to develop a massive shared gas ﬁeld in the Persian Gulf.
(The Iranians refer to the offshore gas ﬁeld as South Pars; the Qataris
call it the North Dome.) They are also competing to supply natural
gas to India and Pakistan.16. Fear of a natural gas “glut” could lead
Iran to seek to limit foreign investment in Qatari gas projects.
Turkey. Iran’s main economic competitor in the region is Turkey.
Should Turkey’s secular parties or the military replace the current
Islamic governing party, Iran could resume its support for Islamic
terrorist groups to destabilize Turkey.
3. Calls to end the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which
the Islamic Republic views as a direct challenge to its predominance.
The Islamic Republic has long sought to force the withdrawal of U.S.
military forces from the Gulf. Since the testimony of former Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Louis Freeh on December 18,
2003, in a civil suit against the Islamic Republic of Iran brought by
families of the Dhahran victims, Iran’s direct involvement in the
bombing has become a matter of public record. The Iranian attack
was aimed at causing casualties unacceptable to the U.S. public that
would force a U.S. withdrawal from Saudi Arabia. 17
In the past, the regime’s use of terror against U.S. targets has
been selective, as Iran carefully gauged the U.S. response. A nuclear
ready Iran will feel emboldened to launch terrorist attacks on U.S.
forces wherever they are stationed in the region as the price of U.S.
retaliation dramatically escalates. To step up pressure on the United
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States to withdraw its forces, Iranian surrogates could also launch
attacks against countries that host U.S. military bases (Qatar, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates [UAE], Bahrain, Oman), and on U.S. naval
ships patrolling the Gulf. (It is my judgment that Iran is less likely to
seek to close the Strait of Hormuz, since this would cripple its own
oil exports, or to openly challenge U.S. warships passing through
the Strait, if it can achieve its goal of a U.S. military pullout through
other means).
4. Active subversion of the Middle East peace process.
Notwithstanding the vicious anti-Semitic rhetoric of its leaders, the
Islamic Republic views Israel as a competitor. The ruling clerics fear
that if the peace process succeeds, Israel will become the predominant
economic power in the region and the partner of choice for the Arab
world, Turkey, and Central Asia, instead of Iran. A nuclear-ready
Iran will seek to broaden the struggle against Israel by expanding its
support for terrorist groups based in the Palestinian territories, Syria
and Lebanon. If war between Israel and its Arab neighbors were to
break out, Iran has made clear it would throw its support behind
Syria.
Conclusion 5: Iran Hopes Nuclear Capability will Deter a U.S. or
Israeli Conventional Strike.
The chronology of Iranian nuclear development, which has
accelerated rapidly since the September 11, 2001, attacks on America,
strongly supports the view that Iran’s leaders believe they can deter
an American conventional attack with the threat of nuclear retaliation.
“Iran’s national defense doctrine has been based on the assumption
that it will, one day, ﬁght a war with the United States, plus its Arab
allies and Israel,” writes Iranian analyst Amir Taheri.
The central assumption of Iranian strategists is that the U.S. cannot
sustain a long war. It is therefore necessary to pin down its forces and
raise the kill-die ratio to levels unacceptable to the American public. In
the meantime, Iran would put its nuclear weapons program in high gear,
and brandish the threat of nuclear war as a means of forcing the U.S
to accept a ceaseﬁre and withdraw its forces from whatever chunk of
Iranian territory they may have seized.18
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Iran’s leaders have become increasingly bold in brandishing the
threat of using nuclear weapons against Israel should the Israelis
attempt a conventional strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. This is
dramatically different from the Cold War logic of mutually-assured
destruction, since it states that Iran would escalate a conventional
conﬂict into a nuclear exchange.
But they have also hinted that they seek nuclear weapons (and
the missiles needed to deliver them) to give them new offensive
capabilities. Iran’s Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani told reporters
after a September 25, 1998, military parade that Iran would strike “in
a way the Israelis cannot imagine” in the event Israel should launch
a preemptive attack on Iran. “Today, we are much stronger than in
the past. The most clear example is the Shahab-3. It will make the
Israelis ponder about putting an end to the arms race one day,” he
said. Banners with the slogan, “Israel must be wiped off the map”
in both Farsi and English, were hung from the Shahab-3 missiles put
on parade. Shamkhani explained: “We have written on the warhead
of the Shahab-3 that this will not land in any Islamic country. . . . Of
course, this program will be pursued, and we will have the Shahab-4
and even the Shahab-5 to respond to our defense needs.”19
At times, Iran’s leaders speak with a kind of millennial exaltation
when evoking a nuclear exchange with Israel. In a speech in Tehran
in October 2000, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani
clearly stated that Iran believed it would come out the winner. “In
a nuclear duel in the region, Israel may kill 100 million Muslims,”
Rafsanjani said. “Muslims can sustain such casualties, knowing that,
in exchange, there would be no Israel on the map.”20
Rafsanjani expanded on this doomsday calculus in a oft-cited
Friday prayer sermon in Tehran on December 14, 2001, noting “the
use of a [single] nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the
ground,” whereas an Israeli strike on Iran “will only damage the
world of Islam” [emphasis mine]. Rafsanjani said that Israel would
be “removed from the region and the world of Islam [as] ‘extraneous
matter’,” and that “those who have gathered together in Israel
would one day be dispersed again.” This is not the language of
mutually assured destruction or deterrence. This is the language of
genocide.21
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When asked about the possibility of Israel launching a preemptive
strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Rafsanjani boasted to al-Jazeera
television on September 18, 2003, “We are not worried about Israel
and its threats. If Israel committed such an error, we would give it a
slap it would never forget—not only during several years, but for all
its history.”22
Rafsanjani gets credited with having revived Iran’s stalled nuclear
program, ﬁrst as Parliament Speaker in the early 1980s, and later as
President from 1989-97. He now heads the Expediency Council, a
leadership body capable of overturning the legislature or even the
Islamic Republic’s main religious court, the Council of Guardians.
Once labeled a moderate by the Washington Post and the State
Department, “either Rafsanjani fooled diplomats and pundits alike,
or moderate in Iran implies ﬁrst-strike use of nuclear weapons,”
scholar Michael Rubin commented.23
Other government spokesmen have reinforced Rafsanjani’s
threats, as Israeli ofﬁcials began warning publicly that a preemptive
strike against Iranian nuclear sites could become necessary. Seyed
Masood Jazayeri, spokesman for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,
accused Washington of using its “wild dog”—Israel—to go after
Iran’s nuclear programs. If Israel tried to disrupt the Iranian program,
it “would be wiped off the face of the Earth and U.S. interests would
be easily damaged,” he warned in July 2004.24 President Khatami
added that Iran would consider the United States co-responsible for
an Israeli attack. “In the international arena, America’s capital is Tel
Aviv, not Washington. It’s the Zionists who dominate the United
States,” he told reporters as he emerged from a Cabinet meeting.
He also announced that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment
activities.25
The clarity of Iran’s threats should not be dismissed as mere
exaggeration or wishful thinking. A nuclear-ready Iran is likely to
goad Israel into launching a preemptive attack, after it has dispersed
its nuclear material to ensure that it survives the strike. If the regime
feels threatened—from domestic dissent, or foreign attack—the risk
of nuclear miscalculation is enormous.
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U.S. OPTIONS
In my judgment, the United States has only two options if it
allows Iran to achieve breakout nuclear capability: capitulation, or
war. The United States might seek to encourage Iran to become a
“responsible” member of the nuclear club, by opening a “dialogue”
with the regime. In exchange for Iran’s agreement to abide by “rules”
such as no nuclear ﬁrst use, and no onward proliferation to third
parties, the United States might chose to offer incentives such as:
• a resumption of normal trade and investment,
• a resumption of diplomatic relations,
• an end to stigmatizing the Islamic Republic as a member of
the Axis of Evil, and
• ending “the language of regime change.”26
The recent Council on Foreign Relations report opines that
the underlying rationale for Iran’s persistent clandestine nuclear
weapons programs is its fear of regional rivals, especially the United
States. “Ultimately, only in the context of an overall rapprochement
with Washington will there be any prospect of persuading Iran to
make the strategic decision to relinquish its nuclear program,” the
report states.
Such an analysis assumes that Iran developed nuclear weapons as
a bargaining chip, which it would be willing to give up in exchange
for certain concessions. But the United States repeatedly has offered
to resume normal trade and investment, to hold a security dialogue
with the regime, and to eschew the language of regime change, if only
Iran would abandon other objectionable behavior—in particular, its
support of international terrorist groups and its violent opposition to
the Middle East peace process. If the Islamic Republic was unwilling
to take up the offer when the costs were relatively low, why should
it take the offer now when the costs are much higher? At best, the
Islamic Republic might agree to a U.S. offer of trade and relations,
in exchange for a pledge of no nuclear ﬁrst use and no onward
proliferation. But Iran’s leaders will take such a U.S. offer as a sign
of weakness. Far from giving up its nuclear capability in exchange,
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the Iranian regime will insist that it be treated with respect as a
new member of the nuclear club. With the EU, Russia, and China in
agreement to thwart strong UN Security Council action, the United
States will have no levers available should Iran ﬁnd a convenient
excuse at some later date to break its promise and unsheath the
nuclear sword.
The only other option for the United States is preemptive war. If
so, it will be war in splendid isolation, and with active opposition from
Europe, Russia, China, the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
and just about every UN member state except, possibly, Israel.
Once the United States begins a buildup of offensive forces poised
on Iran’s borders, the Islamic regime is unlikely to wait before it
uses whatever nuclear arsenal it possesses. Its ﬁrst target will not be
U.S. forces, but Israel. The Islamic regime will claim to be attacking
in “self-defense” (and most of world public opinion will probably
agree), since the U.S. administration will be portrayed as doing
Israel’s bidding, as the “moderate” president Khatami asserts.
Only one Iranian nuclear-tipped missile needs to penetrate
Israel’s Arrow anti-missile defenses to devastate Israel’s highlyconcentrated population. Even a cowed Israeli leadership, deterred
from preemptively attacking Iranian nuclear sites, can be expected
to unleash its nuclear arsenal, in a tragic reenactment of the Jewish
defenders at Masada 2,000 years ago, who preferred suicide to
surrendering to the Roman legion.
A NUCLEAR IRAN IS NOT AN OPTION
From the foregoing, it should be clear that allowing a nuclear Iran
to emerge, for as long as Iran is ruled by a radical clerical regime, is not
an option any U.S. policymaker wants to face. It should also be clear
that the intentions of Iran’s leaders are the issue, not the capabilities
of its military. If nuclear weapons alone were the problem, the United
States would have security issues with Great Britain.
It is my judgment that the United States must take decisive action
before Iran becomes nuclear-ready, for as long as the Islamic regime
remains in power in Tehran.
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PART III
IS THERE A SIMPLE MILITARY OR SANCTIONS FIX?

CHAPTER 6
IS THE BEGIN DOCTRINE STILL A VIABLE OPTION
FOR ISRAEL?
Shlomo Brom
THE BIRTH OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A General Israeli Proclivity towards Preemption and Prevention.
Preemption and prevention were an important part of the security
discourse in Israel since the inception of the state of Israel. The
development of such a discourse was natural because of the unique
geo-strategic situation of the state of Israel; a small state with a small
population surrounded by much larger Arab states determined in
these years to reverse the results of the 1948-49 Independence War
and put an end to the existence of the Jewish state. When the Israeli
defense doctrine was formulated by its ﬁrst prime minister, David
Ben-Gurion, it was evident that Israel could not afford a major
invasion of its very limited territory. Two major principles were
included in this doctrine to prevent the occurrence of such invasion.
The ﬁrst was “early warning” and the second was “transferring war
to the enemy’s territory as soon as possible.”
“Early warning” was supposed to enable taking effective
countermeasures against an invasion by the establishment of an
efﬁcient intelligence system that would be capable of giving accurate
and timely warning of an approaching invasion. If time allowed and
the necessary reserve forces could be mobilized, a preemptive strike
could be launched. If time did not allow such a strike, then it was
envisaged that a very short defensive battle would be utilized to
gain enough time to mobilize the reserve forces that would carry the
battle to the enemy’s territory.
In this discourse sometimes the notion of preemptive war was
mixed with the notion of preventive war, and there was no real
distinction between them. The ﬁrst example of an implementation
of these doctrines was in the Sinai Campaign of 1956. The Israeli
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leadership that was following the large weapons deals of Egypt
in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block suspected that these
weapons deals served as preparation for an approaching Egyptian
strike against Israel. They also decided to exploit the conﬂict that
developed between Egypt and France and the United Kingdom
(UK) following the nationalization of the Suez Canal; Israel formed
an alliance with France and the UK that led to an attack on Egypt by
the three powers. From the point of view of Israel, this operation was
highly successful. It led to the de-facto demilitarization of the Sinai
Desert separating Israel from Egypt, to a stoppage of terrorist attacks
from Egypt, and to a substantial improvement of Israel’s strategic
situation.
In I967 the same scenario repeated itself, but this time with
a more concrete threat. Egypt forced the United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping force to leave the Sinai and deployed massive forces
on Israel’s border. This was interpreted by Israel as preparation for
an all out attack. Israel preempted and attacked the Egyptian army
in the Sinai before it had a chance to attack Israel. Once again, it was
perceived that preemption saved Israel from an imminent threat to
its existence.1
In 1973 the government of Golda Meir considered a premptive
strike when it had reliable information about the approaching
Egyptian-Syrian attack but decided not to take this step because of
concern for the possibility of political repercussions, coupled with too
much conﬁdence in the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) capabilities.
In 1982 Israel initiated the war in Lebanon. This war is very
controversial in Israel because many Israelis were not convinced
that it was really necessary. But its saliency for the understanding of
Israel’s security doctrine stems from the fact that the arguments of
the supporters of the war, arguments that succeeded in convincing
the Israeli cabinet to approve it, were based on the need to preempt
the terrorist threat from Lebanon.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Preemption/Prevention.
Early in the Israeli preemption discourse, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) played an important role because, for Israel, such
threats touch raw nerves. First, they roused holocaust memories. The
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Nazis tried to exterminate the Jews with the use of poisonous gas.
The talk about chemical and biological weapons creates among Jews
an association with the darkest time in Jewish history. At the same
time, these weapons were posing an existential threat on a nation that
was already highly aware of the opposition of its neighborhood to
its existence. The ﬁrst time these considerations played a major role
was at the end of the 1950s, when Nasser’s Egypt was leading the
Arab opposition to the existence of Israel and initiated projects for
the development and production of ballistic missiles and chemical
weapons. For that purpose, German World War II scientists and
engineers were mobilized by the Egyptians. They moved to Egypt
and started to play a major role in these projects. German technology
based ﬁrms were also used to supply components and technology
for the Egyptian projects.2
In the years 1960-64, Israel made a concerted effort to preempt
the Egyptian missile project by a combination of covert action by the
Israeli external intelligence agency, the Mossad, against the German
personnel that were involved in the project, and political action
aimed at the German government. In this framework the means
adopted were covert assassination attempts and intimidation. The
combination worked and eventually the German assistance stopped,
leading to the collapse of the Egyptian indigenous program.3
In the beginning of the 1970s, Saddam Hussein, already the defacto ruler of Iraq, initiated a military nuclear program. The Iraqis
decided to get ﬁssile material through the production of plutonium
in a reactor and its separation. The plutonium producing reactor was
procured from France in the framework of a nuclear cooperation
agreement concluded in 1975. The separation instrumentation was
acquired in Italy.
Aware of the Iraqi program, Begin’s government decided to
preempt it by preventing the construction and operation of the
French-built reactor. First, the well-proved combination of covert
action and political action in France was attempted, but it failed to
stop the project. Israeli agents succeeded in sabotaging the core of
the reactor while it was stored in France prior to its shipment to Iraq.
That only delayed the shipment, and the French government refused
to acknowledge the real nature of the Iraqi project and stop French

135

involvement. In the next stage, Israel decided to attack the reactor
and destroy it before it started operation. On June 7, 1981, eight
Israeli F-16 aircraft attacked the Iraqi Osiraq reactor in Tuweitah,
near Baghdad, and destroyed it completely.4
At ﬁrst, world opinion reaction to the attack was hostile. It
was described as a violation of acceptable norms in international
relations. The U.S. administration condemned the action and decided
to suspend the supply of military aircraft to Israel. The UN Security
Council condemned Israel for this action as well. Ten years later,
after the war on Iraq and the exposure of the Iraqi military nuclear
program by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), there was
general recognition that the attack on Osiraq was justiﬁed.5
While Israel chose to stop the above two programs by the use of
force, either covertly or overtly, other ballistic missile programs and
WMD programs were dealt with differently. The salient examples
are:
• Egypt had an extensive chemical and biological weapons
program from the end of the 1950s. Israel chose not to do any
thing against this program.
• Syria initiated a chemical weapons program after the 1973
war. Once again, Israel chose not to act against this program.
When Syria started a program for the indigenous production
of ballistic missiles in the 1990s, the same approach was
adopted.
• In 1981-83, Iraq, with the support of European companies,
built a large scale facility for the production of chemical
weapons at Al-Muthana, and nothing was done by Israel. The
Iraqi missile production projects received the same Israeli
attitude.6
• The most interesting example is that of the renewed Iraqi
nuclear project after the destruction of Osiraq. This time,
Iraq chose the track of enrichment of uranium for acquisition
of military grade ﬁssile material. Different methods were
tested and developed; enrichment by gas centrifuges, electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), chemical enrichment,
and gaseous uranium diffusion enrichment. In parallel, much
work was invested in the technologies of the production of a
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warhead based on enriched uranium (explosives, electronics,
and metallurgy). Israel had good information about important
parts of these projects, but it choose, until the 1991 Gulf War,
not to use force in any way and preferred to focus on political
pressure directed at European governments to prevent
assistance to the Iraqi program by companies that operated in
these states, mainly, Germany, UK, Italy, and Switzerland.7
• Israel also did not make any real attempt to stop the Pakistani
nuclear program during the 1970s and 1980s, although it was
perceived as an “Islamic bomb” and a threat to Israel.8 At the
time, there were some rumors and suspicions that Israel was
involved in acts against the Pakistani program, but they were
never conﬁrmed.
Developing a General Theory.
Following the Israeli attack on Osiraq, there was a tendency among
researchers to propose that Israel had adopted a comprehensive
and all encompassing preventive counterproliferation doctrine
sometimes referred to as “the Begin Doctrine.” This was based to
a great extent on Israeli government statements. Shai Feldman, for
example, describes how, in its June 9 announcement of Osiraq’s
destruction, Israel’s government articulated its belief that, had Iraq’s
President Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear bombs, he would not
have hesitated to drop them on Israeli cities and population centers.
The Israeli government then went on to a general preventive
doctrine: “under no circumstances would we allow the enemy to
develop weapons of mass destruction against our nation; we will
defend Israel’s citizens, in time, with all the means at our disposal.”9
Feldman adds that this theme soon was crowned as a “doctrine,”
not only because it was immediately viewed as such by numerous
observers worldwide, but also because Israel’s leaders have since
repeated it on numerous occasions. One example is a major policy
address given by Israel’s then Minister of Defense and present Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon:
The third element in our defense policy for the 1980s is our determination
to prevent confrontation states from gaining access to nuclear weapons.
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Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon. For us, it is
not a question of balance of terror but a question of survival. We shall
therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception.10

Feldman, however, doubts the long-term feasibility of the
doctrine.11
Other scholars argue that Israel is more prone to launch preventive
strikes against other proliferators because of its speciﬁc posture as
the only Middle Eastern state that lives in a hostile environment,
is perceived as a nuclear power, but keeps an “ambiguous nuclear
policy.” Etel Solingen proposes that “opaqueness” (that is the term
she prefers for what is named elsewhere as “ambiguity”) may
include the use of compellence by actively preventing an adversary
from achieving a nuclear capability, presumably because the power
that chose opaqueness did it as a way of retaining its nuclear
monopoly.12 Scott D. Sagan sees a wider risk of preventive wars
among proliferators when he refers to the perils of proliferation.
He uses evidence from the U.S.-USSR, India-Pakistan, and Ukraine
cases to argue that this evidence does suggest strongly that military
ofﬁcers have strong proclivity towards preventive war. His main
concern, of course, is preventive nuclear wars and not conventional
surgical strikes against nuclear installations. Strangely enough, Sagan
does not discuss the Israeli case perhaps because he believes Israel
succeeded in developing stable civil-military relations and therefore
it is more likely to adopt a prudent policy.13 Bruce Berkowitz is raising
a similar concern when he says that, considering the expected costs of
acquiring an opponent armed with nuclear weapons, a prospective
nuclear power would present other countries with a temptation
to conduct the ultimate “preemptive strike”--attacking the state’s
nuclear reactors or weapons fabrication plants before a bomb is tested.
He adds that the Israelis did this to Iraq in 1981 with ﬁghter-bombers
armed with conventional bombs, but it would not be outlandish to
argue that the Israelis would have been willing to consider using
nuclear weapons on the mission if such weapons were available and
if they were deemed necessary for success.14 The ease with which
Berkowitz describes Israel’s resort to a nuclear preemptive strike
looks quite outlandish, but it reﬂects a popular belief that Israel
would do anything to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle
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East. Frank Barnaby sees the Middle East as particularly unstable
because of the danger of preemptive strikes against nuclear-weapons
sites. “A large-scale Israeli deployment of nuclear weapons could
provoke a preemptive Arab attack against production sites, arsenals,
and command centers. Israel would almost certainly respond to
any Arab attempt to acquire nuclear weapons with a military strike
such as the one on Iraq’s reactor.”15 This kind of almost automatic
response to an Arab nuclear or other WMD program does not reﬂect
the actual Israeli policies as describes in the previous chapter, and
that raises the question: Under what circumstances is Israel willing
to take violent preemptive action against an adversary’s nuclear
program?
Barry Schneider deals more generally with the question of the
necessary speciﬁc set of conditions for any head of state to order
a preemptive counterproliferation strike. He assumes the nuclear
aspirant would have to be approaching the nuclear threshold and be
led by a hostile government that appeared ready to take extreme risks.
The developing scenario would have to directly and immediately
threaten a vital interest of the country considering the preemptive
strike. It would require information on important nuclear target
locations of the adversary and the ability to achieve tactical surprise.
The adversary should not be able to threaten the preemptor with
nuclear arms or other WMD or have a strong ally who is likely to
do so on its behalf. All other reasonable options should have been
exhausted before such a strike is undertaken. The head of state should
also have adequate domestic and international political support for
the action and for bringing any military campaign to a successful
conclusion before choosing this type of nonproliferation activity.16
Evidence suggests that in the Israeli case some modiﬁcations of
this model are necessary. First, there is a need to deﬁne the meaning
of approaching the nuclear threshold. In the Israeli case, it seems
that this point is deﬁned as the point of irreversibility, namely the
time in which the proliferator stops being dependent on external
assistance; it controls all the necessary technologies and knowledge;
and it cannot be denied these capabilities through pressure over
the states and private elements that supply assistance. Thus, Israel
decided to attack Osiraq when it was clear that all the equipment of
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the reactor and the separation cells was already supplied by France
and Italy, respectively.
Second, there is a wider question of the feasibility of the military
operations against the nuclear installations. It is not only a matter of
having the necessary intelligence about their locations and having
the capability to achieve tactical surprise.
Third, it is not true in the case of Israel that when the adversary
can threaten the preemptor with any WMD, preemptive action will
not be undertaken. Israel attacked Qsiraq although it was already
argued at this stage that Iraq had chemical weapons, and there
already were Iranian allegations, not corroborated, that Iraq used
these weapons in the war.17 It did not deter Israel from carrying out
the attack.
Fourth, international support is not a must. Israel launched its 1981
attack without international support. The United States launched its
recent war on Iraq without international support. The real issue is
what is at stake and is it worth international condemnation. It seems
that, in many cases, leaders are willing to take the risks.
Fifth, the proposition that the developing scenario is directly and
immediately threatening a vital interest of the country considering
the preemptive strike, is highly dependent on the perception of the
preemptor. There is no objective way of measuring it. In Israel, there
is high propensity to see any Arab and Iranian nuclear capability as
an existential threat for Israel.18
The modiﬁed Israeli model that explains the differences in Israeli
reaction to different ballistic missiles and WMD programs in the
Middle East should include the following set of considerations that
are taken during the decisionmaking process by the Israeli leaders:
The magnitude and severity of the threat. In Israel’s case, the immediacy
of a WMD threat does not play an important role. Israel destroyed
Osiraq in 1981 when Iraq was embroiled in a long and difﬁcult war
with Iran and when it was clear that Iraq could not afford another
conﬂict with Israel. On the contrary, Iraq started some gestures
towards Israel at that time. The severity of the threat is dependent
on the type of WMD and their delivery means. The term “weapons
of mass destruction” is misleading. The destructive power of nuclear
weapons surpasses signiﬁcantly the other categories of WMD, and
biological weapons are considered more destructive than chemical
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weapons. It is dependent also on the availability of countermeasures.
There are no countermeasures against nuclear weapons, while it is
possible to acquire protection from chemical and biological weapons,
whether by protective clothes or suitable building codes. There are
also post-attack medical treatments for the victims of chemical and
biological attacks. It is not surprising that in the 1980s and 1990s,
the Israeli decisionmakers felt that they could deal with chemical
weapons and possibly biological weapons, and therefore there
was no acute need to take preemptive action. The availability of
countermeasures is changing through time. In the 1960s, there was a
feeling in Israel that there were no countermeasures against ballistic
missiles, and hence preemptive actions were undertaken against
the Egyptian missile program. Twenty years later, technological
advancements made it possible to develop effective countermeasures.
The severity of the threat is also linked to the level of animosity in
the relationship between Israel and the proliferators. Thus Israel did
not see Pakistan’s nuclear capability as having a direct bearing on
its security, while a nuclear Iraq presided over by megalomaniac
Saddam was considered an existential threat.
Feasibility. Can use of force stop the program or at least delay
it for a substantial time? The answer depends on the character of
the program and on the availability of operational capabilities that
can be used against the program. The decision to attack Osiraq was
relatively easy because the entire nuclear project was dependent on
this one facility, a Plutonium producing reactor. It was clear that
the destruction of the reactor would lead to the stoppage of this
nuclear project, and indeed after the attack the Iraqis abandoned
the Plutonium track, and when they decided to resume the nuclear
program, they based it on enrichment of uranium by a number of
methods. The same thing was true for the Egyptian missile program
in the 1960s. It was clear that the program was totally dependent on
the assistance of the German personnel, and they provided an easy
and soft target.
In comparison, it was difﬁcult to ﬁnd one link in the research,
development, and production chain of the Iraqi chemical weapons
that, when attacked, would have caused a stoppage or a substantial
delay of the program. These programs were much more dispersed
and redundant than the initial Iraqi nuclear program.
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A good example was the Iraqi main chemical weapons production
facility at Al Muthana. It was a huge facility, covering tens of acres,
with several dozen buildings in which there were hundreds of
equipment items. None of these buildings or equipment items was
unique or irreplaceable.19
The same thing was true for the post-1981 Iraqi nuclear program.
The Iraqis learned the lessons of the 1981 attack, and their new
program was much less vulnerable and included many redundancies.
They worked in parallel on several methods for the enrichment
of uranium. When they started to build fully operational plants,
they constructed two different plants at different areas of Iraq for
the enrichment of uranium with EMIS. They also planned to build
several facilities for gas centrifuges enrichment. The new system
was dispersed and could not be destroyed with one surgical strike.
One can assume that this added difﬁculty contributed to the Israeli
decision not to attack these facilities.
Feasibility is also dependent upon the level of intelligence available
to Israel. It should know the location and function of the different
facilities, and be certain the intelligence at its disposal is complete
enough to ascertain that, once these installations are destroyed, the
WMD program will be stopped or delayed for a substantial time.
In the case of the post-1981 Iraqi nuclear program, the ﬁndings of
the IAEA Iraq action team show clearly that the intelligence that
was available to Israel and its Western allies about the Iraqi nuclear
program was partial,20 and it is doubtful whether it allowed for an
effective preventive strike.
Last, feasibility is dependent upon the operational capabilities
needed for the desired effects in the targets. The Israeli Air Force
(IAF) has formidable capabilities and enjoys unchallenged supremacy
vis-à-vis the other Middle East air powers, but Israel has no aircraft
carriers and it cannot use airbases in other Middle East states;
therefore its operational capabilities are reduced when the targets are
located far from its territory. Based on the past performance of the
IAF, its order of battle that includes only F-15I and F-16C/D aircraft
capable of long range strike, and the deployment of its aircraft,21 it
is possible to determine that at long ranges (more then 600 km), the
IAF is capable of a few surgical strikes, but it is not capable of a
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sustained air campaign against a full array of targets. The operational
capability is dependent also on the expected opposition to the attack
by the adversary’s air defense system. Targets that are well-defended
by ground air defense and interceptors have to be attacked by a
larger aerial force composed of the attack aircraft, interceptors that
protect them, and other support aircraft (for air refueling, electronic
countermeasures [ECM] support, communication, and rescue).
Covert action demands other kind of operational capabilities.
The intelligence needed for these kinds of operations is usually more
detailed and necessitates a better penetration of the adversary’s
program. The covert sabotage options are linked to the adversary’s
program’s dependence on other states’ assistance. Usually it is
easier to operate covertly outside the adversary’s territory. The
proliferators in the Middle East are usually states that are ruled by
authoritarian regimes with strong control of their security services,
and very limited freedom of movement for foreigners. The locations
that are part of the WMD program are high security installations and
are well-protected. The only vulnerable point is the connections with
the outside world in states in which Israel’s security services have
better operational capabilities.
Israeli leaders, like other leaders, resort to use of violent means
when other means are exhausted. Osiraq was attacked after many
attempts to convince the French government not to supply the
reactor to Iraq.22 Israel acted against the German experts that helped
the Egyptian missile program only when it seemed that the German
government was not doing anything to prevent this assistance, and
stopped its actions when it became clear that Germany was willing
to take decisive action against these experts. This decision of Prime
Minister Ben Gurion led to the resignation of Director of the Mossad
Issar Harel who objected and argued for the continuation of the
covert operations.23
An Israeli leader that considers preventive action has to take
into account the cost of the action, externally and domestically. He
has to consider two scenarios; a scenario of failure and a scenario of
success. In case of failure, the cost is mainly in the loss of domestic
support. Present Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon suffered a real
blow to his political career because he initiated a preventive war in
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Lebanon in 1982 that was perceived by many in Israel as a failure.
Nevertheless, it seems that because of the high sensitivity in the
Israeli public to the acquisition of WMD by its adversaries, an Israeli
leader may assume that the public will not punish him, even for a
failed attempt of prevention. The external cost of a failure is smaller
because the powers that would have objected to the action will feel
that Israel was punished enough by the failure. In a case of success,
the domestic opposition will be silenced, while Israel may pay a
cost in its external relations. The attack on Osiraq is an interesting
test case. Domestically, there was some opposition to the operation;
some by opposition leaders and some by ofﬁcials that knew about
its preparations, but it subsided a short time after the successful
implementation.24 The external reactions were much harsher and
included sanctions by the United States.
The discussion of the domestic cost raises the question whether the
Israeli doctrine of preemption/prevention is affected by partisanship.
Generally, one can argue that right-wing governments are more
inclined to exhibit tough policies towards Israel’s adversaries, and
therefore it can be assumed that they will be more inclined to adopt
preemptive/preventive policies. Nevertheless, it is not possible to
reach this conclusion from the few cases of Israeli implementation of
preventive action against WMD programs in the Middle East. A leftcenter government initiated violent preventive actions against the
Egyptian ballistic missiles program, while a right-wing government
decided on the destruction of Osiraq. In this latter case, there was
opposition and support for the operation among opposition persons
and among persons that were part of the right-wing administration.
The operation became a highly contested political issue only because
it was executed a short time before the general elections, and it was
argued that it was a kind of elections campaign spin.25 Therefore,
it seems that usually such matters of national security are not
considered a partisan subject as long as they are not perceived as
something that is going to serve the domestic political agenda of the
ruling party.
Another part of the perceived cost is the possible violent reaction
of the attacked proliferators. The Israeli leader has to weigh the
utility of the planned operations, especially in cases where it is
clear that only a delay will be achieved, against the possible cost
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in life and property as a result of the adversary’s reprisals. There
are several explanations for Saddam’s decision to launch ballistic
missiles against Israeli cities in 1991, but one of the simplest and most
probable explanations is that Saddam used the opportunity of the
war to settle the account of the 1981 attack by Israel. In considering
the risk of reprisal, the Israeli leader will have to weigh the military
capabilities of the adversary, the record of its regime, the potential of
reprisal by nonmilitary means, e.g., terror, and the efﬁcacy of Israel’s
defenses against these challenges.
THE IRANIAN CASE
Any estimation of a possible Israeli preemptive attack on the
Iranian nuclear program should be based on the speciﬁc parameters
of the Iranian case.
Israeli Perception of the Threat.
There are two schools of thought in Israel that have different
perceptions of the Iranian threat. The ﬁrst one is represented by
persons like member of Knesset (the Israeli parliament) Ephraim
Sneh and by the Military Intelligence community who perceive Iran
as a bitter ideological enemy that is determined to bring about the
physical annihilation of Israel. This school does not believe that a
regime change in Iran is possible in the foreseeable future. The clear
conclusion is that Israel cannot live with an Iran that has military
nuclear capabilities, because sooner or later Iran will use them
against Israel.
The other school of thought looks at Iran as a more complex
entity with a policy that is inﬂuenced by many considerations, the
ideological consideration being only one of them. According to this
line of thinking, Iranian policies are motivated more by national
interests and preservation of the regime considerations than by
ideology. In the case of the Iranian policy vis-à-vis Israel, Iran is
pursuing its ideological agenda because it serves its national interest
of getting inﬂuence in the Arab world and a status of leadership in
the Moslem world, and it helps the regime to retain its revolutionary
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image and thus keep its raison d’etre for being a legitimate regime.
This school of thought is represented in the Israeli intelligence
community by the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency,26 and
has supporters in the Ministry of Defense and the National Security
Council.
Different perceptions lead to different conclusions. While the
ﬁrst school assumes no political pressure can force Iran to stop its
military nuclear program, the other school believes that political
pressure can be effective in at least delaying the nuclear program
signiﬁcantly. The second school believes that a nuclear Iran with a
different regime will not pose a high risk to Israel and can be easily
deterred. Furthermore, they believe that, if the nuclear program is
to be deferred sufﬁciently, regime change eventually will occur in
Iran, and it will diminish substantially the risk to Israel of an Iranian
nuclear program. The ﬁrst school believes that Israel cannot accept
Iran being nuclearized under any political circumstances. These
differences of view between those that can be deﬁned as Iran hawks
and those that can be deﬁned as Iran doves imply that the ﬁrst will
be more prone to recommend proactive and preemptive/preventive
violent operations against the Iranian nuclear program. The dividing
line is not partisan. One of the most vociferous Iran Hawks is Labor
(left-wing) Member of Knesset and ex-minister Ephraim Sneh, while
the present Likud (right-wing) Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz
sometimes preaches for restraint in Israel’s approach to Iran, even
when he points at the danger of Iran’s nuclear program.
The Nature of the Iranian Nuclear Program
and Its Vulnerabilities.
The Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, Osiraq, had a deep
impact on the evolution of other nuclear programs in the Middle
East. States that were determined to continue with such programs
learned the lessons of the attack and concluded that they should
strive to decrease the vulnerability of their program by adding more
protection and more redundancy. The new nuclear projects are
much more dispersed and well-protected. That is also true for the
Iranian nuclear program. The most essential part of every military
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nuclear program is the production of ﬁssile materials. According
to recent revelations concerning the Iranian nuclear program, Iran
intends to produce ﬁssile materials in two tracks; the uranium track
and the plutonium track. First, using the excuse of a plan to produce
fuel for nuclear power plants, Iran is building uranium enrichment
capabilities. Iran is also pursuing different methods of enrichment
to ensure redundancy. It is vigorously building an industrial size
facility for uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges in Natanz,
and it pursued also LASER enrichment of uranium. In parallel,
it is striving to control technologies that will enable it to build a
plutonium production heavy water reactor. In this context, it was
recently discovered that Iran is building a heavy water production
facility in Arak, and also has an intention to build at the same location
a heavy water so-called “research reactor,” which will probably be
used for irradiating of uranium, and later separation of plutonium
from the irradiated uranium rods.27 Uranium enrichment speciﬁcally
enables dispersion of the production facilities in a relatively large
number of small facilities. It is very difﬁcult to assure that there are
no additional facilities other than those that were already traced.
According to one estimate, there are 19 traced suspected nuclear
facilities in Iran without assurance that this number is ﬁnite.28
The nuclear facilities that Iran is constructing are also welldefended. The centrifuge plant built at Natanz is underground, and
it is defended by an extensive ground air defense system.29
It is very difﬁcult to ﬁnd in the Iranian nuclear program one
vulnerable point that, once it is attacked and destroyed, the Iranian
program is stopped or stalled for a long time. The Bushier nuclear
power plant, which is relatively vulnerable to attacks, is not really
a part of the military nuclear program, and it mostly serves as an
excuse for an Iranian wish to have control over the full fuel cycle,
namely building a capacity for uranium enrichment. Its attack would
not have a real effect on the military program. The net effect is that
any attempt to attack the Iranian nuclear program would necessitate
sustainable attacks on a relatively large number of targets that are
well-defended, passively and actively.
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Israeli Operational Capabilities vis-à-vis Iran.
Iran is situated more then 1,000 kms from Israel. It is a vast country,
and all the meaningful nuclear targets are, and most probably will
continue to be, situated far from its Western borders. That means
that once Israel decides to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will have
to plan a sustainable attack on a number of targets that are situated
1,500-1,700 kms from Israel. For that purpose, Israel can use only
its air force. The targets usually are far from the Indian Ocean, and
Israel has no signiﬁcant seaborne air power assets. Although Israel
has some military relationships with friendly states that are situated
closer to Iran, most notably, Turkey and India, these states also are
keeping a friendly relationship with Iran, and it is highly unlikely
that they would let Israel use their territories for the purpose of
attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This means that the Israeli
attack aircraft would have to take off from air bases in Israel, ﬂy
1,500-1,700 kms to the targets, destroy them, and then ﬂy back 1,5001,700 kms. It is also possible that the ﬂight would be even longer
for the Israeli planes because they would have to ﬂy through the air
space of Jordan and Iraq to use the direct shorter route to Iran. Flying
through Jordan without the explicit or implicit permission of the
Jordanians would hurt relations with a friendly Arab state. Flying
over Iraq without coordination with the United States would lead to
a clash with U.S. interceptors. Any attempt at coordination with the
United States or asking permission from Jordan might compromise
the operation. It is also very doubtful whether Jordan and the United
States would be willing to be involved in such Israeli operations. As
a result, the Israeli planes would have to use the longer route over
the Indian Ocean, with minimal penetration of the air space of other
states.
The IAF does not have any bombers. Its air ﬂeet consists only of
ﬁghter-bombers with limited range of action. Israel has 25 F-15I and
137 F-16C/D ﬁghter-bombers. It is going to improve its long range
capability in 2004 with few operational F-16I aircraft with greater
range of action then the F-15I, but the burden of the attacks would be
laid mostly on the F-15I aircraft that have better capabilities at longer
ranges. F-15I has a radius of action of 1,270 kms. The corresponding
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one for F-16C/D is 925 kms and for F-16I, 2,100 kms (but Israel will
have only few of them at the relevant time).30 The real operational
radius is even shorter because for parts of the route, the planes would
have to ﬂy at low altitude to avoid radar detection. That shortens the
range of ﬂight because of higher fuel consumption at low altitudes.
It means that the attack aircraft would need to be refueled at least
twice, on their way to the targets and from the targets. That adds
complication to the operation because Israel has only a few air
refuelers based on Boeing 707 aircraft platforms. Such aircraft are
very vulnerable, and therefore air refueling cannot take place in
hostile air space.
Assuming that the attack aircraft succeeded in entering the Iranian
air space, they would have to avoid early detection and be capable
of dealing with Iranian interceptors. Iran is a vast country, and the
radar assets available to the Iranian air defense system are limited.
If the Israeli planners had good information about their location, it
would be possible to plan approach routes to the targets that would
avoid early detection. If the attacking aircraft were detected and
intercepted, the Israeli F-15s and F-16s enjoy vast superiority over
the Iranian interceptors and would probably defend themselves
successfully. The problem is that such long range attacks are very
sensitive to interferences, and therefore the intercepted attack
formation might have to abort its mission.
If the Israeli attack aircraft succeed in avoiding early detection
and interception, it can be safely assumed that they would be capable
of avoiding the surface to air missile defenses and the antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) defenses deployed closer to the targets and destroy
the targets by use of a combination of tactics, ECM, and smart
munitions.
In any case, any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would
be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number
of attack aircraft and support aircraft (interceptors, ECM aircraft,
refuelers, and rescue aircraft) would participate. The conclusion is
that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets and not as part
of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one time surprise
operation.
Even if Israel had the attack capabilities needed for the destruction
of the all elements of the Iranian nuclear program, it is doubtful
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whether Israel has the kind of intelligence needed to be certain that
all the necessary elements of the program were traced and destroyed
fully. Israel has good photographic coverage of Iran with the Ofeq
series of reconnaissance satellites, but being so distant from Iran,
one can assume that other kinds of intelligence coverage are rather
partial and weak.
Covert action demands different kinds of operational capabilities
and intelligence. There is no indication that Israel has capabilities
of covert operations in Iran. The recent information about the
development of the Iranian program indicated that it reached a
status of being independent of external assistance. Moreover, the
assistance Iran got was mostly from Pakistan, another place which is
not a traditional area of operations for the Israeli secret services, like
Europe or South America. It seems that there is no real potential for
covert Israeli operations against the Iranian Nuclear program.
Were Other Options Exhausted?
So far, Israel has no reason to believe that the political negotiated
option was exhausted. Developments uncovered since the new
advances in the Iranian nuclear program indicate that a coordinated
action of the United States, the EU, and IAEA succeeded in forcing
the Iranians to suspend their uranium enrichment activities and
accept the additional protocol that will tighten monitoring of their
nuclear program. It seems that this success is also a byproduct of the
war in Iraq. It is feasible that the United States can deter Iran from
continuing its military nuclear program, especially when Europe is
cooperating with the United States and not letting Iran exploit the
differences of views between them.
In the meantime, the Israeli government doubts whether Iran
will, indeed, keep its commitments to stop the enrichment project
and adopts a “wait and see” policy, keeping all options open.31
The Domestic Cost of Action.
Iran is on a clash course with Israel since Humeini’s revolution.
It is leading a ﬂagrant anti-Israeli policy. It supports terror groups
that operate against Israel; Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Islamic
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Palestinian terror groups.32 It was directly involved in the terrorist
bombings of the Israeli embassy and the Jewish community center
in Buenos Aires, Argentina. It is no wonder that at present Iran
has a very negative image in the eyes of the Israeli public. Israelis
constantly are bombarded with anti-Iranian declarations by political
leaders and the media. They hear the director of the General Security
Service (GSS)33 saying at an open conference on December 16, 2003,
that Iran is the number one terror state in the world and a strategic
threat to Israel, and that it operates against Israel and its interests
everywhere.34 The director of the Mossad said that Iran is a threat to
world peace and is an existential threat to Israel when he appeared
in the Knesset’s Security and Foreign policy committee.35 It can be
safely assumed that any Israeli action against the Iranian nuclear
program would enjoy vast support by Israeli public opinion. Even
a failure of the operation would not erode the support because of
the almost general consensus of the public. Most probably, such an
action would not become a matter of partisan debate because there
are supporters and opposers of proactive action against the Iranian
nuclear program among the coalition and opposition parties.
Iranian Possible Responses as a Constraint.
Although presently Israel enjoys vast superiority in long range
strike capabilities in comparison with Iran, Iran is succeeding
in maintaining a balance of mutual deterrence with Israel. Until
recently, Iran’s deterrence was based on the use of proxies, terror
groups that operated from areas close to Israel or in the global arena.
Iran could balance Israel’s ability to strike at targets in its territory
with the ability of these proxies to attack Israeli towns in northern
Israel or Israeli interests all over the world, using the infrastructure
that these terror groups have established in many states. The most
salient of these groups is Hezbollah in Lebanon. It succeeded, with the
support of Iran, in building a large array of surface to surface rockets
in South Lebanon that presents a constant threat over the civilian
population in a large part of Israel. In recent years, Hezbollah has
acquired from Iran longer range rockets (Fajr 3 and 5) and expanded
its strike capability to a larger part of Israel.36 Iran also demonstrated
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its ability to hurt Israeli interests in others states when its agents
were involved in the bombing of the Israeli embassy and the Jewish
community center in Buenos Aires.
Iran is developing a 1,330 kms range ballistic missile, Sheab-3,
that will give Iran the capability to strike directly at targets in Israel’s
territory. The missiles have reached initial operational capabilities.37
Iran admitted after signing the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) that it developed and stockpiled chemical weapons, probably
mustard gas and nerve agents. It was supposed to destroy these
weapons in accordance with the provisions of the CWC, but there is
no report that this was done and Iran is suspected of continuing its
activities in this area.38
If Israel decides to attack Iran’s nuclear installations, it will have
to take into account a response in kind. Iran may use its ballistic
missiles to attack Israeli nuclear installations. Such attacks will not
be effective because of the inaccuracy of its missiles. The probability
of an attempted Iranian attack with aircraft is lower, although strike
aircraft may be more accurate. Iran has a very small number of
long range SU-24 strike aircraft and some air-refueling capability,
but such a long range attack with the challenge of the Israeli air
defense system is a formidable task for its air force. It is possible
that Iran would follow the example of Iraq, and, being aware of the
ineffectiveness of the missile attack on nuclear installations, it would
launch its missiles against Israeli cities.
Iran would probably use its proxies to hit at Israeli targets and
interests in Israel and elsewhere. Under the present circumstances,
striking Israel from Lebanon would be difﬁcult because Israel
probably would react harshly against Syria, Iran’s ally, which is
in a position of weakness; and that does not serve Iran’s Interests.
Hitting Israeli and Jewish targets abroad may look to the Iranians as
less risky.
If an Israeli strike in Iran caused some radioactive contamination,
Israel would have to take into account Iranian use of chemical
weapons. In all other circumstances, such use is highly improbable
because an Iranian chemical attack would be a blatant violation of
the CWC, and might lead to international action against Iran.
It is not possible to ascertain accurately what would be the Iranian
response, but the experience of the Israeli- Iranian relationship in
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the last 2 decades and the declarations of the Iranian leadership39
indicate clearly that there would be a violent Iranian reaction to any
Israeli attack in Iran.
Global and Regional Responses as Constraints.
The Israeli leadership will have to assess the ramiﬁcations of
such an attack on its foreign relations when it weighs arguments
for and against the preemptive action. Israel enjoys the position of
a state that already has been through such an experience, attacking
the Iraqi reactor, absorbing general international condemnation, and
being vindicated later. It seems that the Israeli leadership can only be
encouraged by this experience. First, the political price it had to pay
eventually was insigniﬁcant; U.S. sanctions were limited and stopped
after a short time, and the negative effect on its relations with other
states also subsided very quickly. Second, the environment is more
conducive today for an Israeli preemptive action, because in 1991
Iraq was considered an ally of the West, while Iran is a member of
the “Axis of Evil,” and because after 9/11 and the war on Iraq, the
concept of preemption is not rejected by everyone as it was in 1991;
at least the only global superpower, the United States, adopted it
as part of its doctrine. Third, after the experience of Iraq, one can
assume that some states will be more cautious in their reaction to the
Israeli action.
From Israel’s point of view, the ramiﬁcations of such an action
would be in three arenas; the Middle East, the United States, and
Europe. Israel can assume that the reactions in the Middle East
would be mixed. On the one hand, the Arab States would look on
the Israeli operation as another example of Israel’s intransigence and
aggressiveness, and would object to the manifestation of Israel’s wish
to retain a nuclear monopoly. But on the other hand, they would feel
relieved, because the Iranian nuclear posture is a threat to them as
well. It is quite probable that they would condemn the Israeli action
but would not take any other steps.
Assuming that the preemptive operation took place when it was
clear that the Iranian program could not be stopped in any other
way, it would be difﬁcult for the United States to condemn an action
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that suits perfectly its own positions. Israel can be assured that the
action would not harm its relationship with the United States.
The EU is composed of a majority of states already voicing their
opposition to the U.S. preemption doctrine and the war on Iraq as a
manifestation of this doctrine. They would most probably condemn
Israel. Nevertheless, Israel can assume that such an attack that came
after an European failure to make Iran stop the nuclear program
would not lead to sanctions other than verbal condemnation.
CONCLUSION
The Iranian decision to suspend its uranium enrichment activities
and to sign the additional protocol with the IAEA implies to Israel
that Israel does not yet have to decide on a violent preventive action
against the Iranian nuclear program, and can postpone this difﬁcult
decision. As long as it is possible to stop the Iranian program and roll
it back without resort to violence, Israel will prefer it because it will
minimize risks and the price it would have to pay for this objective.
The decision is difﬁcult because the probability of success is
not high, the risks are high, and the cost is certain. The probability
of success is not high because, on one hand, the Iranian nuclear
installations are dispersed, well-defended and have much
redundancy; and on the other, the Israeli operational capabilities for
sustainable operations, and not a one of its kind surgical strike, are
limited. It is not certain at all whether any Israeli operation will stop
the Iranian nuclear program or delay it substantially. The risks are
high because the operational difﬁculties may lead to a high casualty
rate and because of the high probability of failure. The cost is certain,
because an Iranian violent reaction is almost a certainty. The Israeli
leadership will have to consider whether it is willing to take the risks
and pay the costs for an operation with doubtful results. On the other
hand, there are no real political constraints domestically or in Israel’s
foreign relations that should prevent it from making such a decision.
The conclusion is that eventually the two parameters that will be
decisive in the Israeli decision will be the assessment whether the
Iranian program can be stopped by other means and the assessment
of the operational feasibility.
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It is not surprising that, based on these assessments, Israel
believes that the key to the ﬁght against the Iranian nuclear program
is in the hands of the United States, especially after the war in Iraq.
On November 8, 2002, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said, in
an interview given to the New York Post, that the U.S. war on terror
should not end with Iraq. He added, “as soon as Iraq is dealt with,
I will push for Iran to be at the top of the ‘to do’ list . . . Iran makes
every effort to possess weapons of mass destruction . . . and ballistic
missiles . . . That is a danger to the Middle East and a danger to the
world.”40
Israel’s preferred policy is to let the United States and the
European states help deal with Iran. It believes that keeping the
ambiguity concerning possible Israeli reactions in case the attempts
to stop Iran fail may help the U.S.-European effort because it may
induce some actors—those who wish to prevent Israeli operations
that may lead to further destabilization of the Middle East (especially
the Europeans)—to increase their pressures on Iran, and it also may
have a deterring effect on Iran. An examination of Israeli statements
on the Iranian nuclear program shows a constant emphasis on the
danger to the civilized world of this program; concern that the
Iranians are using deceitful tactics; and threats of an Israeli action
against the nuclear installations as a last resort, combined with
declarations that Israel prefers peaceful solutions.41
The United States has to take into account the possibility of an
Israeli preemptive strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities when
considering its policy options. First, such an attack, especially if it
did not achieve its planned objectives, would have a destabilizing
effect on the Middle East. It could lead to acceleration of the Iranian
program and to a chain of violent clashes between Iran and Israel. The
United States should prepare contingency plans for such an event that
include actions aimed at deterring Iran from destabilizing the Middle
East, and the necessary political reactions, including prevention of
initiatives aimed at a show of support for Iran internationally from
such organizations as the UN. The United States has an interest
in knowing the Israeli intentions and affecting them. That can be
achieved only through an open, detailed, and continuous dialogue
between the two nations.
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Second, if the United States is considering preemptive strikes
against Iran, it should weigh the pros and cons of cooperation with
Israel in such attacks. The main argument against such cooperation
is that it would fortify the existing perception in the Moslem world of
an anti-Islamic Judeo-Christian conspiracy. That could be balanced
only by very convincing and clear operational advantages of such an
alliance.
Last, the United States should make use of the threat of a
preemptive Israeli strike in its deliberations with its other allies,
mostly its European allies. It may help convince them to take a more
robust stand against the Iranian nuclear program. The Europeans
most probably will consider an Israeli preemptive strike a disaster
and will be ready to invest in an effort to induce Israel to avoid it.
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CHAPTER 7
STRATEGY FOR A NUCLEAR IRAN
Thomas Donnelly
The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to speed toward acquiring
nuclear weapons—a reality that has provoked a “do something”
moment across Washington. Conventional wisdom among the
mandarins of America’s foreign policy establishment is that the Bush
administration should pursue some kind of “bargain” with Tehran. A
recent report by the Council on Foreign Relations, for instance, calls
for the United States to offer the regime incentives for disarmament
while dropping the “rhetoric of regime change.”
Such a “balance-of-power” approach, which attempts to divorce
U.S. concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions from any broader regional
or global strategic framework, is an intellectual relic of an earlier era.
It ignores new geopolitical realities of the post-September 11, 2001
(9/11), era, most profoundly the Bush Doctrine’s commitment to a
“forward strategy of freedom” that seeks to transform the politics of
the greater Middle East while containing China’s rising geostrategic
power. Iran stands directly athwart this project, as a sponsor of
Islamist terrorism and an increasingly important patron of Beijing.
A nuclear-armed Iran is doubly threatening to U.S. interests not only
because of the possibility it might employ its weapons or pass them
to terrorist groups, but also because of the constraining effect it will
impose on U.S. behavior in the region.
Any overt bargain with Iran surely will be read as a retreat from
the Bush administration’s proclaimed project of democratization and
regional transformation. However, direct military confrontation is
equally problematic, particularly given that a single, surgical strike
is unlikely to be fully successful or have a lasting effect. Rather, the
most attractive long-term strategy for Iran is traditional containment,
which would emphasize breaking Iran’s ties to China while pressing
for reform and transformation in the greater Middle East. The real
isolation of Iran will come when it is drowned in a larger sea of
liberal, accountable governments in the region.
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The Islamic Republic in Iran continues to speed toward acquiring
nuclear weapons, with every week, it seems, bringing further
evidence of its progress. In late September 2004, the head of Iran’s
Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, announced
his country had begun enriching a “test amount” of uranium—
enough, that is, for several nuclear weapons. Soon, there will be no
insurmountable hurdles left; it is simply a matter of engineering, time,
and Tehran’s choice. This is a reality that the next U.S. administration
will have to confront—and a very unpleasant reality it will be. As
Max Boot recently observed:
[Iran] is also working on missiles with the range to strike targets in
Europe and North America, though the likeliest vehicles for delivering
an Iranian nuke would be its terrorist networks. Hassan Abasi, a senior
member of the Revolutionary Guards, recently boasted that Iran had “a
strategy drawn up for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon civilization.”1

The anxiety raised by the prospect of nuclear-armed Iran is
creating a “do something!” moment across Washington and within
parts of the Bush administration. Boot, a strong supporter of the
Bush administration’s strategy for the greater Middle East, allows
that, “On Iran, as in so many other areas, the administration seems
to be paralyzed by disagreements between Defense Department
hawks and State Department doves.”2 During the 2004 election
season, the Democrats, by contrast, made a point of advocating a
“grand bargain” with the mullahs that would allow them to keep
their nuclear power plants in exchange for a promise to give up the
kind of nuclear fuel used to make bombs. To some degree, this was
a recycling of Clinton-era Iran policy with a sprinkling of the ideas
that underlay the 1994 “Agreed Framework” with North Korea, a
widely celebrated bit of arms control that did nothing to prevent
Kim Jong Il from acquiring his current arsenal. Undeterred by that
failure, Senators Kerry and Edwards made a point of advancing a
“nonconfrontational” approach to Iran that emphasized areas of
“mutual interest.”
Divining mutual interests between the United States and Iran has
been an addiction of many American diplomats since the Iranian
revolution of 1979. Even at the height of the Iran-Iraq war of the

160

1980s, the Reagan administration proved itself open to dealing with
Ayatollah Khomeini; witness the infamous “Iran-contra” affair. The
ﬁrst Bush administration came to ofﬁce, sending the Iranians the
message, in the President’s words, that “Goodwill begets goodwill.”3
After Khomeini’s death in 1989, the rise of Hashemi Rafsanjani
appeared as a moment of renewed dialogue and moderation, but in
the end, Iran remained implacably hostile to the United States, ever
more so after the ﬁrst Gulf War. As Kenneth Pollack has observed,
the period of 1991-92 marked a newly aggressive period in Iranian
foreign policy and, signiﬁcantly, a correlating strategic emphasis on
nuclear weapons:
The [former] shah had an interest in nuclear weapons, but it was actually
rather restrained, given his approach to other aspects of military power.
He did have a nuclear weapons program, but it had not progressed
beyond basic research and was not lavishly funded . . . . The end of
[the Iran-Iraq] war did not diminish Iran’s desire for nuclear weapons.
Instead, it actually began to pump additional resources into its program.
. . . Iran’s logic for accelerating its nuclear weapons program was very
straightforward: if you want to pursue a policy that runs contrary to the
vital interest of the United States, you must be able to deter an American
invasion, and the only sure way to do that is to have a nuclear arsenal.
. . . Deterring the United States was not the only motive Iran had for
acquiring nuclear weapons (deterring Israel, building prestige, and
dealing with a revived threat from Iraq were also considerations), but it
was its most important incentive.4

Indeed, after the disaster of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran began
to coordinate its nuclear program more closely with its overall
strategy. The United States responded in exactly the inverse
fashion, by separating its nuclear concerns from its larger strategic
framework. As in the Cold War, questions of nuclear proliferation
were considered quite apart from their proper policy context; in fact,
proliferation was often believed to be the primary concern.
In the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and at the National
Security Council, Pollack had a front-row seat for Clinton
administration policymaking toward Iran. Despite a supposedly
nuanced policy of “dual containment” that was to weigh more heavily
on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq than Rasfanjani’s Iran, American hopes
for moderation were frustrated constantly. The new pan-European
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engagement with Iran, dubbed “Critical Dialogue,” only made
matters worse; what was meant to be a carrot-and-stick approach left
Tehran free to snack on European carrots while dodging American
sticks. Yet, when Rafsanjani stepped down as president and was
replaced by Mohammed Khatami in 1997, the chimera of Iranian
“reformists” beckoned again to the administration.
From 1997 to 1999, U.S.-Iranian diplomacy resulted in a series
of public displays of affection. As Pollack tells it, the Clinton
administration had all but talked itself into the belief that a big
breakthrough was at hand. All that was required was one ﬁnal grand
gesture on the part of the United States.5 And so, on April 12, 1999, at
a state dinner, President Clinton admitted in “unprompted” remarks
that “Iran . . . has been the subject of quite a lot of abuse from various
Western nations. And I think sometimes it’s quite important to tell
people, look, you have a right to be angry at something my country
or my culture or others that are generally allied with us today did to
you 50 or 60 or 100 or 150 years ago.”6 The President’s feel-Iran’spain impulse soon became formal administration rhetoric. On
March 17, 2000, at Washington’s Omni Shoreham hotel, Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged and apologized for past
American policy toward Iran:
In 1953, the United States played a signiﬁcant role in orchestrating the
overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq.
The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justiﬁed for
strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political
development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to
resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. Moreover,
during the next quarter century, the United States and the West gave
sustained backing to the Shah’s regime. Although it did much to
develop the country economically, the Shah’s government also brutally
repressed political dissent. As President Clinton has said, the United
States must bear its full share of responsibility for the problems that
have arisen in U.S.-Iranian relations. Even in more recent years, aspects
of U.S. policy towards Iraq during its conﬂict with Iran appear now to
have been regrettably short-sighted, especially in light of our subsequent
experiences with Saddam Hussein.7

Yet even as Albright was speaking, the Iranian government had
begun to crack down on internal dissent and resume a hard-line,

162

anti-American stance abroad. Pollack’s verdict on Clinton’s opening
to Tehran is remarkably blunt and worth recounting at length:
I felt [at the time] that we had come very close to making a major
breakthrough with Iran and that if only we had done a few things
differently . . . we might have been able to make it happen. Over the
years, however, I have come to the conclusion that I was wrong in this
assessment. Any rapprochement that could be nixed by two words in
a speech was a rapprochement that was doomed to failure anyway.
That is the fundamental lesson of the Clinton initiative with Iran. The
Iranians were not ready . . . . Iran was ruled by a regime in which the
lion’s share of power—and everything that truly mattered—was in the
hands of people who were not ready or interested in improving ties with
the United States.8

But it is rare when a member of the U.S. foreign policy establishment
comes to such a moment of clarity about Iran. Prior to September 11,
even Bush administration principals were prone to speak hopefully
about the future of relations between Washington and Tehran. Vice
President Richard Cheney, while at Haliburton, had described U.S.
sanctions on Iran as “self-defeating.” At his conﬁrmation hearings,
former Secretary of State Colin Powell observed changing conditions
in Iran and stressed that “Iranians are not our enemies . . . to the
extent that we can nuance our policy in that regard, I think it serves
our interests and the interests of the region.”9
Even in a post-9/11, post-Iraq world, the siren call of an AmericanIranian bargain remains attractive to many in the establishment. The
latest call—for a “modest bargain” alternative—is encapsulated in
the recent report, Iran: Time for a New Approach, by the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR).10 As is so often the case, this “task force”
of foreign policy mandarins calling for a new approach is really just
rehashing old ideas. Thus, the CFR report ﬁnds:
[Tehran] could play a potentially signiﬁcant role in promoting a
stable, pluralistic government in Baghdad. It might be induced to be a
constructive actor toward both Iraq and Afghanistan, but it retains the
capacity to create signiﬁcant difﬁculties for these regimes if it is alienated
from the new post-conﬂict governments in those two countries.11

Thus, inevitably, it is the council’s recommendation that the United
States “engage selectively with Iran to promote regional stability.”
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This, in the task force’s eyes, constitutes a “revised strategic approach
to Iran.”
At least the CFR task force acknowledges that the “grand
bargain” notion “that would settle comprehensively the outstanding
conﬂicts between Iran and the United States is not a realistic goal,
and pursuing such an outcome would be unlikely to produce nearterm progress on Washington’s central interests.”12 However, the
depth of the differences between the United States and Iran is no
excuse for restricting “engagement,” in the report’s view, and in
particular the use of “incentives,” including expanded trade relations:
“Given the increasingly important role of economic interests in
shaping Iran’s policy options at home and abroad, the prospect of
commercial relations with the United States could be a powerful
tool in Washington’s arsenal.”13 Even more saliently, the task force
believes that, while the United States is right to advocate democracy,
America should abandon the “rhetoric of regime change, as it would
be likely to rouse nationalist sentiments in defense of the regime,
even among those who currently oppose it.”14 While willing to forgo
the grandeur, the Council of Foreign Relations hates to pass up a
bargain.
Indeed, to the extent that the CFR report proves anything, it is
that the Cold War is not over: it lives on, and not just in time-warp
regimes like Kim Jong Il’s North Korea or Saparmurat Niyazov’s
Turkmenistan, but among the strategic smart set in the United States,
for whom détente never dies. But in reality, new geopolitical facts
obtain, and the United States has started to formulate new strategies
based upon them. First among these new facts is that the United
States is the global guarantor of international order, history’s sole
superpower, and wishes to remain so. The second fact is that the
“greater Middle East”—the immense swath of the planet stretching
from West Africa to Southeast Asia—is now the central strategic
focus of American security policy. The notion of a bargain with Iran
is the by-product of an earlier era when Europe was the strategic
key and the Middle East a secondary theater. Thus, the third aboutto-be fact—Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal—demands a
genuinely strategic response, one consistent with our broader global
and regional goals.
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Remember the Bush Doctrine?
The central question for the second Bush administration is
whether the “Bush Doctrine”—whose main purpose is to preserve
the generally liberal, stable, and peaceful international order that has
resulted from the collapse of the Soviet empire and that is predicated
upon the U.S. role as global guarantor of international security—is
really the foundation for a lasting security strategy or was simply
a rhetorical exercise meant to justify invading Iraq. The Bush
Doctrine represents not just a continuation of the de facto policies
of the Clinton administration, but a reafﬁrmation of the most basic
American strategic habits; it is consistent with what might be called
American strategic culture. And, in a realpolitik sense, there is no
quiet life for the world’s sole superpower.
At the same time, there is a strong yearning, even among the
grandees of the Republican Party, to avoid further involvement
in the greater Middle East and to try to preserve the status quo
governments—and the status quo relationships—across the region.
This is not just an expression of “Iraq fatigue,” but a more deepseated skepticism about the prospects for democracy in the Islamic
world, and Arabia in particular. At the same time, the pretense of a
return to the status quo in the greater Middle East, of balancing one
thuggish regime against another, and making strategy in partnership
with Western European “powers” such as France and Germany, is
impossible to take seriously in a post-9/11, post-Iraq world. Even if
the United States could neatly withdraw from Iraq—itself an almost
oxymoronic formulation—the “war on terrorism” would not end and
would still include many other actors besides Osama bin Laden.
Thus there may be little alternative to the Bush Doctrine’s
“forward strategy of freedom”; a purely defensive approach is
impossible exactly because the pre-9/11 political order in the regime
was the primary source of the nihilism and violence that led to those
attacks. The Bush Doctrine’s fundamental set of premises may prove
remarkably stable: the rollback of both Islamic terror organizations
and the governments that support them; containing China’s military
ambitions; and, key to it all, preventing any true “axis of evil” that
marks a conjunction of Islamic radicalism with the rising great-power
capabilities in Beijing.
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This strategy is nothing if not ambitious. We are attempting
to resolve a massive civil war within the Islamic world while
simultaneously preventing a dissatisﬁed China—even more dependent
for its economic growth on Middle Eastern oil than the United
States—from interfering with our efforts. The Bush administration’s
occasional confessions about the magnitude of the effort required,
reﬂected in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s forecast of a “long,
hard slog” in Iraq and then National Security Adviser Condoleezza
Rice’s profession of a “generational commitment” to the project of
transforming the Middle East, only begin to hint at the task before
the United States. The only good news is that, while our enemies are
many, they are individually weak and not immediately disposed to
unite against us.
U.S. strategy for a nuclear Iran must be made to ﬁt this broader
framework. The greatest danger is that Tehran’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons will distort and derail American strategy. Strategic
realists will once again see the need to pursue a “balance of power”
approach, undercutting the Bush “liberation strategy.” “Engagers”
and Europhiles will see an opportunity to rush forward with a great
new bunch of “carrots” to tempt Iranian moderates. Arms controllers
will attempt to subordinate real strategy-making to the establishment
of international agreements limiting weaponry. Perhaps most
dangerous of all will be those policymakers who rightly propose
a hard-line against the mullahs: their commendable willingness to
pressure Tehran, even to the point of military action, has a tendency
to obscure their strategic judgment. Indeed, hardliners may be most
prone to the “do something!” fever. It may well be that the United
States ﬁnds itself forced to do something militarily in the case of
the Islamic Republic, but if so, it is more important to do the right
something. And the “right” strategy for Iran is one that ﬁts the Iran
piece within the larger puzzle of political transformation for the
Middle East.
Sources of Iranian Conduct.
To be sure, Iran stands directly athwart this project of regional
transformation. Indeed, the regime in Tehran came to power by
ousting Shah Reza Pahlavi in the tumultuous year of 1979, when
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the old, autocratic order in the greater Middle East began to
crumble. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established an unabashedly
theocratic and revolutionary government, at the same time calling
for a broader Muslim uprising and attacks upon the United States,
the “Great Satan.” And despite international isolation, devastating
defeat in war, and widespread internal unrest, the regime retains its
ideological character, as well as a ﬁrm grip on power. As the Council
on Foreign Relations notes, the Islamic Republic has achieved some
“durability.”15
But if its political and strategic ends have been consistent, Tehran’s
means have changed dramatically. One of the best studies of the IranIraq War, done by the United States Marine Corps, observed that the
casualties of that conﬂict were so great that it essentially bled the
Iranian revolution to death.16 Khomeini and his fellow mullahs were
more than willing to spread revolution by conventional military
means, but a generation of young Pasdaran zealots broke itself in
human wave attacks on Saddam Hussein’s army; what the U.S.
military was able to do so decisively in 1991 and again in 2003—slice
through the Iraqi ﬁeld force—the Iranian army could not manage
even at the cost of perhaps a million casualties over 8 years.
If Iran could not export its revolution by conventional military
means, then unconventional means would have to sufﬁce.
Iran’s sponsorship of terrorists is well-known. As the U.S. State
Department’s most recent report on global terrorism puts it, “Iran
remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003. Its
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and
Security were involved in the planning of and support for terrorist
acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to
pursue their goals.”17
From Beirut to Buenos Aires, international terrorism has been
central to Iran’s foreign policy since the 1979 revolution. Tehran
openly provides funding, training, and weapons to Hezbollah,
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. Iran also has a long relationship with al
Qaeda. As early as late 1991, Sudan’s Islamist leader, Hassan alTurabi, sponsored meetings designed to encourage Shia and Sunni
fundamentalists to put aside their differences and work together
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against the United States. “Not long afterward,” according to the
9/11 Commission report, “senior Al Qaeda operatives and trainers
traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives.”18
Senior al Qaeda operatives captured by the United States have
revealed that Tehran attempted to strengthen its ties to Osama bin
Laden after the USS Cole attack in 2000, and that Iranian ofﬁcials have
facilitated the travel of al Qaeda members through their territory,
failing to stamp their passports. It is also believed that 8 to 14 of the
9/11 hijackers took advantage of this arrangement to transit through
Iran in 2000-01.19
After the fall of the Taliban, several senior al Qaeda operatives
ﬂed to Iran, where they have found a safe haven from which to
plot further attacks—including the May 2003 terrorist bombing in
Riyadh, in which 34 people were killed.20 Although Iran claims to
hold several al Qaeda members in custody, it refuses to disclose their
identities publicly and has rebuffed attempts to arrange for their
transfer.21
Yet for all the vehemence of its ideology and the violence of its
anti-Americanism, the clerical regime in Tehran has found itself
incapable of stemming the seeping U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf
and in the broader region. While Iran essentially stood aside when
Operation DESERT STORM drove the Iraqi army from Kuwait and
contained Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions, the war ushered
in the policy of “dual containment,” targeted at Tehran as well as
Baghdad; indeed, the ﬁrst Bush administration left Saddam in power
primarily to serve as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. The
“no-ﬂy-zones” and other U.S. operations in the area throughout the
1990s attested to the fact that, even with no real regional partner—
beyond the on-again, off-again support offered by the Saudis—the
United States was more than capable of maintaining its military
forces at Iran’s doorstep and had no intention of withdrawing.
And while the mullahs may have celebrated the attacks of 9/11,
they have come to rue many of the subsequent events. Although
there was little love lost between Tehran and the Taliban, the
expanded American military presence along Iran’s eastern ﬂank is
far from welcome. The invasion of Iraq, though it removed Tehran’s
longtime nemesis in Baghdad, completed the near-encirclement of
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Iran by U.S. military forces. Iran’s attempts to inﬂuence the direction
of post-Saddam Iraq have yet to produce anything more substantive
than its past efforts to undermine Saddam; Tehran’s sponsorship of
Moqtada al Sadr helped the “Mahdi army” make headlines, but the
ﬁnality with which mainstream Iraqi cleric Ayatollah Ali al Sistani
evicted Sadr’s forces from the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf reinforced
the truth that the majority of Iraq’s Shia still have little interest in
taking orders from Iran.
Under such apparently bleak circumstances, Tehran’s traditional
hankering for nuclear weapons has sharpened signiﬁcantly. Iran’s
conventional options are now restricted to attempts to limit American
access to the region, such as by pointing missiles at the Straits of
Hormuz and bolstering ground-based air defenses. Terrorism with a
return address carries greater risks, too: it is interesting to speculate
what the U.S. reaction would be now, in a post-9/11 world, to a
Khobar Towers–type bombing. What the Iranians could safely
sponsor in 1996 might not be so safe now. The surest deterrent to
American action is a functioning nuclear arsenal.
What to Do?
To be sure, the prospect of a nuclear Iran is a nightmare. But it is
less a nightmare because of the high likelihood that Tehran would
employ its weapons or pass them on to terrorist groups—although
that is not beyond the realm of possibility—and more because of
the constraining effect it threatens to impose upon U.S. strategy for
the greater Middle East. The danger is that Iran will “extend” its
deterrence, either directly or de facto, to a variety of states and other
actors throughout the region. This would be an ironic echo of the
extended deterrence thought to apply to U.S. allies during the Cold
War. But in the greater Middle East of the 21st century, we are the
truly revolutionary force, and “revolutionary” Iran is more the status
quo power.
The attitudes of the Council on Foreign Relations Iran task
force reveal this dynamic with creepy perfection. Aware that the
fundamental strategic choice on Iran is between policies of regime
change and détente, the consensus among the task force members is
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that the problem is the weapons, not the government building them.
Indeed, the report makes it clear that the task force was divided
about the state of Iran’s nuclear program.
Although Task Force members voiced differing opinions on
whether evidence is sufﬁcient to determine that Iran has fully
committed itself to developing nuclear weapons, the Task Force
agreed that Iran is likely to continue its pattern of tactical cooperation
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while
attempting to conceal the scope of its nuclear program in order to
keep its options open as long as possible.22 But if there were nuances
about the state of Tehran’s nukes, there seems to be consensus about
American policy: forget the regime-change idea and concentrate on
the weapons. By focusing narrowly on the issues of Iran’s weapons,
any discussion of the larger consequences for American policy can
be avoided.
What would the consequences be of a bargain with Iran—be
it grand or small—for a strategy of political transformation in the
greater Middle East? Is it possible to pursue détente with Iran and
regime change elsewhere?
Throughout the greater Middle East, any overt bargain with Iran
will surely be read as a retreat on the part of the United States. Three
years after September 11, the question remains: do the Americans
have the strength, stomach, and sincerity to carry through their
project of democratization and regional transformation? Observers
in the Middle East can see that President Bush is committed, but there
are doubts about the rest of his government, even heading into his
second term. The world’s other industrial powers either are openly
afraid and thus hostile, skeptical, or at best noncommittal; but for a
handful of allies, America stands alone. Détente with Iran would
compel the forces of freedom in the Middle East to further hedge
their bets, and our sometime allies, like the Saudis, who through the
1990s tried to reach an accommodation with Tehran, would equally
reckon that U.S. ambitions for change had overleaped themselves.
Even Pakistan, congenitally unstable and prone to play all ends
against the middle absent unceasing American attention, might toy
with the idea of reversing its post-9/11 policies.
Even more importantly, an obsessive attention to Iran would
divert the United States from the most important, ideological aspect
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of its effort in the Middle East: the project to reform politics among
the Sunni Arabs. This is the real heart of the conﬂict in the region.
The essential question is whether the Sunni community will cling
to near-monarchical autocracies—be they relatively benign and
modern, as in Jordan, or actively aggressive, such as the Wahhabifueled Saudis—or opt for an even more repressive, Osama-bin-Ladenstyle revolution. U.S. strategy is to foment a genuinely democratic
and modernizing revolution. Over the coming decades, the hearts
and minds of Sunnis represent the strategic center of gravity in the
region, and the likely effect of an Iran-centric U.S. policy would be
to obscure this fact and reinforce the impulse to cling to the Sunni
status quo—an “old order” which almost certainly is in the midst of
collapsing.
A bargain with Iran would also have global effects. The most
serious would not be in France or Germany, whose governments
have made it plain that they have no heart for transformation in the
Middle East or for a serious effort to oppose Iran, but in China. Beijing
and Tehran share a mutual dissatisfaction with the Pax Americana
and have a long record of direct and indirect cooperation on nuclear
and missile programs. Hu Jintao and the new generation of leaders in
China have a much larger, global perspective than did Jiang Zemin
and Deng Xiaoping before them, greater conﬁdence ﬂowing from
China’s economic modernization, and, almost certainly, an appetite
to play the geopolitical game more actively. Their horizons very
clearly extend throughout the greater Middle East—China’s energy
interest in Sudan already has posed perhaps the largest roadblock
to stopping the genocide in Darfur, for example—and they are
deeply conscious of the potential U.S. stranglehold on China’s future
growth. Torn between their interests in U.S. security guarantees and
a desire for greater autonomy, Beijing will keenly note, and perhaps
be happy to broker, any bargain for Iran.
Regime Change by Other Means.
If détente with a nuclear Islamic Republic jeopardizes the project
of Middle East transformation, then direct military confrontation is
an equally unappetizing method of regime change. In the heat of the
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“do something!” moment, the difﬁculties of even limited military
strikes are too little appreciated. While a full discussion of the
operational realities is beyond the scope of this chapter, some hard
truths are worth mentioning. Iran is large, populous, rugged, and
its nuclear facilities are spread throughout the country.23 Its nuclear
program probably cannot be crippled in a single, surgical strike, as
was Iraq’s in Israel’s famous Osiraq raid.
And speaking of the Israelis, it is not uncommon to hear the
hope expressed among U.S. policymakers, albeit sotto voce, that
they somehow will solve the puzzle that perplexes us. Earlier in
September, the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reported that Tel Aviv
was planning on buying 500 bunker-busters, precisely the kind of
munitions that might be able to destroy Iran’s underground nuclear
facilities.24 In truth, however, a preemptive strike by Tel Aviv
would be exceedingly difﬁcult. Israel’s long-range strike capacity is
a fraction of the U.S. military’s and would, as a matter of logistics,
require at least American acquiescence (we own a good deal of the
airspace between Tel Aviv and Tehran). And even if, miraculously,
an Israeli strike achieved some tactical success, the Iranians would
surely hold us responsible and target U.S. interests in retaliation. In
sum, punitive strikes cannot be designed to end the Iranian nuclear
threat nor ensure regime change, as our decade-long experience with
Saddam Hussein should remind us.
A full-scale invasion would be a “porridge-too-hot” prospect
in other than the most dire circumstances. While in a conventional
ﬁght, the Iranian army might provide no stiffer resistance than
did the Iraqi army in 1991 or 2003, and a post-invasion campaign
might concentrate solely on a full dismantling of Iranian nuclear
infrastructure and identifying scientists and program ofﬁcials, it is
far from certain that U.S. objectives could be so neatly limited. It
is impossible to know the degree of post-invasion resistance, but to
underestimate it would be an even greater folly than underestimating
it was in Iraq.
The military approach that perhaps best balances risks and
rewards might be a comprehensive air campaign, lasting perhaps a
week, to be followed by fomenting an Afghanistan-style insurgency.
Iran continues to suppress separatist moments among Iranian
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Kurds, Azeris, and Baluchis—Tehran has never had perfect control
of its own borders. Even the most successful strike campaign would
have only transitory effect; having crossed the military threshold,
the United States must be ready to keep regime-threatening pressure
on the mullahs. Indeed, the Bush administration would do well
to put in place covert contacts with Iranian dissident factions—as
well as military supplies capable of sustaining them if needed—
before considering any punitive air campaign. And while there
are tremendous risks associated with any proxy war, it provides
an improvement over air strikes alone. The United States should
not enter a war with Iran without at least some reasonable plan for
victory, measured by regime change in Tehran.
Yet perhaps the most attractive strategy for a nuclear Iran
is traditional containment. There are risks associated with this
approach, and it does not mean “multilateral” diplomacy. From
Khartoum to Tehran, the “international community” is proving
again that it is unwilling to confront renegade regimes. Iran’s
ﬂouting of the IAEA and the United Nations (UN) also takes a page
from Saddam’s book. Despite growing evidence of Iran’s nuclear
malfeasance, many countries are reluctant to sanction it for what
they view as its legitimate right to develop a complete nuclear fuel
cycle. We must anticipate that the primary burden of isolating and
containing a nearly nuclear Iran rests with the United States. Like so
much of our future work in the greater Middle East, this must be a
long-term effort requiring patience and resolve.
The ﬁrst order of business is to keep Iran from establishing a
deeper relationship with great-power sponsors. Breaking Tehran’s
ties to China will be difﬁcult, given that no American administration,
Republican or Democrat, has yet been willing to force Beijing to choose
between the constraints and the beneﬁts of the Pax Americana—
witness Taiwan, North Korea, and now Sudan. Better hopes lie with
India, which, if pressured to scale back its links to Iran as the price of
a real strategic partnership with the United States, might become a
serious future ally.
The second order of business is for the United States to retain the
initiative in its new project of reform and transformation in the greater
Middle East. The real isolation of revolutionary Iran will come when
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it is drowned in a larger sea of liberal, accountable governments in
the region. As democracy takes hold in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran’s
dictatorship will come under increasing pressure.
In a curious way, Iran suffers from both the Middle East’s great
maladies: it is both a sclerotic autocracy and a backward-looking
theocracy. The success of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq not
only will surround Iran strategically, but ideologically as well. In
the ﬁnal analysis, supporting and expanding the forces of freedom
in the region offers, for now, our best hope for containing Iran and
diluting the value of its nuclear deterrent.
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CHAPTER 8
IRAN GETS THE BOMB—THEN WHAT?
George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists or any additional
states would shake the international system. The more strategically
important the state, the greater the potential threat to global
security.
Iran is a strategically vital actor in the international system. It
incarnates an historically major civilization. It is the largest state in
the regional complex that comprises the Persian Gulf, the Middle
East, and Central Asia, including Turkey. Major developments
in Iran, therefore, have wide reverberations simply as a matter of
political geophysics. Iran’s large role in the global supply of fossil
fuels makes it still more important. As a direct source of fuel, and
also as a shaper of regional dynamics, Iran can signiﬁcantly affect
the global economy, and therefore politics. Iran’s ties to terrorist
organizations operating (primarily) in the Middle East renders
Tehran a vital actor in the international campaign against terrorism.
Iran has the capability to peacefully augment or violently disrupt
U.S. missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, a major change in Iran’s
military strength and/or political status would directly affect major
U.S. and international interests.
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would upset international
order signiﬁcantly more than did the acquisition of nuclear weapons
by India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. It would strain the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Turkey would perhaps seek a
countervailing capability or reassurances, and the United States and
other NATO allies would differ in responses to Iran. Iran’s acquisition
of the bomb would threaten the viability of the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
unlike India, Israel, and Pakistan, Iran did sign the NPT and now
puts the treaty’s enforcers in a position of having to uphold its terms.
A nuclear Iran would widen ﬁssures within the Arab world and
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between Arabs and Iran, ﬁssures that run through the Persian Gulf
and that would shake international oil markets.
Curiously, almost no literature has emerged to discuss how
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would affect the international
system beyond the Middle East. Discussion has tended to focus on
potential knock-on effects in the Persian Gulf and Middle East (i.e.,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel), to the exclusion of broader
implications.
In the absence of ofﬁcial indicators, we are left to speculate that
the international community could respond broadly in two ways to
Iran’s going nuclear. It could seek to roll back this acquisition and
bring Iran back into compliance with the obligations of non-nuclearweapon states, or the world could adapt itself to Iran’s new status
and seek a modus vivendi through deterrence, containment and
diplomacy.
This paper assumes that the ﬁrst response will be to seek roll back.
Iran has been caught in noncompliance with its reporting obligations
under the NPT. This violation of the NPT has been recognized by
the IAEA, by all leading states in the international system, and by
Iran itself. Having violated its compliance obligations, Iran cannot
now withdraw from the treaty and escape the consequences of its
violations. Thus, if Iran goes ahead and acquires nuclear weapons,
it will be in open deﬁance of the international regime designed to
prevent such acquisition. This distinguishes Iran from North Korea,
whose initial acquisition of nuclear weapons capability occurred
before the international system declared it to be in clear violation. The
net effect is that Iran poses the most severe test yet to enforcers of the
nonproliferation regime, and acquiescence to Iran’s proliferation is
not a viable option.
It can be assumed that the United States (with others if possible)
would use various forms of coercion to achieve roll back.1 Coercion
or punishment would have three aims. First, to impose enough pain
to compel Iranian leaders to change their minds and abandon nuclear
weapon capabilities. Second, to reduce the perceived beneﬁts Iran
would gain from nuclear weapons and to otherwise weaken Iran.
Third, drawing on the former two desired effects to punish Iran,
thus deterring future proliferators.
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Potential coercive options are discussed below, as are the roles
of key institutions in authorizing or implementing them. It is worth
noting that if Iran were compelled to roll back its acquisition, the
beneﬁts to the international system in terms of security, political,
and economic developments would be far reaching. The greater
challenge is to assess whether the international community would
muster enough will and muscle to coerce Iran to roll back, and if it
failed, what the consequences might be. These are the matters we
address.
We proceed ﬁrst by assessing Iran’s susceptibility to various
forms of coercion. This analysis is rudimentary, but suggestive.
How susceptible would Iran be to international political ostracism?
To economic sanctions? Would military force of various scales be
effective? After considering types of coercion, we then assess the
considerations that different actors likely would have in deciding
whether to apply each form of coercion. How would the permanent
ﬁve members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council respond?
What about the European Union (EU)? How would Iran’s going
nuclear affect U.S. relations with Russia? Russia’s position vis-àvis the United States and the EU? How would the broader Muslim
community and the oil importing states of Northeast Asia likely react
to U.S.-led efforts to deal with a nuclear Iran?
Finally, although this paper assesses the challenge of reversing
Iran’s proliferation, it also would be wise to consider the alternative
strategy of adaptation to a nuclear Iran. If Iran effectively resisted
roll back, the United States and others would shift to a strategy of
deterring Iran from “using” its nuclear capability as an instrument of
coercive diplomacy (nuclear blackmail) or military aggression (using
a nuclear umbrella to shield low-intensity conﬂict in other states).
A shift from roll back to a strategy of deterrence and containment
would come early if Iran indicated it is deterrable and desired nuclear
weapons only to protect its own autonomy, not to alter the status
quo in the Gulf and Middle East. Iran’s more pragmatic international
policy since 1997 suggests that it is moving toward a more status quo
orientation and would not wield nuclear weapons provocatively. If
this were to prove true, the United States would ﬁnd it extremely
difﬁcult to sustain international cooperation in seeking to coerce
Iranian roll back. This paper, however, does not explore the adaptive
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strategy of deterrence and containment because such a strategy
would not be nearly so difﬁcult for the United States to execute as
would be the strategy of rallying international cooperation in roll
back.
COERCIVE ROLL BACK OPTIONS
Coercion can be framed as an escalating ladder of potential
measures to raise the cost and pain Iran would experience, with the
aim of making Tehran’s leaders ﬁnally decide to let go of their nuclear
weapons capabilities. Political isolation is the ﬁrst rung. Economic
sanctions and potential embargoes comprise a rising series of midrange steps up this ladder. Various forms of military action occupy
the next highest rungs.
Political Isolation.
Iranian elites display great pride in Persian civilization and
history. They resent pariahdom in ways, for example, that North
Koreans or even Pakistanis do not seem to. The intensity of the
Iranian elite’s desire for international respect is easily underestimated
by U.S. commentators and ofﬁcials who have little or no contact
with Iran. To be sure, the desire to be integrated into the broader
international community, to partake in a dialogue of civilizations, is
felt most keenly by Western-educated reformers, urban youth, and
some business interests. The most conservative elements in Iran,
particularly those associated with the Revolutionary Guard, the
Guardian Council, and autarkic economic interests, do not consider
political isolation a major threat. However, these elements must take
care not to stimulate active resistance against themselves by causing
Iran’s further isolation.
The utility of political ostracism depends on the political dynamics
within Iran at any given moment. The threat of isolation will be more
effective in preventing Iran from completing acquisition of nuclear
weapon capabilities than it would be in reversing acquisition if Iranian
decisionmakers choose to take that course. The conservatives who
would decide to defy the international community and acquire the
bomb would calculate that political isolation does not threaten their
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hold on power. Otherwise they would be less inclined to take the
risk in the ﬁrst place. Once they have the bomb, abandoning it would
be seen as admitting a grave mistake and capitulating to outside
pressure. Conservatives would not be compelled by international
political opprobrium alone. Were the bomb to be acquired under
autarkic leadership, the capacity of subsequent reformist leaders
to reverse course would depend on variables that simply cannot be
anticipated at this time.
Economic Sanctions.
Iran is economically vulnerable. Unemployment is a grave
problem, hovering at around 20 percent, and even worse for youth.
The Revolutionary government simply has not been able to manage
the economy in ways that produce jobs at a pace with growth of the
job-seeking public. Beyond necessary regulatory and policy reforms,
Iran needs massive capital infusion from abroad to stimulate growth.
Therefore, sanctions to cut off investment and exports can deprive
the country of badly needed capital and, consequently, growth.
Two types and targets of sanctions could be considered: against
foreign investment into Iran, and against exports of oil, natural gas,
and other commodities out from Iran. Between 40 percent and 50
percent of the central government’s revenue comes from oil exports,
and they constitute about 80 percent of Iran’s total export earnings.2
In order to remain a proﬁtable source of revenue, however, the oil
industry needs to be modernized, and new oil ﬁelds have to be
developed. Iran is counting on approximately $5 billion per year in
foreign investment in order to update onshore ﬁelds and develop
new ones. Iran needs $8 to $10 billion to develop its offshore ﬁelds.
Similarly, Iran expends about $1 billion a year in oil imports, mainly
gasoline, because it lacks the infrastructure and technology to
produce it on its own.3 Blocking the ﬂow of gasoline imports would,
therefore, constitute an additional pressure measure.
Iran also possesses the second-largest natural gas resources in
the world. Although it now lacks the capacity and infrastructure to
export signiﬁcant amounts, Iran could become a leading exporter of
natural gas in coming years. Sanctions on natural gas exports would
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send a strong message, but they would not cripple signiﬁcantly
Iran’s economy in the short term. Curtailing foreign investment in
this industry, however, would more dramatically increase the cost
of Iran’s noncompliance with the demands of the international
community.
Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector.
Without new investment, Iranian ofﬁcials say that Iran might become
a net importer of oil by 2010.4 Despite the threat from U.S. secondary
sanctions, several countries have already invested signiﬁcantly in
Iran’s energy industry, and more companies are expected to take
advantage of latest deals presented by the National Iranian Oil
Company, a state-owned enterprise offering 16 new “buyback”5
contracts.
In the next 2 decades, world energy demand also will shift from
oil to natural gas. North America, Europe, and Asia are expected to
account for 60 percent of this growth. Because of its proximity, Iran
hopes to become a key supplier of European and Asian countries.
Despite its vast resources, however, Iran needs large amounts of
foreign investment to develop treatment facilities, pipelines, and
liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) tankers for transportation. Moreover,
many of these deals are still being negotiated, providing the option
of stopping investments before they begin rather than the more
difﬁcult task of reining in projects already underway.
Stopping ongoing projects and deterring key potential investors
from Iran’s energy industry will be difﬁcult, however. Through
2004, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) sanctions had not yet been
imposed on any foreign company investing in Iran’s energy industry.
This sanction-forbearance is due largely to questions over the legality
of the Act outside U.S. national territory and its jurisdiction over
non-U.S. entities. Furthermore, if secondary sanctions were actually
to be imposed, the effects on trade relations would be harmful to
both parties. It is also not certain that other governments would
sanction companies under their own jurisdiction. Iran could threaten
to annul any agreements with current partners and offer “sweet”
deals to less prominent investors. For instance, China Petroleum
& Chemical Corporation (SNP) has already stated that it will not
yield to Washington’s pressure.6 Further, despite growing concerns
over Iran’s nuclear program, Total (France) and Petronas (Malaysia)
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recently have agreed to invest $2 billion for the creation of Pars LNG
Company, which will manage the production of 8 million tons of
LNG a year.7
Year Country

Company

Field

1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001

Elf Aquitaine/Totalﬁna
Elf Aquitaine & Bow Valley
Royal Dutch & Shell
ENI
Statoil
Norsk Hydro
Enterprise Oil
GVA Consultants
ENI

Doroud
Balal
Soroush & Nowruz
South Pars, 4 & 5
Salman
Anaran
South Pars, 6,7 & 8
Caspian Sea
Darkhovin

Japex, Indonesia Petroleum
& Tomen
Sheer Energy
LG Engineering Group
Statoil
Hyundai
Cepsa & OMV*
Japanese Consortium
Japex, Indonesia Petroleum
& Tomen
Total & Petronas
Zhuhai Zhenrong Co.

Azadegan

$1,000
$300
$800
$3,800
$850
N/A
N/A
$226
$5501,000
$2,500

Masjid-e-Soleman
South Pars, 9&10
South Pars, 6,7 & 8
Processing Trains
Cheshmeh-Khosh
South Pars, 6,7, &8
Azadegan

$80
$1,600
$300
$1,000
$300
$1,200
$2,500

France
France & Canada
U.K. & Netherlands
Italy
Norway
Norway
U.K.
Sweden
Italy

2001 Japan
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2004

Canada
South Korea
Norway
South Korea
Spain
Japan
Japan

2004 France & Malaysia
2005 China

Pars LNG
LNG deal

Value

$2,000
$20,000

* Cepsa and OMV annulled their contract after 3 years of negotiations.

Table 1. Foreign Investment in Iran’s Energy Sector
(millions of dollars).8
Yet, the task is not impossible. Steps have already been taken
toward building a coalition to block new investments in Iran’s oil
sector, where Iran might have tremendous natural resources but is
certainly not the only place to invest. Russia and the nearby Caspian
oil ﬁelds of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are potential destinations for
foreign investors.
Furthermore, after 3 years of negotiations, Spanish companies
have pulled back, alleging commercial issues.9 John Browne, chief
executive of U.K’s British Petroleum (BP), has also expressed his
concerns over investing in Iran, given the current international
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political environment.10 And although a Japanese consortium has
recently agreed to develop the vast Azadegan oil ﬁeld, negotiations
took 4 years, in part because Japan shares U.S. interests in
nonproliferation and also did not want to jeopardize U.S.-Japanese
trade relations.
Oil Exports. Iran’s key oil customers include Japan, China, South
Korea, Taiwan, France, Germany, and Italy. These countries are
among the world’s top petroleum net importers, and together they
receive about 1.2 million bbl/d out of the 2.6 million that Iran exports
daily.11 Although Germany and France have shown a decrease in
demand for Iranian oil in the last decade, Japan, China, and South
Korea have increased it, and even Italy still imports about 8.8 percent
of its oil from Iran. Therefore, establishing sanctions on Iranian oil
would entail convincing these countries to stop oil trade with Iran,
or at least to signiﬁcantly decrease it. Their compliance would, in
turn, require that they be provided with a reliable alternative source
of oil supply.

Japan
China
South Korea
France
Germany
Italy

Total

1991
Iran

5,458
N/A
1,384
2,166
2,829
2,168

385
N/A
N/A
172
53
233

Percent

Total

2001
Iran

Percent

7.053
N/A
N/A
7.94
1.873
10.747

5,324
N/A
2,831
2,241
2,922
2,129

531
24212
155
76
1
188

9.973
6.700
5.475
3.391
0.342
8.830

Table 2. Main Importers of Iranian Oil (Million Barrels per Day).13
Approximately 1.2 million bpd would have to be redirected to
this group of countries.14 One possible source is Saudi Arabia, which,
on its own, has an excess capacity of 1.4-1.9 million bpd, as of the
year 2003.15 Venezuela, too, has the capacity to expand production by
1 million bpd with stable foreign investment.16 Other Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)17 such as the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Nigeria, and Libya also have the capability
to increase production at no signiﬁcant additional cost.18 In addition,
non-OPEC countries such as Norway, Mexico, and more importantly,
184

Russia, would be prime sources of extra oil supply. Without almost
one-half of its oil exports revenue, the Iranian central government
would be seriously depleted of important resources.
Country

Production

Saudi Arabia
Russia
Norway
Venezuela
Iran
United Arab Emirates
Iraq
Kuwait
Nigeria
Mexico
Libya
Algeria
United Kingdom

9.1
6.7
3.3
3.1
3.8
2.5
2.6
2.2
2.1
3.5
1.5
1.4
2.8

Consumption

Net Exports

1.3
2.4
0.2
0.5
1.2
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.3
2.0
0.2
0.2
1.7

7.8
4.3
3.1
2.7
2.6
2.2
2.1
2.1
1.9
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1

Table 3. Top Petroleum Net Exporters, 2000
(Million Barrels per Day).19
More complex issues to consider are the political and economic
implications that could derive from this kind of punishment.
Sanctions against Iranian oil could be seen as an indirect reward
to substitute supplier countries that are less than democratic. This
could undermine international will to cooperate with sanctions.
More likely, countries necessary for effective sanctions against
Iranian exports would be reluctant to endanger their important nonoil trade relations with Iran (see discussion below.) At the same time,
it is difﬁcult to predict how oil-producing states would react to the
oil sanctions. Although oil prices have been highly volatile in the
last 25 years, Iranian oil customers might decide not to comply with
the oil embargo if oil producers take advantage of the situation by
signiﬁcantly increasing already-high oil prices. Furthermore, the
political instability in countries such as Venezuela might add to the
pressure on oil prices to reach levels not acceptable to importing
states.
In short, sanctioning Iranian oil exports would require many
major states to put nuclear counter-proliferation ahead of economic
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well-being, at least in the near term. In democracies, elected leaders
would calculate whether their publics would care more about the
security implications of Iranian nuclear weapons than rises in their
cost of living. These calculations would in turn be affected by national
threat perceptions and by the process by which sanctions would
be authorized. Would a nuclear Iran be seen as a threat primarily
to Israel and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf? Would key European
Union states feel more threatened by Iranian nuclear weapons or by
inﬂation? Major Asian importers of Iranian oil probably would not
feel directly threatened by Iranian nuclear weapons and therefore
less inclined to cooperate with sanctions. This reluctance would
be greater still, if sanctions were seen as primarily a U.S. “project”.
Thus, it would be vital to obtain UN Security Council authority for
such sanctions, in order to broaden the legitimacy of such action,
and if done under Chapter VII, to make all states obligated to impose
sanctions.
Tackling Iran’s Non-oil Exports. Iran’s non-oil exports constitute
about 15 percent of the country’s total export revenues (about $6 billion
in 2003). Products include carpets, fruits and nuts, and chemicals.
The United Arab Emirates, Germany, Azerbaijan, Italy, Japan, China,
and India are among Iran’s major customers. Curtailing imports
from Iran might not signiﬁcantly cripple Iran’s economy. If the ban
on imports was multilateral, however, the message to Iran might
be signiﬁcant enough that, in addition to other sanctions, it could
either force Iranian leadership to reconsider its nuclear aspirations,
or provoke strong protest within Iran’s civilian population against
the direction of the government’s policies.
Tackling Exports to Iran. Perhaps as signiﬁcant and hard to achieve
as a multilateral ban on Iranian non-oil exports, would be to restrain
other countries’ exports to Iran. Although previous sanctions on
U.S. exports forced Iran to ﬁnd new providers, the cost that Iran has
incurred in value and quality, particularly on high-tech products,
has been signiﬁcant. Iran is presently in great need of machinery,
transportation vehicles, chemical products, iron, and steel. Current
major suppliers to Iran include the European Union (EU), with 37.2
percent of Iran’s total imports; Russia, with 5.6 percent; the UAE,
with 5.5 percent; and Japan, with 5 percent.20
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1997/98

2001/02

United Arab Emirates
Germany
Azerbaijan
Italy
China
India
Japan
Ukraine
USA
Others

286
392
194
276
62
95
104
84
5
1,412

641
313
314
192
177
187
239
142
108
2,252

Total21

2,910

4,565

Table 4. Main Customers of Iran’s Non-oil Exports
(millions of dollars).22
The EU in this case is in a very strong position to inﬂuence
Iran’s behavior. The EU and Iran are negotiating a “Trade and
Co-operation Agreement” that is contingent on Iran’s compliance
with the Europeans’ demands to resolve the nuclear proliferation
crisis, to cease support of terrorist groups and actions, to support
a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conﬂict, and to end abuses
of human rights. This treaty is of particular signiﬁcance because,
despite repeated attempts, the World Trade Organization (WTO)
keeps denying Iran access into the trade organization. The fear of
isolation against a uniﬁed front between the United States, Europe,
and Japan would dramatize the cost in any cost/beneﬁt analysis by
the Iranian leadership and thus compel it to abandon any desires to
pursue a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, Iran’s dependence
on Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K. for imported machine tools
poses a vulnerability that could be exploited by targeted sanctions.
Russia, too, would be forced to collaborate with this multilateral
sanctions regime or face the possibility of being left without its
privileges at the G8 negotiation table.23
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Product
Food and live animals
Grains and derivatives
Beverages and Tobacco
Raw nonedible products
Mineral products, fuel, oil products,
and derivatives
Vegetable and animal shortening
Chemical products
Goods classiﬁed by composition
Iron and steel
Transportation vehicles, machinery and tools
Nonelectric machinery
Electric machinery, tools and appliances
Transportation vehicles
Miscellaneous ﬁnished products
Other
Total

1997/98

2001/02

2,508
1,705
8
647
265

2,106
1,472
18
675
578

434
1,890
2,720
1,290
5,045
2,672
1,444
929
384
295

388
2,384
3,319
1,895
7,565
4,051
1,819
1,696
535
57

14,196

17,626

Table 5. Value of Imports by Product (millions of dollars).24
1997/98
1,854
562
704
795
552
882
675
395
294
681

Germany
UA Emirates
Russia
Italy
South Korea
Japan
France
China
Brazil
U.K.

2001/02
1,807
1,633
914
996
958
787
1,109
887
896
666

Table 6. Iran Main Import Suppliers (millions of dollars).25
France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K might be faced with a difﬁcult
but necessary choice. Regardless of their differences with the United
States, these countries must prove that they are truly committed to
the basic premises of the “Trade and Co-operation Agreement.” If
Iran decides to restart its uranium enrichment program or impede
IAEA inspections, French, German, Italian, and U.K leaders will have
to compromise very signiﬁcant proﬁts (based on 2002 data, about
$1,109, $1,807, $996, $666 million in exports, respectively.) The gains
from doing so, however, would translate into international security.
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Again, the question would be the relative priority that various
polities attach to nonproliferation compared to economic growth.
Attaining collaboration from these countries is uncertain precisely
because the economic relations between the two sides are very
signiﬁcant. Italy, for instance, has not only shown great reluctance
to constrain trade with Iran, but has also claimed that some sort of
recognition or reward measures should be given to Iran for showing
improved cooperation regarding its nuclear program.26
Tackling Credit by International Financial Organizations. As a state
designated a supporter of terrorism, Iran has been forbidden since
1984 from receiving any U.S. contributions to international ﬁnancial
institutions. The U.S. Government has also lobbied other country
members of such international bodies to uphold their donations. For
7 years, the United States was successful in ensuring multilateral
cooperation from members of the World Bank Group. Between
July 1993 and May 2000, a coalition among the G7 states blocked
all contributions from the World Bank to Iran. Consensus broke,
however, when European partners adopted an engagement strategy
with Iran. Since then, the World Bank has awarded four loans for
development projects in Iran: $145 million for the Tehran Sewerage
Project, $87 million for the Primary Health Care and Nutrition
Project, $20 million for the Environmental Management Support
Project, and $180 million for the Earthquake Emergency Recovery
Project.27 In addition, $150 million will be directed to establishing
a local development fund, $80 million for a low-income housing
project, $120 million for a water supply and sanitation project and
$295 million for a “deurbanization” project.28 As major contributors
to international ﬁnancial institutions and trade partners with Iran,
European countries have, once again, a pressure point to force Iran
to comply with its obligations under the NPT.
It should be noted, however, that despite economic pressures
throughout the last 3 decades, Iran has never applied for assistance
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While other countries
have chosen to receive loans from the IMF’s Contingency and
Compensatory Financing Facility (CCFF), Iran has implemented
arduous structural reforms that, in the long term, have helped the
country to ensure economic growth.29
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Use of Force.
The most direct and limited way to apply force to reverse or
contain Iran’s nuclear acquisition would be to destroy key nodes of
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. If, for the sake of this analysis, Iran is
assumed already to have acquired at least a few nuclear weapons, the
military task becomes even more complicated. Enforcers would want
to destroy extant weapons as well as production infrastructure.
Experience with Iraq and, more speculatively, North Korea
suggests that reliable intelligence will not exist on the exact location
of Iran’s nuclear weapons and all relevant production infrastructure.
The lack of high conﬁdence that all desired targets could be identiﬁed
and destroyed need not preclude attacks. Degradation of some but
not all capabilities could still be deemed valuable enough to warrant
attack, both to limit Iran’s capacities and to demonstrate resolve.
Yet, lack of high conﬁdence in destroying all weapons and
production capabilities would raise the major question of Iran’s
potential use of surviving nuclear weapons against U.S. forces and
allies. An attack on Iran would make Iranian counterattacks more
likely. Many, especially in the Muslim world, would ﬁnd such
responses justiﬁed. This would affect the calculus of the long-term
political and strategic effects of attacks on Iran. Would such attacks
weaken, rather than strengthen, international support for those
who authorized and/or conducted the attacks? Depending on the
perceived legitimacy of the attacks, and their consequences, the
lesson could be that a few select states should seek nuclear weapons
to deter illegitimate exercise of force by, say, the United States.
Others, including in Europe, could express disaffection with “U.S.
militarism” by defecting from cooperation with the United States in
nonmilitary nonproliferation initiatives. Again, the conditions and
agencies through which such attacks on Iran were authorized would
affect their perceived legitimacy.
Iran does not lack means to deter and/or retaliate against military
attacks against it. Iranian Revolutionary Guards reportedly have
deployed action cells in Iraq. These cells appear not to have been
activated yet, but rather are to provide capabilities to attack U.S. forces
in the region if Iranian decisionmakers judge it necessary to respond
to U.S. actions in Iraq and/or against Iran. Nor can the possibility be
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dismissed that Iran has “terrorist” capabilities deployed in Europe,
South America, or even the continental United States for activation
“if necessary.” Again, these capabilities could be seen as a form of
asymmetric strategic deterrence against U.S. action.
Of course, the United States and/or a multilateral coalition, or the
UN Security Council could decide that a nuclear Iran poses a threat
to international peace and security sufﬁcient to warrant military
action to remove the current government in Iran. Regime removal in
Iran would be more demanding than the invasion of Iraq. Without
pretending a detailed analysis, one can say that current military and
international political and economic conditions militate against such
a risky enterprise. Among other things, it is practically impossible to
estimate how events in Iran would evolve following a military action
to remove the current government, even if such action were feasible.
Those who would contemplate forcible regime change would be
obligated to posit realistic scenarios and means to effect a future in
Iran better than the current situation.
The United States also could contemplate supporting armed
opponents of the current regime to take power in Iran. This would
lower the direct risk to the United States, but would attract almost
no international support. The United States likely would rely in part
on the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq (MeK) to conduct such an insurgency.
Given that the United States itself has deemed the MeK a terrorist
organization, and given widespread international misgivings over
the U.S.-U.K. 1953 coup in Iran, Washington could expect almost no
international support for such a regime change effort. Indeed, the
effort would seriously harm U.S. legitimacy.
In sum, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the options for coercive
measures to roll back this capability are highly problematic. Political
isolation, alone, would seem inadequate. Military force would be
unlikely to “solve” the problem in the sense of completely eliminating
Iran’s nuclear wherewithal. Use of force would likely unleash
dangerous counteractions by Iran, which, in turn, would likely
dissuade many in the international community from supporting
such measures. A tremendous campaign to remove the offending
government in Iran would seem beyond the means and will of
the United States and the international community today. Robust
economic sanctions, beyond those yet applied to any country,
191

would seem more promising, though still highly problematic.
The willingness to effectively apply such sanctions would depend
heavily on the development of a widespread consensus that Iran’s
proliferation is such a grave threat to international security and order
that leading states and institutions of the international system must
act decisively.
How are key national and international actors likely to interpret
and respond to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons?
This section explores how key actors likely would deal with the
aftershocks of Iran’s acquisition and cooperate with efforts to compel
Iran to roll back. It should be noted, however, that if roll back fails
within a couple of years, many in the international community will
defect and pursue a strategy of adapting to a nuclear Iran through
deterrence, containment, and diplomacy.
The UN Security Council.
The United States, U.K., and France, as well as other leading UN
states such as Japan and Germany, appear determined to compel
Iran to adhere to its obligations under the NPT and to prevent
Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. Yet the ultimate
(or penultimate) test will come if and when the Iranian matter is
forwarded to the UN Security Council. The course of prevention
will not be complete unless and until the Security Council, as the
ultimate enforcer of the NPT, addresses the challenge.
Presumably, then, if Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, it will be
either in deﬁance of the Security Council or in the aftermath of the
Council’s failure to act. Speciﬁcally, this means that the United States,
U.K., France, Russia, and China will have failed to act effectively
together. In this case, some of these ﬁve states will either have to act
more decisively to roll back a capability they failed to prevent from
developing, or adjust their own policies and global institutions to
overcome the implications of this failure.
If the Security Council were uniﬁed in the “prevention” stage,
and Iran had deﬁed a strong Council position, then the Council
would be more likely to cooperate to authorize punitive measures
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such as strong sanctions. Authorization of military action would be
less likely, especially if events in Iraq do not yield durable progress.
Still, under this scenario, the Council could be expected to impose
unprecedented political and economic costs on a proliferator—Iran.
The imposition of such costs would preserve at least some vital role
for the Council as an enforcer of international peace and security.
If Iran’s deﬁance came before the Security Council had occasion to
consider proposed antiproliferation resolutions by the United States
and other states, Iranian proliferation would hasten the adoption
of tougher new norms and enforcement mechanisms. The ensuing
response would be like shutting the barn door after at least one horse
escaped, but the argument would be “better late than never.”
It is more likely, though, that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it
will be in the context of disunity among the P-5 in trying to prevent
it. In this scenario, there would be mutual recriminations among the
P-5 over blame for the breakdown in prevention. Some members,
then, would have to be willing to retreat from prior positions and
rededicate themselves to seeking unity. Decisions whether to alter
policies would occur in a highly charged international atmosphere,
with domestic tensions in each of the capitals—not an environment
conducive to the sort of statesmanship the situation will require.
Based on recent performance, we can anticipate that the United
States would be charging at least one or two of the other members
with fecklessness, and they in turn would be charging the United
States with recklessness. Depending on how this contest played out,
it is conceivable that the United States and other members would
conclude for different reasons that the Security Council simply
cannot fulﬁll its security-providing function. In such a circumstance,
it is unlikely that the Security Council would authorize truly robust
economic sanctions against Iran, or military reprisals. The Security
Council’s position in the international system would be gravely
damaged, perhaps beyond repair for the foreseeable future.
The European Union.
If any entity has economic and political leverage over Iran,
the EU is it. Historical and current animosities between Iran and
the United States make rapprochement between them extremely
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difﬁcult, whereas Iranian desire for community with Europe is
relatively uncomplicated. The more revolutionary segments of Iran
do not appear so interested in ties with Europe that they would alter
policies signiﬁcantly, but reformers and pragmatic conservatives
wish to take steps to accommodate European concerns.
Iranians desire ties with Europe for identity and political reasons
and for economic interests. The EU has conditioned its willingness to
open relations with Iran on Tehran’s compliance with nonproliferation
rules, human rights, and disavowal of terrorism. A special trade
relationship is the key incentive the EU offers conditionally.
If Iran goes ahead and acquires nuclear weapons, EU leaders
will likely block trade and other forms of normalization. Imposing
more punitive sanctions would be more difﬁcult, given aspirations
of European energy corporations. However, proscriptions on
investment in Iran could be seen as a minimal EU action to uphold
the international norm against proliferation. An embargo on Iranian
oil exports would be more difﬁcult, but if the United States were
prepared to suffer the global economic consequences, the EU would
be hard-pressed not to go along given the failure of their strategy
of engagement to dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
(Again, this calculus would be altered if the United States were
seen to undermine the EU’s diplomatic strategy to prevent Iran’s
acquisition and could be “blamed” for “driving” Iran toward the
bomb.)
France has demonstrated real determination to block Iran’s
proliferation, and as long as the United States does not move
precipitously and unilaterally to use force, France appears likely to
join with a tough U.S. approach. Thus, if the United States and France
stay aligned on preventive strategy and tactics, and Iran nonetheless
deﬁes them, France would be inclined to work with Washington on
punitive measures short of force. German Foreign Minister Fischer,
according to knowledgeable sources, evinces strong determination to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom,
though politically chastened by opposition to its participation in the
Iraq War, and therefore publicly dismissing the prospects of military
action against Iran, nonetheless recognizes the need for success in
diplomatically diverting Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons
capability. Italy would ﬁnd an embargo most difﬁcult, on economic
grounds.
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Were the EU to participate in sanctions and other punitive
measures against Iran, and then be hit by terrorist reprisals, some
politicians would urge steps to learn to live with a nuclear Iran.
Their aim would be to obtain Iranian assurances that its nuclear
capability would be used only to deter attack against Iran, and not
for offensive purposes. Some would also move quickly to note that
Israel possesses nuclear weapons and that Iran’s acquisition was
inevitable because of this. The prospect of knock-on proliferation
in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or other states would be left for the United
States to deal with. Many in Europe would urge the opening of a
regional security dialogue to address the Israel-Palestine conﬂict
and WMD issues as a comprehensive problem.
Still, Europeans would be chastened by Iran’s acquisition and
could be expected to join with IAEA Director General El Baradei’s call
to reinterpret the rules of nuclear technology management. Members
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would probably agree to proscribe
exports of fuel-cycle capabilities to states that do not already possess
them, and to toughen export control enforcement.
The IAEA.
The IAEA has much riding on preventing Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. The Agency failed to detect key proliferation
steps in Iran, but, once given leads and authority to press, Iran has
investigated admirably within the limitations of its mandate as
determined by the states comprising its Board of Governors.30
IAEA professionals do not determine policy, the states on the
board of governors do. The Board will determine how to press Iran
to comply with its obligations and whether and when to send the
matter to the Security Council for enforcement. If action or inaction
by the Board is subsequently blamed for failing to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, the value of the IAEA in the international
system will come under severe doubt.
If the board is divided, and these divisions later explain fateful
inaction, the United States and others will press to reform the
Agency’s governance. Such reforms likely would seek to disempower
countries that were loath to pursue tough enforcement, probably
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developing countries. Rancor would ensue over the discriminatory
effort by the United States and others to rewrite the long-standing
nuclear bargain to disadvantage developing countries in favor of
those who already possess nuclear weapons and now want to impose
backwardness on the poor. The United States and its allies would
press for streamlined authority and specialization to strengthen the
Agency’s detection and inspection capabilities, while others would
demand greater nuclear cooperation. If this struggle over governance
reform appeared intractable, the United States and likeminded states
would be inclined to disinvest the Agency of authority and resources
to facilitate nuclear cooperation.
It is impossible to predict how this drama would unfold, but
the net effect would be polarization of the nuclear order. Nuclear
technology-providing states that are most security minded would
act coalitionally to toughen the standards and terms of nuclear
cooperation and the operation of nuclear complexes, while countries
that depend more on assistance would suffer the consequences. The
future of nuclear energy would come under doubt on proliferation
grounds. The nuclear industry’s argument that nuclear power must
expand to reduce growth in greenhouse gas emissions, would
bump hard against evidence that nuclear power provides cover for
dangerous proliferation.
The NPT Community.
Many states participate in the international nonproliferation
regime primarily through their membership in the NPT and
involvement in the treaty’s review process. Argentina, Brazil,
South Africa, Japan, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Australia, and Canada
are among the most important participants. These non-nuclearweapons states would help determine whether and how to adjust
interpretations of NPT requirements in the aftermath of Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Much would depend on the context in which Iran acquired
nuclear weapons. The U.S., leading EU states, and the IAEA Board of
Governors have not yet developed a consensus to demand that Iran
permanently abjure acquisition of national fuel-cycle capabilities.
Such a demand, hinted at by Director General el Baradei and
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explicitly endorsed by President Bush on February 11, amounts to a
reinterpretation of NPT Article IV. That article does not specify that
particular technologies must be shared with states in good standing
with the NPT, but it also does not say that particular technologies
may be categorically exempted from cooperation. As long as Iran
(or any other state) is not in full compliance with the treaty, it is
reasonable to insist that no cooperation should be extended to it.
(The UN Security Council would do well to make this a rule: no state
not deemed in full compliance with the NPT shall receive nuclear
cooperation, except for safety purposes, and it should be illegal for
any person or entity to provide such cooperation to such a state.)
The more ambitious NPT interpretation would be that even states in
good standing should no longer be eligible to acquire (indigenously
or through import) uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
capability under national control.
If NPT members had not agreed on this rule before Iran acquired
nuclear weapons, they would be more likely to do so afterward to
try to contain follow-on proliferation. But non-nuclear-weapons
states would demand “quids” for the quo. Article IV contains one
of the two major bargains in the NPT: in return for renouncing
nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapons states received guarantees
of generous civilian assistance from the nuclear-weapons states
and the IAEA. If the terms of nuclear assistance are to be radically
reinterpreted, the non-nuclear-weapons states will demand
corresponding gains. These demands could be for signiﬁcantly
subsidized fuel-cycle services to be provided to states that have or
will acquire nuclear-power reactors. The other major NPT bargain
is Article VI’s pledge by the ﬁve nuclear-weapons states to cease the
nuclear arms race and unequivocally to seek “the total elimination
of their nuclear arsenals.” A reinterpretation of Article IV would be
perceived to favor the nuclear-weapons states. Leading non-nuclearweapons states would demand a corresponding concession by the
nuclear-weapon states on the disarmament front.
In other words, efforts to strengthen NPT norms and rules
following Iran’s break out would entail intense and confrontational
negotiations over the core tradeoffs between the nuclear-weapons
and non-nuclear weapons states. Many developing non-nuclearweapons states would use the opportunity to blame the United
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States, Russia and other nuclear-weapons states for failing to reduce
the perceived value of nuclear weapons. Many states also would cite
Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons and refusal to join the NPT
as a central cause of Iran’s proliferation. Parties would blame the
United States for indulging Israel on this score and more broadly.
Beyond the conﬂict between nuclear-weapons “haves” and
“have nots,” NPT parties would divide over the future of the nuclear
industry. States that have large and export-hungry nuclear industrial
establishments will resist efforts to tighten severely the conditions
under which nuclear technology can be transferred. The United
States and like-minded states focusing on proliferation risks will call
for greater concentration of inspection and enforcement efforts on
ill-deﬁned “suspect” states, while developing countries will resist.
The United States will press to exclude further separation and use of
plutonium as a reactor fuel, while Japan and India (not an NPT state)
will cling to hopes for breeder reactors.
Thus, in the wake of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons,the
United States and other nonproliferation stalwarts would not yet
give up on nonproliferation. They would seek to create new norms
and rules to prevent states from acquiring dual-use fuel cycle
capabilities, strengthen inspections and other processes to detect
and deter proliferation, and establish more automatic measures to
enforce compliance and punish non-compliance with NPT norms and
rules. Key non-nuclear-weapons states would see the merits of such
measures but also would argue that the blame for proliferation lies
with the United States and other nuclear-weapons states that have
failed to comply with their disarmament obligations. To the extent
that knock-on proliferation pressures would center on the Middle
East, NPT debates would elicit enormous pressure on Israel, and the
United States as Israel’s patron. Intense bargaining would ensue,
the outcome of which cannot be predicted. Not only would major
U.S. security interests be at stake; the legitimacy of U.S. leadership in
nonproliferation also would hang in the balance.
U.S.-Russian Relations.
Washington and Moscow have butted heads over the Iranian
nuclear issue for a decade. The United States feels vindicated by
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IAEA acknowledgement that Iran has been lying and deceiving the
international community about its nuclear activities. Russia appears
a bit chastened by this, and also perturbed that Iran had secretly
acquired enrichment capabilities through non-Russian channels. Yet,
Moscow’s frustration with Tehran is tempered by an ongoing desire
to conduct lucrative nuclear commerce with Iran. Russia has pledged
that if the IAEA ﬁnds Iran noncompliant with its NPT obligations,
Russia will discontinue nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran has
brought itself back into compliance.
Moscow’s willingness to cooperate in a roll back strategy will
depend signiﬁcantly on how the United States and the EU ﬁrst manage
negotiations to bring Iran into compliance with its obligations. Iran
still must clarify the complete story of its past nuclear activities,
ensure total transparency, and, in the meantime, not violate a stillundeﬁned suspension of fuel-cycle activity. The United States and key
EU states also condition Iran’s rehabilitation on Tehran’s agreement
permanently to forgo acquisition of national fuel-cycle capabilities.
From Russia’s point of view, the key element is whether the United
States and the EU will induce Iran to accept these terms by blessing
the completion of the Bushier power reactor (and perhaps others)
with a guaranteed fuel services agreement with Russia. Such a deal
would satisfy the economic, bureaucratic and political interests of
Russia, including the Ministry of Atomic Energy. If the United States
were to endorse such a deal, and the package were offered to Iran via
talks with the EU, the IAEA Board of Governors or even the Security
Council, and Iran were to turn it down, then Russia would be much
more willing to support a coercive response against Iran. If, on the
other hand, Iran were not “allowed” to complete nuclear power
stations, Russia would be reluctant to penalize subsequent Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Russian leaders (and increasingly society) evince disdain
for Muslims, in large part due to the Chechen war. But Iran is an
exception, in many ways. Iran has cooperated with Russia in
containing unrest in Tajikistan. Iran has not exploited the Chechen
war. Nor has Iran worked against Russian interests in the ArmenianAzerbaijani conﬂict. The two states regard each other warily over
dispensation of Caspian Sea resources, but neither has appeared

199

inclined to make the matter a source of crisis. The two states seek
business-like relations; neither needs another adversary to worry
about, so both seem interested in strategies of reassurance.
Against this background, Russia will be reluctant to accede to U.S.
demands to punish severely Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.
As noted above, this reluctance will be even greater if the United
States does not endorse Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation in the
current prevention-phase of diplomacy with Iran. Still, if Iran acquires
nuclear weapons despite a “fair” effort by the United States, EU, and
the IAEA to stop it, Russia will acknowledge the need for a punitive
response. Russia’s historic leadership role in the nonproliferation
regime and its desire for greater integration with the West will impel
it to cooperate with Western leaders. That is, Russia’s equities in the
NPT-system and a strong UN Security Council would be the only
strong motivations for joining the United States in trying to coerce
Iranian roll back.
Because Russia will feel less directly threatened by Iranian
nuclear capability than the United States and others, it will seek
side payments for supporting sanctions. Such payments could come
in the form of agreements for Russia to be a substitute supplier of
oil to states embargoing Iranian exports. The powerful Russian
nuclear industry also would seek compensation for the closing of
the Iranian market. Over time, Russia may actually beneﬁt from the
consequences of Iranian nuclear acquisition. Tensions within NATO
over Turkey’s response to Iran, would not alarm Russia. Knock-on
proliferation in Saudi Arabia or Egypt would destabilize the Middle
East and perhaps raise oil prices, which would advantage Russia
as an exporter. Russia faces terrorist challenges from Chechnya,
Uzbekistan, and perhaps elsewhere on its southern periphery, but
even if turmoil in the Persian Gulf and Middle East produced more
terrorists, it is not evident that Russia would be affected worse by
such developments than the United States or Western European
states would be.
From a perspective of relative gains or losses, then, Russia would
not see Iranian nuclear acquisition as a major problem.
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The United States and Other Muslim States.
Despite deep splits within the Muslim world—Sunni versus Shia;
Arab versus Persian, Pakistani, Indonesian,; fundamentalist versus
modernist; and regime versus civil society—several issues unite
most Muslims. The Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, and the perceived
double standard with which the United States treats Israel, rallies
many Muslims’ hatred of the United States Similarly, displays
of U.S. military prowess in attacks that defeat and kill apparently
hapless Muslims generates widespread hatred of Washington. These
two coalescing tendencies would be relevant in the event that Iran
acquired nuclear weapons, and they probably would not be offset by
appreciation of U.S. efforts to promote freedom in Arab societies.
Neighboring Arabs and Turkey would be alarmed by arrogant
Persia’s acquisition. This alarm would be greater or weaker
depending on the bellicosity and character of the Iranian government.
But the United States would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to channel neighboring
states’ concerns into support for coercion against Iran if the United
States were not simultaneously pressing Israel to relinquish its
nuclear weapons, and if Israel were not closer to a resolution with
the Palestinians. Privately, Arab leaders might welcome coercion
against Iran, but publicly they and their societies would denounce
the United States for its favoritism of Israel. Iranian leaders know
this and would be expected to frame their acquisition of nuclear
weapons as a necessity to counter the nuclear-armed Zionist entity
and the arrogant United States.
Antipathy toward the United States (and any coalition it would
muster) would be greatest in the event of military attacks on Iran.
Strikes pinpointed against Iran’s “illegal” nuclear infrastructure
would be more understandable than a wider military campaign that
could harm civilians, especially if Iran completed its nuclear facilities
despite promises not to. Common people would see military action in
a now-common narrative: the United States, with its overwhelming
military machine and thousands of nuclear weapons, does Israel’s
bidding by smashing poor Muslims who, after all, are only trying
to acquire what Israel has. The narrative extends further to a U.S.
determination to keep Muslims backward by denying them advanced
technology.
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If the United States eschewed military action against Iran and
implicitly or explicitly recognized that Iran’s capability were not
going to be rolled back, Iran’s neighbors would quietly seek greater
U.S. security assurances against potential aggression or intimidation
by Iran. It is possible for people in Arab states, Pakistan, and
elsewhere simultaneously to denounce the United States for being
anti-Muslim and imperialistic and at the same time demand that the
United States insert itself more robustly to protect them. If attempts
to coerce Iranian roll back gave way to a strategy of deterrence, Iran’s
neighbors would be receptive to U.S. security guarantees against
Iran.
U.S. Relations with Oil Hungry Asia.
China receives one-sixth of its oil from Iran, Japan imports
one-tenth, and ﬁve percent of South Korea’s total oil needs come
from Iran. China and Japan are key: China is a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, and Japan is a leading advocate of
civilian nuclear power and of preventing new states from being
accepted as nuclear-weapons possessors. Both Asian leaders can
play important roles in diplomacy to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. If this diplomacy fails, however, it is difﬁcult to
see either state supporting sanctions against Iranian oil exports. The
resultant economic dislocations would be daunting, and a nucleararmed Iran would not directly threaten them militarily or in terms of
international status.
By contrast, Japan saw India’s acquisition as a greater threat
insofar as India bids to be a great power and therefore a rival to Japan.
Similarly, China views India as a direct military and major-power
competitor. Both Japan and China have accommodated India’s nuclear
evolution. Iran would be signiﬁcantly less “threatening” to Tokyo and
Beijing. The only major interest a nuclear Iran would threaten is the
viability of the NPT-related nonproliferation regime. China gradually
has determined that it genuinely beneﬁts from nonproliferation and
would not welcome the disorder that proliferation could cause, but
if the effects could be contained in the Gulf region, China could
live with it. Japan is an NPT stalwart, but it also has latent nuclearweapons capabilities and a frustrated-nationalist vein that could be
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tapped to favor “going nuclear” if the NPT dam collapsed. If in the
wake of Pakistan and India going nuclear, Iran and North Korea
were to follow suit and the ﬁve recognized nuclear-weapon states
continued not to take nuclear disarmament seriously, Japan could
adopt a more overt hedge strategy. This would alarm China, but
is probably a sufﬁciently uncertain and indirect possibility that it
would not inform China’s strategy toward Iran.
In short, given their economic equities in Iran, and the distance
of the Iranian threat, it is difﬁcult to see China and Japan favoring a
truly robust coercive strategy to roll back or punish Iran’s acquisition
of nuclear weapons. Unlike a tough strategy to persuade Iran to
comply with its NPT obligations and abjuration of national fuel-cycle
capabilities, coercion to achieve roll back would seem open-ended.
Neither Japan nor China likely would feel it could afford indeﬁnite
biting economic sanctions against Iran’s oil exports.
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PART IV
FURTHER COURSES OF ACTION

CHAPTER 9
REDUCING VULNERABILITY OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ
Dagobert Brito and Amy Myers Jaffe
The Strait of Hormuz is a vitally important international
waterway that connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman.
The passageway is by far the single most important chokepoint in
the world oil transportation system. It consists of two, mile-wide
channels for inbound and outbound tanker trafﬁc in addition to a
2-mile-wide buffer zone. It is 50 kilometers wide at its narrowest
point.1
The Strait is the main passageway for 15 to 16 million barrels of
oil a day, roughly two-thirds of total world oil trade by tanker and 20
percent of total world daily oil demand. Oil and petroleum products
from Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) transit the Strait of Hormuz. Large quantities of
liqueﬁed natural gas are also exported from Qatar through the
Strait. The signiﬁcance of the Strait of Hormuz has become enhanced
in recent years because virtually all of the world’s excess spare
production capacity that can be brought on line quickly to defend
against the adverse effects of a sudden oil supply crisis or disruption
is located in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE and thereby could
be cut off, if the Strait could be closed.
Maintaining the free ﬂow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz
is of vital strategic importance to the world economy and to the
United States and its allies. The United States receives about 25
percent of its imported oil via the Straits. Asia buyers are other key
purchasers of Persian Gulf oil with China, Japan, South Korea, India,
and Singapore receiving the lion’s share of Middle East exports
through the Strait of Hormuz. Keeping the Strait open is important
as a matter of protecting the international order and global economy
by maintaining the indisputable right of the freedom of navigation
of international seaways that is so vital to international trade and
commerce. About 30 U.S. warships now patrol the Persian Gulf and
nearby waters, about twice the level posted there during the IranIraq war in the 1980s.2
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There have been several challenges to the freedom of navigation
in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent territories over the last several
decades. The most prolonged threat to navigation in the Persian Gulf
in recent years arose during the 8-year war between Iraq and Iran. By
1984, the then 3-year-old Iraq-Iran war entered its so-called “tanker
phase,” with regular bombings of shipping and oil export facilities,
and mining of the waters of the Persian Gulf.3 By 1987, the United
States responded to the escalation of attacks on Persian Gulf shipping
by organizing a ﬂeet of frigates, destroyers, and minesweepers in the
region to combat the threat against shipping.4 In March 1987, the U.S.
Government agreed to transfer Kuwaiti oil and gas tankers to the
American ﬂag, and in July 1987, the U.S. Navy initiated Operation
EARNEST WILL, providing naval escorts to tankers passing through
the Persian Gulf.5
In April 2004, U.S. Navy vessels were called to service to repel
attacks by terrorist suicide bombers on both of Iraq’s offshore oil
shipping terminals, and shippers from the Persian Gulf region
are again asking the U.S. military to provide naval escorts.6 The
possibility of terrorist attacks at the Strait of Hormuz cannot be ruled
out as similar threats already have been identiﬁed in Asia against
another vital oil waterway, the Straits of Malacca.7
The nature of future risks against free navigation in the Strait of
Hormuz appear at present to come mainly from two directions: (1)
the possibility that a nongovernmental group, such as al-Qaeda, will
plot to disrupt trafﬁc in the Strait through suicide bombings attacks
using divers or small ships, or by deploying a dirty bomb or other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); or (2) the possibility
that a neighboring state would threaten passage of the Strait through
conventional or nonconventional military means to gain leverage in
a localized dispute or during a political or strategic conﬂict with a
major power such as the United States or a major Asian oil consuming
nation.
The U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf and overwhelming
U.S. naval superiority for the foreseeable future is likely to discourage
a major conventional attack on shipping in the Persian Gulf by any
nation with naval capabilities. There currently does not appear to be
an emerging naval power with the means or inclination to challenge
the U.S. mission of protecting the Strait of Hormuz. However, the
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possibility of a smaller, regional nation-state threatening free passage
through the Strait using non-naval military capabilities cannot be
ruled out. Iran, for example, has a history of challenging the status
quo in the region and might, under extreme circumstances, pose a
risk to the safety of passage through the waterway.
A territorial dispute between Iran and the UAE over three islands
inside the shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz has continued for
several decades. The islands, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser
Tunbs, were determined to be run under co-sovereignty by the two
nations in 1971, following the departure of British colonial rule from
the region. However, since 1992, Iran has occupied the islands and
taken steps towards unilateral control over the course of the 1990s,
restricting outside access, building an airstrip, and deploying SA-6
surface-to-air missiles, 155 millimeter artillery, and seersucker antiaircraft missiles on Abu Musa.8 Iran test ﬁred an anti-ship missile
near the Strait of Hormuz in 19879 and again in January 1996.10 Iran
has silkworm missiles deployed at Qeshm, Abu Musa Island, and on
Sirri Island, all within range of shipping through the Strait.11
In June 2004, a UAE warship ﬁred on an Iranian ﬁshing vessel
in waters close to Abu Musa Island.12 The Arab Gulf Cooperation
Council has backed UAE claims to the islands, but Iran has refused
to agree to international arbitration on their status. In April 2004,
Iran also accused Qatar of overproducing its share of natural gas
from the giant offshore North Field that straddles the Qatari-Iranian
border, warning that Iran would resort to “other ways and means
of resolving the issue” if Qatar did not enter new negotiations about
regulating production from the ﬁeld. The North Field/South Pars
gas reserves were clearly demarcated in a maritime border deal in
the late 1980s.13
Assessing The Threat of a Nuclear Iran to the Strait.
The backdrop of conventional Iranian military actions inside
the Persian Gulf has raised concerns about whether a nuclear Iran
would use the leverage of nuclear capability to demand political
or other gains by threatening trafﬁc through the Strait of Hormuz
via conventional or nonconventional means. A potential conﬂict
between the United States and Iran on a number of issues, including
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international terrorism or the proliferation of WMD, would raise
the stakes of such a risk. The possibility of such a threat, however,
must be evaluated against the backdrop of improved U.S.-Iranian
cooperation in several arenas in recent years. In the 1990 Gulf War,
Iran “helped” the coalition by “not interfering.”14 During the U.S. war
in Afghanistan, Tehran assisted in efforts to form the interim Afghan
government at a meeting in Bonn in December 2001. Iran also was
relatively cooperative during the early days of the campaign in Iraq,
although its long-term intentions are unclear.15 Iran also is seeking
better ties with the European Union (EU), whose long term strategy
with Iran focuses on linking into potential economic and political
reform there. As starting points, Iran has attained observer status to
the EU Energy Charter and is discussing a proposed gas pipeline to
Greece.16
Still, it remains a possibility that a nuclear Iran could make a threat
in political negotiations to use conventional weapons to close the
Strait of Hormuz. “Words of warning” from Israeli ofﬁcials that Tel
Aviv could hit vulnerable oil export facilities like Kharg Island and
other offshore regions instead of preemptively attacking the Bushier
nuclear plant could bring such an issue to the fore, as suggested
by Geoff Kemp of the Nixon Center in his monograph, “U.S. and
Iran: The Nuclear Dilemma, Next Steps.”17 In the context of issues
discussed in this chapter, Israeli grandstanding against Iranian oil
facilities is not constructive to common goals and, in fact, aggravates
the issues rather than serving as a deterrent. A threat of this nature
has immediate cost ramiﬁcations in that it would instantly raise the
price of oil, beneﬁting Iran overnight as it is a major oil exporter, and
hurting the United States and its allies in the industrial world who
are major oil importers.
Iran traditionally has been a strong advocate for higher oil prices
at meetings of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and is considered a pivotal price hawk leader inside the
producer oil cartel, inclined to ignore concerns that soaring oil prices
might hurt future oil demand or damage world economic conditions.
Its policy history on the subject of oil prices has been relatively
consistent since the early days of the Islamic revolution, and Tehran
has used its inﬂuence when it could to boost world oil price levels
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through a combination of public statements, diplomatic initiatives,
and outright threats.
In autumn 1984, as an oil price war was looming, inﬂuential
speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hojjatolislam Hashmi Rafsanjani
indicated in a sermon that Iran might attempt to block the ﬂow of
oil from the Persian Gulf if oil prices continued to fall, warning if
Iran “was one day pressured in a price-cutting war, it will create
such a crisis in the region that it will be similar to the days of the
revolution and oil would not ﬂow to the other side.”18 Iran’s minister
of oil announced the country would like to see $25 per barrel oil
remain OPEC’s minimum price in the aftermath of the Gulf War and
was able to orchestrate a high level political agreement with Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah to boost prices above the traditional $18 a
barrel target price starting in 1999.19 In recent years, Iran has lobbied
within OPEC to keep prices high by pressing the producer cartel
to maintain a pattern of pivotal oil production cuts. It has used its
leadership position inside OPEC to try to thwart the producer group
from raising production during times of market disruptions.
Iran’s economy is highly dependent on oil export revenues,
which constitute roughly 80 percent of its total export earnings, 4050 percent of the government budget, and 10-20 percent of its gross
domestic product (GDP). The U.S. Department of State concluded
in its 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report that Iran remained “the
most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2002.” Oil revenue represents
a signiﬁcant portion of Iran’s disposable income. This report
concluded that Iran provided Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian
rejectionist groups, such as HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command,
with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons. Iranian funding
for Hezbollah was reportedly about $60 million to $80 million a year
in the 1980s. The report also asserted that Iran provided support to
extremist groups in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The United States ﬁrst placed Iran on the State Department
terrorism list in 1984, in response to allegations of Iranian involvement
in the 1983 suicide attack by Hezbollah on the U.S. Marine barracks
in Lebanon.20 Iran was also linked to the bombing of Khobar Towers
in Saudi Arabia, where 19 American servicemen were killed. On
June 21, the Justice Department announced that it had indicted 13
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Saudis and one Lebanese who were members of Saudi Hezbollah.
The indictment said that these individuals belonged to groups that
were “inspired, supported, and supervised” by elements of the
Iranian government.21 In April 2001, Iran sponsored an international
conference supporting Palestinian groups, including groups
promoting violence in Israel. In January 2002, a shipment of 50 tons
of arms from Iran to the Palestinian Authority was uncovered.22 The
United States maintains economic sanctions against Iran because of
its terrorist links, and American ﬁrms are not allowed to purchase oil
from Iran nor invest in its oil ﬁelds.23
Political negotiations between Iran and the United States and its
allies can result in different outcomes. If the points in the bargaining
set dominate a war outcome, both sides, if they are rational, may very
well decide to choose to negotiate a solution rather than ﬁght a war.
However, if they choose not to bargain or if they cannot agree, then
one option open to Iran is to try to block the Strait using conventional
force. The United States currently has the ability to attack Iranian
missile sites and can, at some cost, reopen the Straits. Iran’s shift to
nuclear status most likely would alter its political leverage vis-à -vis
conﬂict with the United States and its allies.
The implications for an Iran that has acquired nuclear capability
differs from the above scenarios. It is unlikely that Iran would have
nuclear weapons in sufﬁcient number and sophistication that they
would use them to attack the United States and it allies. From the
Iranian point of view, perhaps the greatest utility to attaining nuclear
weapons is to protect its territory from outside aggression, and deny
the United States aggressive interference in its internal affairs or at
the extreme, an Iraq-style invasion by U.S. or allied troops. Iran also is
concerned about the nature of the military balance in its neighborhood,
which includes several nuclear powers (Israel, Pakistan, and India).
Iran is not expected to deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile
capable of striking the continental United States. This means that
for Iran even to consider implementing an actual regional nuclear
attack, it would have to be able to withstand a massive preemptive
U.S. conventional attack, or if Iran used nuclear weapons ﬁrst in
the theatre, a nuclear second strike by the United States. In strategic
terms, therefore, it is difﬁcult to see why a rational Iran would use its

214

nuclear weapons except under dire circumstances where its existence
was threatened.
However, it cannot be ruled out that a more radicalized regime in
Tehran might pass nuclear material to a terrorist group. Alternatively,
should the political climate in the region change, it would be possible
for Iran to threaten to use its nuclear weapons as an umbrella to close
the Strait of Hormuz. It has been estimated that a 3-month closure
of the Strait of Hormuz, without any offsetting oil export procedures
or market intervention, could cost the United States a 4 to 5 percent
drop in GDP, with up to 2 percent added to the unemployment rate
and 7 percent added to the inﬂation rate.24
Bargaining with threats is really a two-stage process.25 The ﬁrst
stage is explicit bargaining. The second stage, in which the threat point
will be implemented should the bargaining process fail, is implicit.
The logical difﬁculty is that such games usually are not subgame
perfect. In the bargaining process, it may be optimal to threaten to use
nuclear weapons should a player’s demands not be met. However,
it is unlikely that the player will want to implement its threats. One
way to address this problem is through a commitment mechanism. If
a player can restrict its freedom of action so that it has no alternative
but to implement the threat, then the threat is credible.
Precommitment mechanisms can be subtle.26 One example would
be to transfer control of nuclear weapons to battleﬁeld commanders.
This creates the possibility that in the “fog of war,” the weapons will
be used. The aggressor is forced to try to evaluate the probability that
the other side will use its nuclear weapons. If it is a nuclear power, it
can invoke the threat point by using the argument in its negotiations
that political instability may create the danger that the nuclear
weapons may fall into irresponsible hands. Thus, the potential for
political instability is itself a form of a precommitment mechanism.
A non-nuclear power does not have the advantage of this type of
leverage. Given the enormous damage nuclear weapons can inﬂict,
their expected loss can be large, even though the subjective probability
of their use is small. Given the political instability of Iran, it would be
dangerous to assume that all bargaining would be rational, as there
would the very real possibility that the nuclear weapons would be
under the control of the more radical elements of the government.
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Since the nuclear threat is credible, the status quo is likely to be
stable. Nuclear weapons put the burden of accepting the risk of the
threat being implemented on the party that wants to change the
status quo. The potential use of nuclear weapons also can change
the probability distribution of potential gains and losses from
conventional war so as to reduce its expected gain. In fact, a very
small probability of enormous loss due to the use of nuclear weapons
can change the expected value of a conventional war from positive
to negative.
The acquisition of nuclear weapons is thus a means to validate
conventional superiority. If a country has both conventional
superiority and nuclear weapons, it can use the threat of conventional
weapons to achieve the result it desires and use its nuclear weapons
to validate this action. This threat would deter third parties from
intervening in a regional conﬂict. Suppose, for example, that Iraq had
been a nuclear power in the summer of 1990. Having taken Kuwait,
Iraq would have forced the allies to choose between accepting the
new allocation, or risking that its threat of using nuclear weapons
would be implemented.
Iran’s arsenal of Silkworm and Seersucker missiles mean that it
could use these missiles in an attempt to close the Strait.27 Under
normal circumstances, this would be a problem, but one that could
be addressed by U.S. naval power. However, if Iran has nuclear
weapons, the nature of the threat to the Strait or other Persian Gulf
energy facilities would change. The military problem would be much
more complex, as it would be necessary to destroy Iran’s nuclear
weapons before attacking the conventional forces that are blocking
the Strait. Under such circumstances, time becomes a precious
commodity, and the ability to buy time by moving Saudi and other
Gulf production to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean becomes a
key resource.
Strategies for Reducing Threats to the Closure
of Strait of Hormuz.
Maintaining alternatives to shipments of Persian Gulf oil through
the Strait of Hormuz will be a critical aspect to limiting the economic
damage to oil importing countries of a major shutdown of the Strait.
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The ﬁrst line of defense in this regard is the existence of the emergency
stockpiling system of the International Energy Agency (IEA) which
includes the joint release of oil from U.S. strategic petroleum reserve,
together with strategic oil stocks of other Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states. However,
the potential of the IEA strategic stocks is limited, as it can only
replace the volume of oil coming through the Strait for less than 30
days. Western industrialized nations likely would have to resort to
emergency conservation measures in combination with a major stock
release to mitigate the damage of a prolonged closure of the Strait of
Hormuz, barring other alternative strategies.

Emergency Ppreparedness
Maximum withdrawal profile from OE C D S trategic R es erves
million b/d

14

US

12

Germany

Japan

Other

10
8
6
4
2
0
0-30

31-60

61-90

91-120 121-150 151-180 181-210 211-240 241-270

Days from start of drawdown
S ource: IE A

Table 1.
Western strategic oil stocks could be supplemented by unsold
oil stored near end-user markets by key producers like Saudi Arabia
or Russia. Such “ﬂoating” stocks were pivotal in stabilizing oil
markets in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.28 Floating stocks would
be beneﬁcial in today’s circumstances and should be considered.
However, other alternative strategies do exist that could give the
United States and its allies time to pursue a negotiated solution or to
properly prepare for a military response. Among those alternatives
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are to use existing pipeline and oil export infrastructure to create a
bypass to the Strait of Hormuz. The costs and options for doing so
have been studied in detail by the James A. Baker III Institute and
the Center for Naval Analysis.29
One signiﬁcant existing Strait of Hormuz bypass is the transSaudi Arabian Petroline, an oil pipeline that has existing capacity to
move over 5 million barrels a day of crude oil from Saudi oil ﬁelds to
the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
A second pipeline, the Ipsa-2 pipeline, which extends from
southern Iraq to the Saudi Red Sea port of Mu’jiz, could be refurbished
and adjusted to carry an additional 1.65 million barrels a day of
oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia (and with construction of a spur
line, Kuwait) to the Red Sea, bypassing the Persian Gulf. The 1.65
million b/d Iraqi-Saudi (Ipsa-2) pipeline was closed indeﬁnitely by
Riyadh during the Gulf War. Although Saudi Arabia has refused to
comment on whether it would ever bring the line back on stream, it
has maintained its portion in good working order. In June 2001, the
kingdom announced that it had taken ownership of Ipsa-2, which was
used to export Iraqi crude oil via Saudi Arabia in the 1980s during
the Iraq-Iran war. Riyadh said that it was seizing the line, including
pumping stations, storage tanks, and the maritime terminal, as Gulf
War reparations for Iraqi military actions. Baghdad, for its part, has
insisted that it still owns the line and has not accepted the legitimacy
of the Saudi appropriation. Utilization of this line would require a
diplomatic initiative involving both Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
The capacities of both of these pipelines could be upgraded by
65 percent in the event of a Hormuz incident to 11 million barrels a
day by upgrading the lines through the use of drag reduction agents
that reduce turbulent eddies in the oil which lessen the volume of
oil that can be transported through a pipeline at any given time.
Costs of such a project are calculated to be relatively low at around
$600 million. Drag reduction agents (DRAs) are chemicals that are
injected into crude oil pipelines to reduce energy loss. DRAs have
been used on the Alaskan pipeline, and frequently on the Colombian
pipeline system, to make up for lost ﬂows during times of operational
interruption. Another option would be to build a spur line from Abu
Dhabi and other regional production centers so that oil could exit to
world markets via Oman.
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Upgrading these pipelines could allow the United States to
respond to a closure on a deliberate and risk-minimizing timeline,
potentially lessening the need for U.S. military deployment during
a crisis. The existence of such contingency options also could be
used to reduce Iranian motivation to close the Strait of Hormuz by
reducing the political leverage and gain from doing so. Studies show
that full use of a bypass option would mean that a closure of the
Strait of Hormuz would only result in a loss of U.S. GDP of roughly 1
percent, also mitigating the impact on unemployment and inﬂation.30
However, the bypass option only would be effective if Iran did not
have the capability to simultaneously threaten the bypass facilities
or Saudi Arabian oil production facilities themselves, but focused
solely on closing the Strait as its primary target.
The bypass contingency plan described above certainly would
be extremely effective against a one-of-a-kind terrorist attack that
temporarily affected the passage of oil through the Strait. Rapid public
announcement of the planned utilization of bypass routes could be
used in combination with strategic stocks to keep oil markets calm
during such an event by demonstrating to the markets that Persian
Gulf oil will still be made available.
High Costs of a Loss of Access to Saudi Facilities.
While there exist several alternative ways to bypass a loss of access
to the Strait of Hormuz, a major attack on Saudi oil production facilities
would be harder to counterbalance. Saudi oil export infrastructure
has important, substantial built-in redundancies on both the east and
west coasts of the kingdom that would make it extremely difﬁcult for
terrorist cells or saboteurs to knock out Saudi export capacity for any
signiﬁcant period of time. The same would apply to military attacks
by air. The kingdom’s export capacity is over 14 million b/d, almost
twice as much as current export levels, and a wide variety of facilities
would have to be substantially jeopardized simultaneously before
any oil export curtailment would be unavoidable. The kingdom also
has access to other less well-known offshore loading facilities and
makeshift systems, such as single-buoy mooring systems that could
be used to load ships for export of Saudi oil.
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However, a major attack on core Saudi oil production facilities that
signiﬁcantly affected oil production and handling operations at the
major processing facilities at Abqaiq would prove far more difﬁcult
to replace quickly. As noted in the Economist Magazine, “Saudi
Arabia remains the indispensable nation of oil.”31 Saudi Arabia not
only exports more oil than any other producer, it maintains over one
million barrels a day of idle swing capacity on hand for emergencies
and can, in a relatively short order, bring on new ﬁelds to replace the
exports of any other single exporter in the world. No other nation
currently sits in this important position. The ramiﬁcations of Iran or
some other nuclear power or group being able to blackmail the West
would be quite extreme. A loss of access to Saudi production facilities
at Abqaiq would leave world markets with a deﬁcit in the millions
of barrels a day (depending on the extent of damage) and would
not be replaced easily, even in the 3 to 6-month timeframe when
strategic stocks could be used to replace lost Saudi barrels. Certain
facilities can take between 1 to 2 years to rebuild on an expedited
basis. To lessen the impact of an attack by a terrorist group or others
on important Saudi oil processing facilities, construction of some
alternative bypass facilities should be considered and implemented
where possible, and critical parts for the repair or reconstruction of
such oil processing facilities should be stockpiled in country.
In the event of a major attack on Abqaiq facilities, Saudi production
eventually could be replaced with investment in new ﬁelds in
Venezuela, Iraq, Russia, and West Africa, but this process is also
likely to take several years. In the meantime, the United States and
other large industrial and emerging economies would be forced to
restrict the use of oil through rationing and other extreme measures
to prevent a full blown market crisis of proportions reminiscent of
the crisis of 1973.
Conclusion.
The United States has acted to protect the freedom of navigation
of the Strait of Hormuz for several decades. However, military
strategies alone may be less effective than a combination of strategic
options, should hostile parties in the region acquire WMD and be
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willing to use them to threaten core Saudi oil production facilities
signiﬁcantly as a means of deterring a military response to a closure
of the Strait.
The United States, through a combination of release of IEA
emergency strategic stockpiles, utilization of strategic export
bypass facilities, and military operations, could ease any threat or
actual blockade to the Strait of Hormuz. For an investment totaling
roughly $600 million, existing pipeline systems in Saudi Arabia
could be modiﬁed to permit the export of up to 11 million barrels
a day of oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.32 Used in combination
with the release of strategic stocks, an upgraded bypass system
could almost completely offset the loss of oil due to the closure of
the Strait of Hormuz for as much as 90 days. Such a strategy would
allow the United States to respond to the threat of a closure or an
actual closure on a deliberate and risk-minimizing timeline and
could limit the extent of military engagement needed. The existence
of such contingencies could reduce the Iranian motivation to close
the Strait of Hormuz and reduce the political leverage they get from
threatening to do so.
However, the effectiveness of this deterrent is reduced under
scenarios where Iran is a nuclear power and might consider threatening
Saudi oil production surface facilities. A nonconventional attack on
certain key Saudi oil production facilities would be extremely difﬁcult
to deal with, given the lack of alternative idle production capacity
that could be brought on line in other oil producing countries. This
extreme case, however, would have to be considered by Iran in the
context of a massive U.S. response.
Given all the factors considered in this question, having the ability
to by-pass the Strait of Hormuz has two signiﬁcant beneﬁts. First, it
buys time, allowing the United States to move forces into the region
to address the Iranian nuclear threat. Second, Iran would have to
use its nuclear weapons without provocation; this weakens their
position in negotiations. It is one thing to threaten to use nuclear
weapons in response to an attack and quite another to threaten to
use nuclear weapons if a concession is not made in negotiations. In
the latter case, Iran runs high risks of serious consequences that its
small nuclear arsenal would not enable it to guard against.

221

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9
1. See www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/choke.pdf.
2. Chip Cummins, “As Threats to Oil Facilities Rise, U.S. Military Becomes
Protector,” Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2004, p. A1.
3. Nadia El-Sayyed El-Shazly, The Gulf Tanker War: Iran and Iraq’s Maritime
Swordplay, London: Macmillan Press, 1997.
4. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, “The Impact of U.S. Policy on the Stability of the Gulf
States: A Historian’s View,” Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Arab States, Joseph Kechichian,
ed., New York: Palgrave, 2001.
5. John Partin, Special Operation Forces in Operation EARNEST WILL, Prime
Chance I, MacDill Air Force Base, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, History
and Research Ofﬁce, April 1998, p. 5-7; also see Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkim, “The
Arabian Gulf at the New Millennium: Security Challenges,” in Keahiahian.
6. Cummins.
7. See http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/fr/fr040630_1_
n.shtml; http://www.nydailynews.com/front/story/119482p-107611c.html.
8. BBC website, BBC Timeline, Abu Dhabi; Al-Alkim.
9. See http://www.nti.org/e_research/proﬁles/Iran/Missile/3876_4086.html.
10. See http://www.converger.com/eiacab/chron.htm.
11. See http://www.nti.org/e_research/proﬁles/Iran/Missile/3876_4086.html.
12. AFP news service, June 13, 2004.
13. “Iran Accuses Qatar of Overproducing Gas,” Oil Daily International,
Energy Intelligence Group, April 24, 2004, available at www.energyintel.com.
14. So argues Geoffrey Kemp in his monograph, U.S. and Iran: The Nuclear
Dilemma: Next Steps, available at www.nixoncenter.org.
15. Details available in ibid.
16. Friedemann Miller, “Why Iran is Key for Europe’s Security of Energy
Supply,” Eugene Whitlock, ed., Iran and Its Neighbors Diverging Views on a Strategic
Region, SWP Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July
2003.
17. Kemp.
18. “Iran Threatens Action if Oil Price War Erupts,” Middle East Economic
Survey (MEES), Vol. XXVII, No. 6, November 19, 1984.
19. “Iran Hopes $25/barrel Minimum Price Remains After Gulf Crisis,” MEES,
Vol. XXXIII, No. 49, September 10, 1990; “Saudi Arabia and Iran See Eye to Eye on
Oil Price Issue,” MEES, Vol. XLII, No. 21, May 24, 1999.

222

20. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of
Terrorism,” Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003, Chapter 3.
21. See http://news.ﬁndlaw.com/cnn.
22. An overview on Iranian terrorism links also is outlined by George Tenet,
Testimony given on “Current and Future Threats to National Security,” Senate
Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1999.
23. For a detailed account of the U.S. oil sanctions policy against Iran, see
Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of
Terrorism,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003.
24. Estimates are based on the U.S. Department of Energy DIS model and do
not cover any ameliorating policies such as the release of the strategic petroleum
reserve or utilization of alternative export routes.
25. Dagobert Brito and M. D. Intriligator, “The Economic and Political
Incentives to Acquire Nuclear Weapons,” Security Studies, 1993.
26. Ibid.
27. For details on Iran’s military capabilities, see Wisconsin Project on Nuclear
Arms Control, Iran Missile Update, 2004, Risk Report, Vol. 10, No. 2, March-April
2004; also see Al-Alkim.
28. Because of weak markets in mid-1990, Saudi Arabia and Iran held tens of
millions of barrels of oil aﬂoat, unsold, that served as a cushion to the sudden loss of
Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil production. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Saudi
Arabia maintained a policy of storing oil abroad in the Caribbean and Northwest
Europe to make sure it could respond to any sudden disruption in oil markets.
See Ronald Soligo, Amy Myers Jaffe, and Peter Mieszkowski, “Energy Security,”
working paper, The Political, Economic, Social, Cultural and Religious Trends in
the Middle East and the Gulf and Their Impact on Energy Supply, Security and
Pricing, available at www.rice.edu/energy.
29. For a detailed study of this subject which is the basis for this section of this
chapter, see M. Webster Ewell, Jr., Dagobert Brito, and John Noer, “An Alternative
Pipeline Strategy in the Persian Gulf,” available at www.rice.edu/energy, under
Research/Other Publications and Presentations. A classiﬁed version of the study
also exists that should be revisited by policymakers, given the risks to Persian Gulf
facilities described in this chapter.
30. Ibid.
31. “What If?” The Economist, May 29, 2004, p. 69-70.
32. Ewell, Brito, and Noer.

223

CHAPTER 10
DETER AND CONTAIN:
DEALING WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN
Michael Eisenstadt
For nearly 2 decades, Iran has been acquiring nuclear technology
from around the world, ostensibly to support its civilian nuclear
power program. These efforts have made slow, but steady progress.
Reviewing the scope and nature of Iran’s clandestine and overt
nuclear-related activities over the past 20 years, and the long trail
of partial, misleading, and/or untruthful declarations about these
activities that it has provided to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), it is hard to avoid the conclusion that many of these
activities were likely intended to support a clandestine nuclear
weapons program. 1
How close might Iran be to acquiring a capability to produce “the
bomb”? It is hard to say, as estimating nuclear timelines is far from
an exact science, and Iran’s nuclear program often has moved slower
than reasonably might have been expected, given what is known
about other nuclear programs in the developing world. That being
said, several nongovernmental analysts and organizations have
estimated that were it to decide to do so, and were it to encounter
no major obstacles, Iran could probably produce a nuclear weapon
within 3-5 years.
• Were Iran to employ clandestine gas centrifuge cascades of
the type being built for its declared civil program (presumably
its preferred path), it might be able to acquire enough ﬁssile
material for a bomb in 3-5 years—provided that it resolves
technical problems that have apparently dogged this effort
and centrifuge programs elsewhere.2
• If it were to fall back on its reactor at Bushier, which is
nearly complete and which, according to Russian ofﬁcials,
will commence operations by the end of 2006 if there are
no teething problems, Iran could produce enough ﬁssile
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material for its ﬁrst bomb within 2-3 years of start-up. To do
so, however, it would have to be willing to openly violate
its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations by
diverting safeguarded spent fuel, or to withdraw from the
NPT before taking this step.3
• If Iran were to secretly obtain ﬁssile material from abroad
(i.e., North Korea or Pakistan), it could conceivably build a
device or weapon within a year—assuming it possessed plans
for a viable design and the necessary special materials and
components needed to build a bomb.
By contrast, according to public statements by U.S. intelligence
ofﬁcials and news reports summarizing authoritative U.S. and Israeli
intelligence assessments, Iran could have a nuclear weapon by early
to mid-next decade—that is, within 5-10 years. 4
In any case, due to uncertainty about the Islamic Republic’s actual
nuclear status (as a result of enduring concerns about the possible
existence of a clandestine weapons program), Iran increasingly is
likely to be perceived as a nuclear capable or de facto nuclear weapons
state in the coming years. Accordingly, some of its neighbors, and
some members of the international community, are likely to start
treating Iran with the deference generally reserved for nuclear
weapons states.
For this reason, U.S. policymakers and military planners can
be expected to devote more attention to the special challenges of
deterring and containing a nuclear Iran that derive from the nature
of the Islamic Republic, regional political realities, and Iran’s support
for and involvement in terrorism.
DETERRING THE “MARTYRDOM-SEEKING NATION”
Because Shi‘i religious doctrine exalts the suffering and martyrdom of the faithful, and because religion plays a central role in the
ofﬁcial ideology of the Islamic Republic, Iran is sometimes portrayed
as an “undeterrable” state driven by the absolute imperatives of
religion, rather than by the pragmatic concerns of statecraft. This
impression has been reinforced by Iran’s use of costly human-wave
attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, its prolongation of the war with
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Iraq due to its single-minded pursuit of the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein, and its support for groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that have pioneered the tactic of
the suicide bombing.5
Is Iran “Undeterrable”?
Iranian ofﬁcials frequently have sought to cultivate and play on
this image of Iran abroad as a fanatical, indefatigable foe, whose
soldiers seek martyrdom, and whose society is willing and able to
absorb heavy punishment, in order to bolster the country’s deterrent
capability. Thus, according to Iran’s former Army chief of staff, Major
General ‘Ali Shahbazi, though
. . . the United States or some country incited by it may be able to begin a
military conﬂict . . . it will not be strong enough to end it. This is because
only Muslims believe that “whether we kill or are killed, we are the
victors.” Others do not think this way. 6

The perception, however, of Iran as an irrational, undeterrable
state with a high pain threshold is both anachronistic and wrong.
Within the context of a relatively activist foreign policy, Iranian
decisionmakers have generally sought to minimize risk by shunning
direct confrontation and by acting through surrogates (such as the
Lebanese Hizballah) or by means of stealth (Iranian small boat and
mine operations against shipping in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq
War) in order to preserve deniability and create ambiguity about
their intentions. Such behavior is evidence of an ability to engage in
rational calculation and to accurately assess power relationships.
Moreover, despite the frequent resort to religious imagery in
speeches and interviews, Iranian ofﬁcials often employ the language
of deterrence as it is spoken and understood in the West when
discussing the country’s national security strategy. Thus, shortly
after the Shehab-3 missile test launch in July 1998, Defense Minister
Ali Shamkhani explained that to bolster Iran’s deterrent capability
“we have prepared ourselves to absorb the ﬁrst strike so that it inﬂicts
the least damage on us. We have, however, prepared a second strike
which can decisively avenge the ﬁrst one, while preventing a third
strike against us.”7
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Tehran’s conduct during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War
demonstrated that Iran is not insensitive to costs. It is possible to
argue that in the heady, optimistic, early days of the revolution—
from the early-to-mid 1980s—Iran, as a society, had a relatively high
threshold for pain. During the early years of the war, Tehran was
willing to endure hardships, make great sacriﬁces, and incur heavy
losses in support of the war effort—eschewing the opportunity for
a cease-ﬁre in 1982 to pursue the overthrow of the Ba‘th regime in
Baghdad and the export of the revolution. But as the war with Iran
dragged on, popular support for it had waned: the population was
demoralized and wearied by years of inconclusive ﬁghting, making
it increasingly difﬁcult to attract volunteers for the front. Many
clerics had come to the conclusion that the war was unwinnable.8
This was not, as Ayatollah Khomeini was fond of saying, “a nation
of martyrs.”
Khomeini was probably the only ﬁgure with the charisma and
moral authority to inspire the Iranian people to sustain the level of
sacriﬁce required to continue the war for 8 years. The double blow
embodied by the unsuccessful conclusion of the war in August 1988
and the death of Khomeini in June 1989 marked the end of the decade
of revolutionary radicalism in Iranian politics. Years of revolutionary
turmoil and the long, bloody war with Iraq made Iranians weary of
political violence and war, and risk averse. With respect to its ability
to absorb casualties and bear costs, Iran has since become a much
more “normal” state.
This has clearly been manifest in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy
behavior during the past decade and a half. Its cautious behavior
during the 1991 uprising in Iraq, and the 1998 crisis with Afghanistan
that followed the Taleban victory there, provides perhaps the best
proof that Tehran is wary of stumbling into a costly quagmire for
which there would be little or no public support. In both cases, it
failed to intervene on behalf of endangered Shi‘i communities. It
will sooner compromise its Islamic ideological commitments and
abandon endangered Shi‘i communities to their enemies, rather than
risk Iranian national interests by entering into foreign adventures.
Such pragmatism is consistent with a basic principle of
decisionmaking established by Khomeini shortly before his death.
In a series of letters to then President ‘Ali Khamene’i and the Council
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of Guardians in December 1987 and January 1988, he afﬁrmed the
Islamic government’s authority to destroy a mosque or suspend the
observance of the ﬁve pillars of faith (the fundamentals of Muslim
observance) if Iranian state interests so required. In so doing, he
sanctioned the supremacy of state interest over both religion and
the doctrine of the Revolution.9 Ever since then, national interest has
been the guiding principle of Iranian decisionmaking, whether with
regard to social issues (such as birth control), the economy (foreign
investment in the oil sector), or foreign and defense policy (restraint,
since the early 1990s, in exporting the revolution).10
This basic policy framework is unlikely to be altered by the
emergence of a new generation of highly nationalistic politicians in
the legislative and executive branches of the Iranian government,
who count among their ranks many veterans of the security services,
the Revolutionary Guard, and the Iran-Iraq War—as exempliﬁed by
Iran’s new president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad. This is due, in large
part, to the fact that those wielding real power in Iran consist largely
of the same old familiar cast of “unelected” leaders: Supreme Leader
‘Ali Khamene’i, Expediency Council Head ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and
others. The deﬁant, confrontational style of this new generation of
assertive nationalist leaders (evident in Iran’s recent handling of the
diplomacy with representatives of the European Union regarding its
nuclear program) is, however, liable to further aggravate tensions
with the West, and could contribute to an Iranian miscalculation visà-vis the United States, Israel, or its more immediate neighbors.11
Challenges for Deterrence.
The main problem in deterring a nuclear Iran is not the putative
“irrationality” of the regime or its high threshold for pain. Rather, it
is: 1) the impact of political factionalism on the regime’s behavior; 2)
the possibility that a nuclear Iran might be more likely to engage in
terrorism or military aggression, or seek an “eliminationist” solution
to the Arab-Israeli conﬂict, and; 3) the effect of domestic instability
on the security of Iran’s nuclear stockpile and on the ofﬁcials that
control its nuclear arsenal. Each of these could complicate efforts to
create a stable deterrent relationship with a nuclear Iran.
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Political Factionalism. Political factionalism has sometimes led
to dramatic zig-zags in Iranian policy, as different personalities,
factions or branches of the government worked at cross purposes,
sought to subvert their rivals, or pressed the government to take
actions inconsistent with its general policy line. Accordingly, Iranian
policy has often been inconsistent and unpredictable. Such behavior
would seriously complicate efforts to establish a stable deterrent
relationship with a nuclear Iran.
Recent examples of this tendency can be seen in Iranian policy
toward Afghanistan and Iraq. According to U.S. ofﬁcials, while
Iranian diplomats played a constructive role at the Bonn Conference
in December 2001 and the subsequent creation of an Afghan Interim
Authority, members of the Revolutionary Guard Qods Force were
working to undermine the authority of the nascent central government
by arming and training the Afghan Shiite Sepah-e-Mohammad militia
and cultivating the warlord Ismail Khan in Herat.12 Likewise, in the
wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Iranian government apparently
encouraged Shi‘i parties such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq to cooperate with coalition forces and to participate
in the U.S.-backed Iraq government, while supporting and arming
groups engaged in attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces.13
This tendency has even expressed itself in the economic domain.
Revolutionary Guards shut down a new Tehran airport operated by
a Turkish-Austrian consortium only one day after it opened in May
2004—claiming that the Turkish ﬁrm did business in Israel (a charge
it denied). In September 2004, the Majlis froze a $2.5 billion deal with
a Turkish consortium to create a privately-owned cell phone network,
only days after the contract was signed. Finally, a $390 million deal
with the French company Renault to build cars in Iran came under
attack by critical legislators in October 2004, though the Majlis has
not blocked this contract. This ongoing struggle between advocates
and opponents of foreign investment in Iran—part of the broader
political struggle among factions of the dominant conservative
bloc—is likely to continue.14
Propensity for Risk-Taking. There are two schools of thought
regarding how nuclear weapons affect the behavior of states. One
argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons induces greater
prudence and caution among possessor states, and adduces U.S. and
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Soviet behavior during the Cold War as proof. However, post-Cold
War revelations about the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and other Cold
War crises have shown how close the superpowers came to nuclear
war on several occasions, thereby diminishing the appeal of this
model.
The other school of thought argues that the acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) in general and nuclear weapons in
particular can lead to an increased propensity for risk-taking. Iraq’s
maturing chemical and biological weapons programs may have
emboldened Saddam Hussein to pursue a more aggressive regional
policy in 1989-90, and ultimately to invade Kuwait. Similarly, the
conﬁdence that Pakistan’s leadership drew from its May 1998 nuclear
weapons test may have emboldened it to attempt to seize a portion
of Kashmir from India, in the mistaken belief that India would be
deterred from responding militarily, leading to the Kargil Crisis of
May-July 1999.
Thus, Iranian decisionmakers might convince themselves that
the possession of nuclear weapons could provide them with greater
latitude to pursue more aggressive policies against their neighbors,
the United States, or Israel. Iran is unlikely to engage in outright
military aggression against any of its neighbors; its conventional
military forces are weak, and there are few scenarios in which a
conventional military move would make sense—at least under
current conditions (although a civil war in Iraq might generate
pressure for Iran to intervene, particularly if coalition forces were to
leave Iraq). For now, however, surrounded by potential enemies and
U.S. forces on all sides, Tehran seems more interested in preserving
the political and territorial status quo in the Gulf, than in altering it.
A nuclear Iran might, however, increase support for antiAmerican or anti-Israeli terrorist groups, or be tempted to resume
efforts to export the revolution to places where there are large Shi‘i
communities. Iran’s past successes in obscuring its involvement
in terrorism or avoiding retribution (e.g., the 1983 Beirut Marine
barracks bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing), might lead
some Iranian decisionmakers to believe that they could encourage
or sponsor terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel or interests with
impunity—and that their possession of “the bomb” would protect
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them from retaliation. Such reasoning could lead to miscalculations
and imprudent risk-taking. Such a scenario is not far-fetched: an
attack by Pakistani-based extremists on the Indian Parliament in
December 2001 sparked a prolonged crisis and nearly led to war
between the two countries.
A nuclear Iran might also be more inclined to take risks vis-à-vis
Israel, in the belief that its nuclear capability would deter retaliation.
This may have been the assumption underpinning the assertion in
a December 2001 Friday prayer sermon by ‘Ali Akbar HashemiRafsanjani, Expediency Council chairman, that “If one day, the
Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel
possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill
because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy
everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not
irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.” 15
While Rafsanjani’s sermon lends itself to alternative readings—
as either a matter-of-fact description of strategic reality in a Middle
East in which more than one country has nuclear weapons or,
more ominously, as a statement of intent—it raises the disquieting
possibility that some Iranians may see nuclear weapons as a means of
pursuing an eliminationist solution to the Arab-Israeli conﬂict. This
would not be surprising in light of the prevalence of anti-Semitic
attitudes and anti-Israel vitriol in the public political discourse of
both reformers and conservative hard-liners.
A discussion about terrorism and a nuclear Iran necessarily raises
the issue of nuclear terrorism. The fact that Iran or its agents have not
yet used chemical and/or biological agents in terrorist attacks may
indicate the existence of a normative threshold against WMD terror,
or it may indicate that, having achieved signiﬁcant successes by
means of conventional terrorism, Tehran and its surrogates perceive
no need to incur the risk that use of nonconventional weapons would
entail.
Nonetheless, because of the importance that Tehran traditionally
has attached to preserving deniability, Iran is likely to seek, when
acting against more powerful adversaries, the ability to deliver
covertly nonconventional arms by nontraditional means (for instance,
terrorists, boats, or remotely piloted aircraft). Because such methods
offer the possibility of deniability, they are likely to become important
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adjuncts to more traditional delivery means such as missiles, and
in situations in which deniability is a critical consideration, they
are likely to be the delivery means of choice—either by members
of Iran’s security services, or by operatives of Hizballah’s security
apparatus, which has cooperated with their Iranian counterparts on
some of the most sensitive and risky operations Iran has undertaken.
The possibility of deniable, covert delivery of nuclear weapons by
Iran could pose a major challenge for deterrence—particularly if the
country’s leadership believed that the regime’s survival was at stake.
For this reason, convincing Tehran that U.S. forensic capabilities (e.g.,
the ability to determine the origin of a nuclear device or weapon
by analyzing the isotopic signature of its ﬁssion products) preclude
the possibility of deniable delivery would be of vital importance for
efforts to deter a nuclear Iran.
Instability in Iran. Finally, there are the implications of political
instability and domestic unrest in a nuclear Iran. Should anti-regime
violence escalate to the point that it were to threaten the existence of
the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near-term, but possible in the
future, should Iran’s conservative leadership prove unable to better
the population’s living standards, and continue to ignore calls for
political change), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out
at the perceived external enemies of the regime with all means at their
disposal, as the regime teeters on the brink. In such a scenario, the
apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by the Islamic Republic
in its death throes must be treated seriously.
There is not a lot that the United States can do to alter those
aspects of Iranian politics that make establishing a stable deterrence
relationship with Tehran potentially problematic. What it can do, is
to understand Iran’s “red lines,” the crossing of which could lead to
crisis or conﬂict, while clearly communicating its own “red lines” to
Tehran, in order to reduce the risk of miscalculation, and to introduce
an element of predictability into relations between the two countries.
And it can continue to encourage those Iranians working for political
change in their country in the hope that, through these efforts, a more
moderate leadership may come to power; a leadership not wedded
to the use of terrorism or to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or at
least more likely to act responsibly should Iran nonetheless acquire
nuclear weapons.
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OPERATIONALIZING DETERRENCE
U.S. efforts to inﬂuence a potentially hostile nuclear Iran must
incorporate measures to deter by denial as well as by punishment.16
Raising doubts in the minds of Iranian decisionmakers about the
country’s ability to reliably deliver its nuclear weapons, and stoking
fears that the attempted use of such weapons could threaten their
personal survival and that of the regime, could make the use of
nuclear weapons prohibitively risky for Tehran in all but the most
dire of circumstances.
Deterrence by Denial: Countering Iran’s Ability to Project Inﬂuence
and Deliver Nuclear Weapons.
By preventing Tehran from using its nuclear potential to
intimidate neighbors and enemies and casting doubt on its ability to
reliably deliver nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies can
strengthen deterrence and undermine the utility of Iran’s nuclear
arsenal. It is therefore crucial to understand how a nuclear Tehran
might project inﬂuence or deliver its nuclear weapons.
To bolster deterrence and warﬁghting, Iran has created a triad
of capabilities that leverages the country’s geographic location
adjacent to the world’s main oil supply routes, exploits the regimes’
connections to terrorist groups with global reach, and reﬂects the
preference of the clerical regime for ambiguity and opacity in its
actions. Iran’s deterrent/warﬁghting triad consists of the ability to:
1) disrupt oil exports from the Persian Gulf; 2) launch terror attacks
on several continents in conjunction with the Lebanese Hizballah
and other groups, and; 3) deliver nonconventional weapons against
targets in the Middle East and beyond, by aircraft, land-based ballistic
missiles, and by various nontraditional means such as ship-based
ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, boats, and terrorists.17
As Iran stands up and expands its nuclear arsenal, it might seek
to provide a nuclear “punch” to all three legs of its triad. In addition
to building nuclear bombs and ballistic missile warheads, it might
produce nuclear naval mines and nuclear-tipped anti-ship missiles
(for use against U.S. aircraft carriers), and perhaps eventually, manportable nuclear devices (the so-called, but inaccurately labeled,
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“suitcase nukes”) for use by Iranian special forces or foreign terrorist
groups aligned with Tehran.18
Iran may rely on nontraditional delivery means before it can use
more traditional delivery systems, such as strike aircraft or missiles.
Iran’s ﬁrst nuclear weapon might be too large and/or heavy for
delivery by aircraft or missiles, and insufﬁciently rugged to withstand
the rigors of ﬂight. It might therefore put such a device on a vehicle
or boat.
To counter Iran’s deterrent/warﬁghting triad, the United States
and its allies will need to enhance their ability to:
• Detect and interdict attempts to deliver covertly nuclear
devices by sea, air, or land;
• Identify and neutralize terrorist cells afﬁliated with Tehran;
• Detect and intercept nuclear-armed strike aircraft, cruise, and
ballistic missiles;
• Counter Iranian naval mine, small boat, and submarine
warfare operations.
Much progress has been made in recent years in developing
capabilities to deal with some of these threats. In other areas, much
remains to be done. Exactly what can be done will be discussed in
greater detail below.
Deterrence by Punishment: Threatening the Survival
of the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s leaders must understand that should they brandish or
use nuclear weapons, the United States (and/or its regional allies)
could threaten their personal survival and the stability of the Islamic
Republic by conventional military strikes that:
• Target the senior leadership of the Islamic Republic;
• Disrupt the functioning of the security organizations responsible for the survival of the regime, and;
• Target key elements of the country’s economic infrastructure.

235

Would the threat of conventional attack be sufﬁcient, or is the
threat of nuclear retaliation necessary for deterring a nuclear Iran?
The awesome potential of modern air power—particularly the ability
to disable modern industrial and economic infrastructures—was
dramatically demonstrated during Operations DESERT STORM
(1991) and ALLIED FORCE (1999) and, to a lesser degree, Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM (2003).
This capability enables Washington to counter conventional and
nuclear threats by Iran (and others) with the credible threat of a
devastating conventional riposte that does not necessitate the use
of nuclear weapons (although the knowledge that the United States
possesses a vast nuclear arsenal would undoubtedly enter into the
calculations of Iranian decisionmakers).
The bottom line is that the United States does not necessarily
have to respond to the emergence of a nuclear Iran by extending
a nuclear deterrent umbrella to its regional partners (which would
undermine those elements of U.S. nonproliferation policy that seek
to devalue nuclear weapons); its conventional capabilities might be
sufﬁcient to deter Iran in all but the most extreme circumstances.
And at any rate, the United States ultimately retains the ability to use
nuclear weapons, if the threat of a conventional response is deemed
insufﬁcient in some circumstances to deter the use of nuclear weapons
by Iran.
Targeting Iran’s Leadership. Iran’s leaders must understand that
if the Islamic Republic uses nuclear weapons, they will be held
accountable for the consequences, and will become legitimate military
targets. There are, however, practical obstacles to operationalizing
such an approach.
Political authority in the Islamic Republic is widely diffused.19
Though the Supreme Leader is the paramount authority, many
other individuals play important roles in the regime. Moreover,
the dualistic power structure of the Islamic Republic, in which
revolutionary Islamic institutions counterbalance the traditional
institutions of the Iranian state (the Supreme Leader counterbalances
the President, the Guardian Council counterbalances the Parliament,
and the Revolutionary Guard counterbalances the regular army)
provides the system of clerical rule with great resilience, and would
complicate efforts to destabilize the Islamic Republic by decapitation
strikes.
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Though Iran’s leadership is drawn from geographically diverse
origins, many senior ofﬁcials now live in Tehran (including some
of the posher neighborhoods in north Tehran). 20 Many residents of
the city know the location of the villas of senior clerics and regime
personalities, making decapitation strikes possible—at least in
principle. The difﬁculties of striking leadership targets from the
air, however, should not be underestimated. During recent wars in
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, numerous attempted strikes on
“high value targets” (key individuals) failed. In Iraq alone, some 50
attempted decapitation strikes involving manned aircraft failed to
kill even one of the intended leadership targets, while inadvertently
killing scores, if not hundreds, of innocent civilians.21 Success here
will await U.S. development of better human intelligence, and more
ﬂexible and responsive precision-strike capabilities and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs). With sufﬁcient resources and
talent devoted to this effort, it could become a viable future option.
If targeting senior ofﬁcials offers uncertain prospects for success
(at least for now), targeting their ﬁnances, business interests, and
properties has a certain appeal, given the near-legendary avarice and
corruption of Iran’s clerical elite. It is, however, hard to conceive of
how this might be done in a way that is meaningful for purposes of
deterrence. Many ofﬁcials have made their fortunes in the informal
economy or through the bonyads (parastatal foundations); as a result,
little is known about their ﬁnances or their business interests, greatly
complicating efforts to target their assets.22 Moreover, the ﬁnancial
holdings of many bonyads and of at least some senior politicians are
highly diversiﬁed, further complicating efforts to put the squeeze
on these individuals. Perhaps most importantly, the track record
of recent efforts elsewhere to target the ﬁnancial assets of senior
government ofﬁcials and their cronies in order to deter or compel, is
not encouraging.23
Targeting the Regime’s Command and Control. In Iran, several
organizations have responsibility for ensuring the survival of the
regime, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the Basij militia, the security
and intelligence organs of the Justice Ministry, and the street thugs
of Ansar-e-Hizballah. The IRGC and LEF units are garrisoned
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throughout the country, while the Basij is more loosely organized,
as is the more informal Ansar-e-Hizballah. The locations of most
major IRGC garrisons and LEF facilities are well-known to local
residents, though the fact that these organizations are rather
lightly armed (relative to similar entities in other countries, such as
Syria’s Republican Guard and Iraq’s Republican Guard and Special
Republican Guard units) and are garrisoned in or near populated
areas, could make it difﬁcult to strike these organizations in a way
that would undermine their effectiveness and loosen the regime’s
grip on power.
Targeting Iran’s Economic Infrastructure. Iran is acutely vulnerable
to economic warfare. Its economy is heavily dependent on oil and
gas exports, which provide the country with some 80 percent of its
foreign exchange earnings. Nearly all of its major oil and gas ﬁelds
are located in the exposed southwest corner of the country and in the
Gulf—where all six of its major oil terminals are also located—and
nearly all of its oil and gas exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
Four of Iran’s six main ports are located on the Persian Gulf; these
handle about 90 percent of all imports by tonnage, while Iran’s sea
lines of communication in the Gulf are vulnerable to interdiction along
their entire length.24 Thus, the United States and its allies could halt
Iranian oil exports as well as critical imports of reﬁned oil products
and other necessities, causing great harm to the economy—which is
the regime’s Achilles’ heel—and perhaps leading to popular unrest
and political instability in the Islamic Republic.
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), both belligerents targeted
each others’ oil industry in the hope that economic warfare might
bring their adversary to its knees. Oil facilities, tankers, and tanker
terminals were hit, and though these attacks succeeded in reducing
overall oil exports of both sides, these attacks were not pressed home
in a sustained fashion, and therefore did not have a decisive impact
on the outcome of the war.25 There can be little doubt that the United
States has the means to succeed where both failed in the past, and
effectively shut down Iranian oil exports through action in the air
and on the sea. The main challenge would be to deter or disrupt
Iranian retaliatory moves, which might not be limited to the Gulf
region, and could take the form of an attempt to close the Strait of
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Hormuz, attacks on oil and gas installations on the other side of
the Gulf, attacks on shipping in the Gulf, and/or a terror campaign
spanning several continents.
CONTAINING A NUCLEAR IRAN
What factors might affect Tehran’s ability to derive beneﬁt from
its nuclear weapons? And how might Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons affect U.S. efforts to organize a “coalition of the willing” to
deter and contain a nuclear Iran?
Tehran’s ability to derive political beneﬁts from nuclear weapons
will depend, to some extent, on whether Iran remains silent about its
nuclear capabilities, adopts a policy of ambiguity, or makes known
its newly acquired capabilities by means of an announcement or a
weapons test.26 Iran’s actual nuclear status, however, is less important
than the fact that in the coming years its neighbors increasingly are
likely to perceive it as a threshold nuclear state, if not a de facto nuclear
power, and to act accordingly. The domestic and regional contexts
are also important here: Is there domestic calm or unrest in Iran? Is
Iran at peace with its neighbors, or embroiled in crises or war? All
these factors will affect the intensity with which the threat posed by
Iran’s nuclear program is felt by its neighbors, and could affect U.S.
efforts to enlist foreign support in containing a nuclear Iran.
During the 1990s, Iran’s neighbors rebuffed U.S. efforts to
politically isolate and economically pressure the Islamic Republic;
they generally deemed these measures as unnecessarily provocative
and injurious to their own economic interests. Rather, they have
generally preferred to keep open channels of communication with
Tehran to avoid antagonizing or provoking their large and powerful
neighbor, and to preserve access to Iranian markets. For these same
reasons, Iran’s neighbors likely will avoid participating in future
efforts to politically isolate and economically pressure the Islamic
Republic. In the international division of labor, it will largely be the
job of the United States, Europe, and others to isolate Iran politically
and pressure it economically.
Iran’s neighbors might, however, be prepared to join the United
States and Europe in pointing out to Iran’s leaders that the acquisition
of nuclear weapons will more likely harm than help their country,
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by prompting the formation of a loosely-knit coalition to contain
Iran, deepening the U.S. role in the region, and perhaps prompting
further proliferation—much of it directed at the Islamic Republic.
Hopefully, this message would encourage Iranian decisionmakers
to reassess the potential costs of a nuclear breakout. Some of Iran’s
neighbors might also welcome the opportunity to strengthen their
hand vis-à-vis Iran by deepening their relationship with Washington;
by expanding access, basing, and overﬂight rights to U.S. forces in
the region; and by strengthening their conventional forces to enable
them to better deal with potential Iranian military moves.
Small Steps or Grand Design? The Military-Technical and
Political-Military Context of Efforts to Contain a Nuclear Iran.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM initially inspired hopes that the
United States would build on its military success in the war to
establish a new regional security architecture capable of generating
stability and security in the Persian Gulf.27 Most of these proposals
call for conﬁdence and security-building measures, the establishment
of a regional security forum, collective security arrangements, or a
mix of the three. Though such ideas merit consideration, conditions
are not ripe for the creation of a regional security architecture in the
Gulf, where politics are highly personalized, and characterized by
distrust and petty rivalries.28 This militates against the creation of
truly effective regional organizations that require state members to
cede authority to the collective (this is the experience of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) and its Peninsula Shield force) or to
work together to counter a common threat.
Accordingly, the United States should work to improve militarytechnical cooperation with regional friends and allies, by deepening
existing bilateral security relationships where feasible (with
Turkey, the GCC states, and the Central Asian Republics), forging
new bilateral security relationships where possible (with Iraq and
Afghanistan), and pursuing regional cooperative ventures where
desirable (augmenting efforts already underway to create shared
air- and missile-defense early warning and command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence [C4I] arrangements).
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No doubt, such an approach lacks the appeal of more ambitious
proposals to create new regional political and security structures,
but it would allow the United States to build on existing bilateral
and multilateral efforts and, through incremental steps, lay the
foundation for future regional collective security arrangements.
Countering the Iranian Threat.
The principal security threats posed by a nuclear Iran include
terror and subversion, limited conventional military operations
conducted under the protection of Iran’s nuclear umbrella, and the
actual use of nuclear weapons. When feasible, it would be desirable
for the United States to provide its friends in the region with the
means to deal with each of these threats on their own—to include
the ﬁelding of an independent conventional retaliatory deterrent
by some allies—so that they might have the conﬁdence not to yield
to Iranian intimidation, and might not feel compelled to acquire
chemical or nuclear weapons to counter Iran’s nuclear option. In
most cases, however, the burden of responding to these threats will
fall to the United States.
Regional Subversion, Global Terror. Iran might support opposition
groups or sponsor acts of terrorism in neighboring countries (as it did
during the 1980s) in order to intimidate, compel them to deny U.S.
access and basing requests, and to undercut U.S. power projection
capabilities in the region. Here, intelligence sharing and cooperation
with friends and allies, and U.S. efforts to enhance the internal security
capabilities of Iran’s neighbors, will be key. Also vital will be U.S.
efforts to encourage political and economic reform in the region, in
order to defuse popular disaffection with the political status quo—
particularly in countries where extreme Islamists have in the past
shown a willingness to work with Iran’s intelligence services (e.g.,
Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Afghanistan).
Staying the Hand on the World’s Oil Jugular. Iran’s conventional
offensive options are limited. It does not pose a ground threat to
any of its neighbors due to the small size and limited capabilities
of its ground forces, although it could launch limited air or rocket
and missile strikes into neighboring countries (as it did in Iraq on
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several occasions during the past decade). The main conventional
threat from Iran is in the naval arena, speciﬁcally: the threat it poses
to the ﬂow of oil from the region, and the ability of the United States
to project power in the Gulf.
Iran’s force of mines, missiles, small boats, and submarines could
temporarily disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. It could not,
however, block the strait (as it claims), which is too wide and too
deep to be obstructed. Moreover, although the Gulf is a signiﬁcant
barrier to major acts of aggression against the southern Gulf states,
Iran could conduct limited amphibious operations to seize and hold
lightly defended islands or offshore oil platforms in the Gulf. Its naval
special forces could sabotage harbor facilities, offshore oil platforms
and terminals, and attack ships while in ports throughout the lower
Gulf, disrupting oil production and maritime trafﬁc there.
Some Iranian decisionmakers might believe that “the bomb”
might provide them with a free hand to take such steps with relative
impunity, by deterring an effective response by its neighbors or
the United States. For this reason, it is critical that the United States
help its GCC allies obtain the means to counter Iran’s naval mine,
special warfare, small boat, submarine, and coastal anti-ship missile
forces on their own. Countering these capabilities will also require
a signiﬁcant U.S. military presence in Gulf. As a result, the U.S.
Navy will remain susceptible to Iranian attempts to intimidate U.S.
allies into denying U.S. forces access and basing. This will remain a
potential vulnerability for the foreseeable future.
For this reason, the U.S. Navy’s Sea Power 21 “Sea Basing”
concept may be particularly useful for contingencies in or near the
Gulf. This concept calls for the U.S. Navy to develop an ability to
operate independent of shore-based logistical hubs, thereby limiting
the impact of enemy anti-access measures and decisions by friendly
states to refuse or limit access, basing, and overﬂight rights during
crises or wartime.29
The concepts under consideration to free the United States
from reliance on shore-based facilities include new Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future) cargo ships, Joint Mobile Offshore
Bases (JMOBs), and large, semisubmersible platforms. (The latter two
are ﬂoating structures derived from offshore oil drilling platforms.)
These would deploy to crisis zones, and serve as large aﬂoat logistics
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hubs, storage or repair depots, forward operating bases for combat
and support personnel, or air bases (the cargo ships may be ﬁtted
with ﬂight decks and/or runways, or several JMOBs could be linked
together for this purpose). These concepts, if proven viable, could
preserve the navy’s operational freedom in the Gulf, even if denied
access to basing in the region. They are all, however, very expensive,
are untried, and suffer from various drawbacks that might preclude
their eventual deployment.30 Moreover, large ﬂoating bases would
be vulnerable to an Iranian nuclear strike, vitiating their utility
in circumstances where the use of nuclear weapons is a plausible
Iranian option.
Preventing Nuclear Armageddon. To deal with the possible use of
nuclear weapons by Iran, the United States will need to be able to
detect the deployment of nuclear weapons and preempt their use, or
at least interdict the device or weapon en route to its target.
The United States and its allies will need to establish the ability to
detect the transport of nuclear weapons by small boats or merchant
ships originating in Iranian ports, motor vehicles exiting Iran at
ofﬁcial and/or unofﬁcial border crossing points, and perhaps
eventually, by individuals carrying “suitcase nukes.”
Given the relatively short distances that penetrating radiation
from a nuclear device or weapon may be detected (tens of meters for
gamma radiation, scores of meters for neutron radiation emanating
from an unshielded device or weapon), the early detection of a
nuclear weapon being delivered by nontraditional means (such
as a truck or boat) will pose formidable challenges.31 Nonetheless,
the United States should consider (if it is not already doing so)
unconventional methods of employing radiation monitors: aboard
yachts or other civilian pleasure craft plying the waters of the Persian
Gulf; on helicopters patrolling the waters of the Persian Gulf; on
unattended ﬂoating sensors clandestinely emplaced at the mouth of
Iranian harbors, and on unattended ground sensors emplaced along
traditional smuggling routes on Iran’s border and clandestinely
planted adjacent to runways at Iranian military airﬁelds. In addition,
portal monitoring for radiation sources should be carried out at
ofﬁcial border crossing points and ports of entry in neighboring
states.32
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Preventing the delivery of a nuclear weapon by sea will also
require U.S. naval forces to work with local naval forces and coast
guards in the Gulf to identify and monitor suspicious vessels plying
the waters of the Gulf and passing through the Strait of Hormuz,
and interdict them if need be. Detecting the transport of so-called
suitcase bombs will require neighboring states to monitor ofﬁcial
ports of entry, unofﬁcial border crossing points, and, if feasible,
known smuggling routes, though the sheer number of these might
render such a task impractical.
The United States and its allies should likewise continue to
encourage the networking of regional air- and missile-defense early
warning and C4I networks to enhance the capabilities of regional
air- and missile-defenses. Several such initiatives are already
underway.
• The so-called “Cooperative Belt” (Hizam al-Ta‘awun) program
to create a distributed C4I network for the air defenses of the
states of the GCC that will enable them to jointly identify,
track, and monitor hostile aircraft and to coordinate a response
to airborne threats.33
• American Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers in the
Persian Gulf can provide early warning and a ﬁrst line of
defense against air or missile attacks from Iran toward the
southern Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, with their AN/SPY-1
radar and Standard SM-3 missile—which is just now entering
operational service with the U.S. Navy.34
• The Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI), which involves
the GCC six, plus two (Egypt and Jordan), and which has
promoted cooperation in the area of shared missile defense
early warning.35 More, however, needs to be done to enhance
cooperation among GCC members and with non-GCC
members in the region.
Currently, cooperation in the area of shared missile defense early
warning is limited to the GCC plus two, but future efforts could
expand to include other participants. Thus, missile defense early
warning radars located in Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia
could provide early warning and detection and tracking data for
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missiles launched from western Iran against the states of the lower
Persian Gulf (Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates [UAE], and
Oman), and Israel. Some of the lower Gulf states could provide
early warning to Saudi Arabia with regard to missiles coming from
south-central or southeastern Iran. The main challenge here will
be to convince the Arab Gulf states to increase funding for missile
defenses, and to transcend the petty rivalries that have in the past
hindered cooperation among the Arab Gulf states in the conventional
military arena.
Further aﬁeld, Israel, Jordan, and Turkey are also natural
candidates for cooperation. Jordan has expressed concern that
Israeli missile defenses could knock down incoming missiles from
Iraq or Iran over the populated western half of the country, possibly
producing casualties on the ground. Contingency deployment of
U.S. missile defenses to Jordan might resolve this problem.
In addition, some have argued that boost-phased missile defense
systems employing ground-based interceptors located in southeastern
Turkey, aboard ships in the Caspian Sea and/or the Sea of Oman,
and in Tajikistan, could protect the United States against Iranian
intercontinental-range missiles, if and when these are ﬁelded. While
a boost-phase missile defense would likely have many advantages
over a mid-course national missile defense system, it has a major
political drawback: the remnants of intercepted Iranian missiles
and their warheads might land in Russia, virtually ensuring that
deployment of such a system would meet with strong opposition
from Moscow.36
Though regional allies may have an important role to play in
deterring and defending against military initiatives by a nuclear
Iran, they are unlikely to play a role in any preventive strike the
United States might undertake against Iran’s nuclear program. The
need to preserve operational security, and the desire of local allies
to avoid being caught in the middle of a U.S.-Iran conﬂict, would
likely preclude their provision of overt support for a preventive
strike, which, for this reason, would probably be conducted by
heavy bombers (most likely B-2s) based out of the continental United
States. They could, however, play a supporting role in preemptive
strikes against deployed Iranian nuclear forces (boats or merchant
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vessels, missiles, or bombers) during a crisis, by providing access
and basing to U.S. Air Force aircraft (F-117s, F-15Es) participating in
such a strike.
Iraq as Regional Counterweight to Iran?
Some have argued that as part of its efforts to dissuade Iran from
crossing the nuclear threshold, Washington might indicate to Tehran
that should it acquire nuclear weapons, the United States would
encourage Iraq to build-up its military as a counterbalance to that
of Iran—and thereby ensure that Iran’s acquisition of “the bomb”
harms, rather than enhances, its security.37
For now, however, building up the Iraqi military as a counterbalance to Iran is neither practical nor desirable. Rebuilding Iraq’s
armed forces will be an immensely costly task that will take many
years. Current plans call for the Iraqi Army to ﬁeld between 100,000150,000 men, organized into some eight divisions by 2006.38 For the
foreseeable future, however, Iraq will lack the funds and the equipment
needed to ﬁeld a larger, more capable army, and the United States is
unlikely to provide either. At present, the U.S. priority is to prepare
Iraq’s internal security forces to assume increased responsibility for
dealing with internal threats—particularly the insurgency raging in
the so-called “Sunni triangle.”
Moreover, it will be up to Iraq to decide on the roles, missions,
and force structure of its army (though the United States is likely to
retain some inﬂuence over Iraqi decisions on these matters for years
to come). It is not clear that the expansion of the Iraqi Army will
be a priority of a new Iraqi government, that an Iraqi government
in which Iraqi Shi‘a and Kurds are likely to play a major role will
see Iran as its primary threat, or that the Iraqi government will take
directions from the United States on such matters.
Nor is it in the U.S. interest that Iraq has a large military. For
the coming years, it will be in the U.S. interest to keep the Iraqi
Army relatively small, logistically constrained, capable of deterring
and/or defending against external meddling and intervention in its
external affairs, but incapable of threatening its larger neighbors.
This might make it easier to convince Iraq’s neighbors to forgive or
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defer repayment of its debt and/or reparations burden, and thereby
facilitate Iraq’s political and economic integration into the region.
Finally, it is in the U.S. interest that the Iraqi Army remains small,
should efforts to create a stable, democratic Iraq fail, and the country
reverts to authoritarian rule and an aggressive posture vis-à-vis its
neighbors.
To ensure that a post-Saddam Iraq does not eventually resurrect
its WMD programs to counter Iran’s own WMD, it would be desirable
for the United States to include Iraq in CDI and associated efforts to
enhance regional defenses against missiles and WMD, and to provide
security guarantees that it will come to Iraq’s assistance in the event
of Iranian meddling or intervention (should such guarantees be
sought from the United States).
Reassure Allies by Enhancing Local Capabilities for Conventional
Defense and Deterrence.
The United States will want to ensure that regional friends
and allies do not respond to an Iranian nuclear breakout by either
accommodating Tehran, or acquiring WMD of their own (Saudi
Arabia might try to purchase nuclear weapons, while some of the
smaller GCC states might leverage their extensive petrochemical
industries to create a modest chemical warfare capability).
To avoid such an outcome, the United States should underscore
that nuclear weapons will not stop it from meeting its security
commitments to friends and allies in the region, or from retaliating for
WMD use against U.S. and allied personnel. Continued U.S. efforts
to enhance the ability of CDI participants to defend against and/or
mitigate the impact of a WMD incident will be the most tangible
expression of this commitment. Such activities should, moreover,
be complemented by efforts to enhance the ability of local allies to
deal with Iranian subversion, terror, and sea denial capabilities in
the Gulf—activities that might someday be conducted under the
cover of a nuclear umbrella. However, such capabilities may not be
enough to reassure some allies.
The United States should therefore consider helping those allies
that feel most threatened by an Iranian “bomb” and that desire to do
something about it, to develop a credible independent conventional
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deterrent in order to build conﬁdence in their ability to stand up to
Iranian intimidation, and to discourage them from acquiring WMD
in response to Iran’s acquisition of the bomb.
The United States can do this by helping select Gulf allies enhance
their naval special warfare and aerial precision-strike capabilities
(capabilities that some are already developing) so that if Iran were
ever to threaten their ability to produce and export oil, they could
threaten to respond in kind by attacking Iranian oil production and
export facilities, interrupting Iranian port operations, and interdicting
Iran’s sea lines of communication. Emphasis should be placed on
helping these countries develop relatively short-range precision
strike capabilities so that they can hit high-value Iranian targets in
the vicinity of the Gulf, but not much beyond that. This is because the
most important Iranian economic targets are in the Gulf region, and
because the ability to attack leadership or other targets in and around
Tehran is of dubious strategic value. And by focusing on only shortrange strike capabilities, the United States can ensure that its efforts
to build up Arab capabilities in the Gulf do not compromise U.S.
efforts to preserve Israel’s “qualitative edge.” Finally, U.S. assistance
in creating such capabilities should be explicitly conditioned on a
commitment by these states to eschew the development or acquisition
of WMD, and to dramatically clamp down on the smuggling of
special materials and dual-use technologies for the WMD programs
of third countries (such as Iran) through their territories. This, in
particular, is a problem for Dubai in the UAE.39
Admittedly, this is a potentially risky course of action, and it is
not altogether clear that enhancing the ability of allies to disrupt the
ﬂow of Iranian oil from the region is desirable, or is an acceptable
tradeoff for a halt to, or more likely a slowdown in the proliferation
of WMD in the Gulf region. For this reason, continued high-level
U.S. engagement with its allies will be essential, in order to keep
tensions among the GCC states in check, and to restrain them in
times of crisis, so that they do not use these capabilities against each
other, or Iran, except in extremis.
Such efforts should, whenever possible, leverage assets and
weapons currently in the inventories of these countries to avoid the
appearance that the United States is stoking a regional arms race, to
avert tensions among GCC states (who may fear that such capabilities
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will more likely be used against their fellow GCC members, rather
than Iran), and to avoid provoking Iran. Emphasis should be put
on qualitative, over quantitative enhancements, and the creation
of small, highly capable units that will constitute the mainstay of
regional efforts to deter a nuclear Iran. Most of the smaller countries
in the region simply lack the manpower to create large, highly
capable forces anyhow. This approach is appropriate, considering
their resource base and needs.
This is not an unrealistic goal; several Arab militaries have
succeeded in creating small elite units or organizations that performed
well in combat, even if the performance of their sister services left
much to be desired. Examples of such units or organizations include
the special forces of Syria and Jordan, the Republican Guard of Iraq,
and Iraq’s F-1 and Saudi Arabia’s F-15 ﬁghter squadrons.40 There are
already signs that some of the GCC states may be heading down this
path: the UAE’s interest in commercial satellite imagery, computerized
mission planning support software, advanced simulators, and its
efforts to build a potent conventional strike capability around its
force of advanced precision munition-equipped Mirage 2000-9s (30)
and F-16 Block 60s (80), show what even a small state can do in this
regard.41
CONCLUSIONS
Efforts to deter and contain a nuclear Iran would likely encounter
signiﬁcant challenges. The nature of the Islamic Republic, regional
politics, and Iran’s involvement in terrorism make establishing a
stable deterrent relationship with a nuclear Iran risky and uncertain.
The experience of the United States and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War, and of India and Pakistan since then, demonstrate that
both preventive diplomacy and luck may be necessary to avert some
kind of nuclear crisis involving Israel or the United States on the
one hand, and Iran on the other hand, should Iran become a nuclear
power in the coming years. Managing the instability and uncertainty
created by a nuclear Iran is likely to pose major challenges for U.S.
policymakers.
Iran may likewise emerge as the driving force behind efforts to
create a new regional security architecture in the Persian Gulf and
southwest Asia. While it is in the long-term U.S. interest to create
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a free-standing balance of power in the Gulf that obviates the need
for a permanent forward U.S. presence, for the foreseeable future,
the stabilization of Iraq, the Global War on Terrorism, and ongoing
efforts to counter the nuclear ambitions of Iran will draw the United
States deeper into the affairs of the region. Enhancing the military
capabilities of regional allies threatened by Iran, deepening bilateral
cooperation with these countries, and encouraging multilateral
cooperation in the areas of air- and missile-defense and beyond may
be the best way to lay the basis for regional collective security. For the
near term, however, the United States will remain the “indispensable
nation” when it comes to formulating a response to the possible
emergence of a nuclear Iran, and to achieving security and stability
in a proliferated region.
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CHAPTER 11
MANAGING THE IRANIAN THREAT TO SEA COMMERCE
DIPLOMATICALLY
Douglas E. Streusand
Between the completion of this chapter and its appearance
in print, new developments doubtless will have occurred in the
continuing saga of Iran’s nuclear program and the global response
to it. In all probability, these changes will take the form of evolution,
not resolution. The Iranian nuclear program will remain a matter
of international contention for years, as North Korea’s has, rather
than ending with a bang like Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs, or in a whimper like, apparently, Libya’s. Despite
all the rhetoric about the possible use of force against Iran, whether
to overthrow the regime or to destroy nuclear facilities, there are
substantial reasons for the Bush administration to avoid the use of
force and choose to manage the threat of a nuclear Iran. If it becomes
a lasting problem, it requires management.
In Richard Haass’s words,
Management is not a solution, which implies the end of conﬂict through
a meeting of the minds, engendered by compromise, but something very
different . . . [When a solution is not possible] the best that can reasonably
expected . . . is . . . to bring about some modest degree of progress, or,
failing that, at least keep things from getting worse.1

This chapter presents and evaluates a series of diplomatic options
for coping with a nuclear Iran with particular reference to the Strait
of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. The vital role of the Strait in the
world energy market, admirably explained by Dagobert Brito and
Amy Jaffe in their chapter,2 and Iran’s status as a major producer of
petroleum and natural gas, make the management of any Iranian
crisis a matter of vital global interest. Iran’s international economic
importance, pivotal geopolitical position, and large population make
it a far different proposition than North Korea. This chapter argues
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that the importance of the Strait of Hormuz as the world’s jugular
vein implies opportunity as well as vulnerability. The chapter has
four sections: (1) an exposition of the problem to be managed, (2)
a discussion of three historical management regimes which offer
precedents for the current problem: the Lausanne Convention,
which governed the use of the Turkish Strait from 1923 to 1936, the
Montreux Convention, which replaced the Lausanne Convention and
remains in force, and the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement
between the United States and Soviet navies; (3) an examination of
possible methods of managing tensions; and, (4) a conclusion. The
chapter presents only modest proposals, in the literal sense of the
term. Despite their modesty, they may well fail to win international
approval. But even suggesting them might give the United States
additional leverage.
STATING THE PROBLEM
The nature of the Iranian regime, not the power of nuclear weapons,
makes a nuclear Iran a threat to the United States. Though we profess
to frown upon nuclear proliferation in principle, in practice the
context matters more than the fact. Iran’s Islamic totalitarian ideology
and record of supporting international terrorism distinguish it from
all other nuclear powers; North Korea is the only other state with
a similar record which has or shortly may have nuclear capability.
The United States has not taken preemptive action against North
Korea, primarily because of North Korea’s conventional deterrent.
North Korea’s conventional capabilities, especially tube and rocket
artillery capable of hitting Seoul, give North Korea the ability to
massively retaliate to an attack without WMD.3 Iran’s ability to block
passage through the Strait of Hormuz, albeit temporarily, constitutes
a comparable conventional deterrent. If, however, Iran does obtain
a nuclear deterrent, it would have greater freedom to use its other
capabilities.
Iran might use nuclear weapons against Israel, against U.S. or
allied interests abroad, or even against the United States or supply
them to a terrorist proxy. It has tested medium range ballistic missiles;
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analysis in 1999 suggested
that Iran could test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of
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reaching the continental United States within 10 years.4 This threat
adds to the justiﬁcations for global ballistic missile defense, but Iran,
despite its Islamic totalitarian ideology, is not necessarily more likely
to use nuclear weapons than any other state. The regime, despite its
conﬁdence about the next world, wishes to survive in this one and
thus to avoid suffering nuclear retaliation. Even supplying nuclear
weapons to terrorists would be extremely risky; Iran hardly could
expect to avoid being held responsible. Iran is far more likely to
use nuclear weapons the way nuclear powers have used them since
1945, as a deterrent, however aggressive its intentions are. The oft
repeated, if not conﬁrmed, statement of a senior Iranian ofﬁcer to an
Indian counterpart that Operation DESERT STORM taught one great
lesson: never confront the United States without nuclear weapons, is
consistent with this position.5 It suggests that with a nuclear deterrent
the Islamic Republic might perceive itself free to take provocative
actions with conventional or irregular forces. The possible range
of such actions extends far beyond the Gulf and Strait, but Iran
would have the most leverage in that critical region. Diplomatic
management of a nuclear Iran must thus include preventing Iran
from taking provocative military action in the Gulf under the cover
of its nuclear deterrent.
Iran’s military programs reﬂect its identity and foreign policy.
Beyond survival, it has two competing yet complementary agendas,
the national and the revolutionary. Inevitably, if ironically, the
Islamic Republic shares much of the vision of the late Shah: Iran
as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf by virtue of location,
population, wealth, and history.6 Like the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic
Republic fears a superpower; unlike the Pahlavi regime, it cannot
rely on another superpower for protection. The Islamic Republic
also faces three regional nuclear powers, India, Pakistan, and
Israel. The national aspect of Iran’s agenda includes a compelling
argument for nuclear weapons.7 The acquisition of nuclear weapons
also offers Iran a cheaper way of improving its military position
than modernizing its conventional forces.8 Thus far, there is no
indication that international efforts to dissuade Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons will work, and little reason to believe that even a
more representative Iranian government would relinquish nuclear
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ambitions.9 If Iran’s conventional deterrent, and other considerations
make preemption too dangerous or costly, management is the only
alternative. It must begin with deterrence and containment.10 A
diplomatic approach would be a complement to military capability
and entirely dependent upon it.
U.S. interest in the Strait of Hormuz has not changed since 1971,
when Great Britain relinquished responsibility for keeping order
in the Persian Gulf, or perhaps since the ﬁrst oil shock of 1973: to
prevent interference with free and safe passage through the Strait
from disrupting the global petroleum market. This concern goes
far beyond preventing an actual halt to passage through the Strait;
concrete threats and even vague fears raise tension and prices. This
interest, of course, goes beyond the Strait themselves; any disruption
in the production and distribution of Persian Gulf petroleum harms
the global economy and might harm global order. The Strait draws
special attention because more petroleum is more vulnerable there
than anywhere else. Although the Iranian military lacks the ability
to sustain a blockade of the Strait against a sustained U.S. effort to
open them, it certainly has the ability to close them temporarily. A
leading expert on Iran’s military forces has concluded that Iran has
the ability to interfere signiﬁcantly with Gulf trafﬁc and perhaps to
block the Strait of Hormuz temporarily with anti-ship missiles and
mines.11 Any form of naval engagement in the Strait might leave
wrecks which would interfere with navigation until they were
cleared, not to mention the potential for environmental damage if
loaded tankers were sunk or petroleum facilities damaged. Insofar
as the issue may be limited to the Strait themselves, the preservation
of free and secure navigation matters the most.
The dependence on petroleum trafﬁc, of course, runs both ways;
the exporters depend on it as much as the importers do. A closure of
the Strait would harm all concerned. Does that mutual dependence
create a mutual deterrence on which all concerned may rely, making
the vulnerability of the Strait a nonissue? Unfortunately, it does not.
Faced with what it considered an existential threat to the regime, the
leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran certainly would be willing
to close the Strait, however destructive the effects would be on their
own economy.12 Two generations ago, the Mossadeq government
deprived itself of oil revenue when it nationalized the oil industry.13
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Iran’s economy is far more dependent on oil and gas export revenues
today than in 1952, but the regime could survive a short blockage.
Since a far larger proportion of world energy supplies comes from
the Persian Gulf now than in the past, Iran has greater leverage now
than it did under Mossadeq.
The U.S. interest in the security of Gulf petroleum goes far beyond
the Strait. Since 1973, the United States has employed a variety of
strategies to secure our interests in the Gulf, from the “twin pillars”
policy—reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia as U.S. proxies to keep
order—of the 1970s to the dual containment policy of the 1990s. Until
2003 at least, two themes have remained consistent through all the
changes in policy and administrations: protection of the production
and distribution of petroleum from external attack, whether from
the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or Saddam’s Iraq;
and support of stable regimes against internal subversion, whether
from the Communist left or the Islamist right. Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM and the George W. Bush administration’s new emphasis
on the promotion of democracy in the Middle East have altered these
themes, though encouragement for the Gulf regimes to develop
more representative institutions (especially the smaller members of
the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]) is hardly new and produced
palpable results in the 1990s.14 The destruction of the Ba`ath regime
in Iraq eliminated any possible counter to Iran from within the
region for years to come. The GCC countries still lack the ability to
counterbalance Iranian power. It will take years for Iraq to regain the
ability even to defend itself. There is no power capable of preventing
Iran from dominating the Gulf except for the United States.15
These realities ﬁx the parameters of the international issue
requiring management: the conﬂict between Iran’s national objective
of regional dominance and revolutionary objective of spreading
Islamic totalitarianism and the Western objective of security for the
production and transportation of oil and natural gas from the Gulf
region. Any reduction in tension and uncertainty in the Gulf and Strait
would affect global oil and natural gas prices directly by reducing
insurance premiums on shipments without reducing the income of
the producers. It thus would serve the interests of both producers
and consumers. For this reason at least, the competition between the
United States and Iran is not a zero sum game, creating opportunities
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for mutually beneﬁcial management. The lack of diplomatic relations
and persistent hostility between the United States and Iran does not
make the establishment of a management regime impossible, though
it certainly makes it more difﬁcult. The United States has negotiated
with and entered into agreements with North Korea, though the
results hardly have been encouraging. But a management regime
would not necessarily involve direct negotiations; it might consist
merely of an exchange of public statements. It also might involve the
creation of a multilateral organization speciﬁcally to deal with the
Strait of Hormuz or the Gulf as a whole; it might or might not have
a regional disarmament component.
Any such diplomatic initiative would have to be fail-safe, meaning
it would need to meet three criteria. First, the presentation of the
initiative would need to strengthen the standing and credibility of
the United States, globally and regionally, even if Iran rejected it.
Second, if Iran accepted the initiative and then violated it after it
went into effect, the stigma or penalty Iran would need to suffer by
doing so would need to outweigh substantially any disadvantage
to the United States. Concretely, the United States must retain the
ability to blockade Iranian shipping outside the Persian Gulf, as well
as to take effective military action against Iranian territory. Third,
if Iran accepted the arrangement and abided by it, the result would
need to make disruption of trafﬁc through the Strait of Hormuz, and,
preferably, of the supply of hydrocarbons from the Gulf in general,
less likely. Any diplomatic initiative which did meet these criteria
would warrant serious investigation. It, of course, would not deal
with Iran’s nuclear program directly and would, in fact, constitute
an entirely separate diplomatic track.
THE PRECEDENTS
A different set of Straits preoccupied global statesmen for most
of the 19th and 20th centuries. The “Straits Question,” the question
of control over access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and
Dardanelles, was the core of the Eastern Question, the unknown
prognosis of the Ottoman Empire, the “Sick Man of Europe”. It
attracted enough attention to add the word “jingoism” to the English
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language; the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 inspired a popular song
in Britain with the refrain:
We don’t want to ﬁght, but, by jingo if we do
We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men, we’ve got the money too.
We’ve fought the Bear before, and while Britons shall be true,
The Russians shall not have Constantinople!16

The European powers addressed the Straits Question in a series of
treaties, beginning with the London Protocol of 1830 and ending with
the Montreux Convention. Evaluation of the terms and functioning of
the Montreux Convention and the preceding Lausanne Convention
thus requires review of the history behind them.
Geopolitics, not geography or the routine functioning of
international law, made the Straits Question a question. The
Dardanelles is no more than four miles wide, and the Bosporus even
narrower. As long as a single state controlled both shores, the Straits
ordinarily would be the territorial waters of that state, and the Sea of
Marmara between them an enclosed sea. When the Ottoman Empire
was a great power, there could be no Straits Question. The Treaty of
Kucuk Kaynarca of 1774 ended that era. It established the Russian
presence on the Black Sea littoral and awarded Russian ships free
navigation through the Straits. The other major European powers
gained similar rights by individual treaties; the Black Sea, for centuries
an Ottoman lake, became an international waterway. Access to the
sea for commerce, however, did not make the Straits a matter of high
politics. The Russian desire to dominate the Black Sea and to gain
unfettered access to the Mediterranean Sea through the acquisition
of Constantinople did so. Britain, the chief maritime power of the
time, regarded Russian control of the Straits an unacceptable threat
to her interests. It would have created a fundamental asymmetry,
with the Russian ﬂeet able to penetrate the Mediterranean and the
Black Sea closed to outside forces. The British determination to deny
the Straits to Russia kept the Sick Man of Europe alive. The AngloRussian rivalry over the Straits formed the complement of the “Great
Game,” the competition between the two powers in Central Asia.17
In its broader form, then, the Straits question concerned control
of Constantinople and the Straits littoral; the more narrow form,
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which the diplomatic instruments generally addressed, concerned
the passage of shipping, especially naval forces, through the Straits.
The Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1809 stated that the prohibition of the
passage of foreign warships through the Straits was an “ancient rule”
of the Ottoman Empire. Britain sought to transform the ban from an
Ottoman policy to international law. Russia sought to replace the
ban with an exclusive privilege to use the Straits for naval purposes.
The procession of treaties governing the use of the Straits during
the 19th century reﬂected the ebb and ﬂow of British and Russian
fortunes and interests. The 1841 London Convention prohibited all
foreign naval shipping, with some minor exceptions, from passing
through the Straits; subsequent treaties in the 19th century continued
this arrangement. This compromise satisﬁed Russia because it kept
the superior Royal Navy out of the Black Sea, and Britain because it
kept the Russian ﬂeet from threatening the Mediterranean lifeline to
India. In essence, this situation remained stable so long as no outside
force altered the policies of Britain and Russia. In the 20th century,
Germany twice became that outside force.18
When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I by permitting
the German battlecruiser Goeben and cruiser Breslau to enter the
Dardanelles and closing the Straits to pursuing British warships,
it ended, temporarily, the conﬂict between Britain and Russia over
the Straits. Turkish control of the Straits blocked the best route for
British supplies to reach Russia; the British leadership considered
the Russian alliance essential for the defeat of Germany. Although
the Allied efforts to force the Straits failed, British opposition to
Russian control of the Straits ended. Russia demanded possession
of Constantinople and the entire western shore of the Straits and the
Sea of Marmara; Britain agreed. That commitment later became part
of what is generally known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, although
Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazanov also signed it, and it was
negotiated in Petrograd in 1916.19
When the war ended, the Russian Empire had ceased to exist,
and the Soviet regime had renounced the Russian claims on Ottoman
territory. The Armistice of Mudros, which ended hostilities with the
Ottoman empire on October 31, 1918, opened the Straits to Allied
shipping and permitted the Allies to occupy Constantinople and
the Bosporus fortiﬁcations. The Allies addressed the future of the
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Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Sevres, signed August 10, 1920. The
Treaty called for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. It assigned
the western shore of the Straits except Constantinople to Greece;
an Ottoman rump would retain control of Constantinople and the
eastern shore. Those states, however, would delegate sovereignty
over both shores of the Straits, designated as the Straits Zone, to a
Straits Commission, consisting of representatives of the Allied
powers. Under the Commission, all ships and aircraft would have
virtually unfettered freedom of navigation in the Straits, in peace
and war.20
TREATIES GOVERNING USE OF TURKISH STRAIT
The Lausanne Convention.
The emergence of the new Turkey under Mustafa Kemal, later
Kemal Ataturk, rendered the Treaty of Sevres moot. When Kemal’s
forces, already in control of Anatolia, approached the Allied garrison
at Constantinople in October 1922, Britain and Greece agreed to an
armistice and revision of the Treaty of Sevres. During the course of
the negotiations which produced the Treaty of Lausanne, signed
July 24, 1923, Ataturk put a formal end to the Ottoman Empire and
established Turkey as a republic. The Soviet Union, now ﬁrmly
established, participated in the Lausanne negotiations. The Lausanne
Treaty gave the new republic full sovereignty over Anatolia and
a small enclave in Europe, including the important city of Edirne,
but not control over the Straits. The old polarity between Britain
and Russia over the Straits had reappeared. The Soviet delegation
at Lausanne supported Turkish sovereignty over the Straits with
commercial trafﬁc entirely unrestricted and naval passage entirely
prohibited, a return to the status quo ante bellum. Britain and
the other Western powers, however, wanted to retain the Sevres
arrangements for the Straits. Prolonged and difﬁcult negotiations
produced the Convention of Lausanne, signed August 14, 1923,
which was separate from the broader Treaty of Lausanne and dealt
only with the Straits Question.21
The Lausanne Convention had four main provisions: freedom
of navigation through the Straits, demilitarization of the Straits,
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an international guarantee for the security of the Straits, and the
establishment of a Straits Commission to execute the provisions of
the Convention. This arrangement satisﬁed neither Turkey, which
did not gain sovereignty over the Straits, nor the Soviet Union,
which confronted the possibility of facing hostile naval forces
in the Black Sea. But the Convention protected Soviet interests to
a degree. It distinguished between riparian states, states on the
shores of the Black Sea, and nonriparian outside powers. No outside
power could send into the Black Sea a naval force larger than the
most powerful riparian ﬂeet, inevitably but not explicitly that of
the Soviet Union, but outside powers had the unconditional right
to send ﬂotillas of up to three ships, with the largest not to exceed
ten thousands tons. This provision tacitly prohibited outside capital
ships—battleships and aircraft carriers—from entering the Black
Sea. In time of war, these arrangements did not change if Turkey
was neutral; if Turkey was a belligerent, neutral warships retained
the right to pass through the Straits but enemy ships and aircraft
were prohibited. The Straits Commission, not Turkey, had the right
and the responsibility to enforce these provisions. This arrangement
reassured the Soviets about a possible threat from the Black Sea, but
permitted the nonriparian states to operate naval forces there and
assured international control of the Straits. Although Turkey was
deprived of control over the Straits and sovereignty over the Straits
littoral, Ataturk had every reason for satisfaction with the broader
settlement of the Treaty of Lausanne and priorities beyond the
Straits.22
The growth of German power in the 1930s reduced the importance
of British and Soviet differences over the Straits and increased the
value of Turkey as a potential ally. This situation gave Turkey the
opportunity to obtain a revision of the Lausanne Convention. The
revision of other components of the postwar settlement provided the
Turks with a pretext for requesting revision of the Convention in
1933, though the conference to do so did not meet until 1936.23
The Montreux Convention.
During the complex series of negotiations which produced the
Montreux Convention, Britain took the position that the Straits were
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an “international waterway connecting two international seas.”24
The Soviets sought to differentiate between the Mediterranean as an
international sea and the Black Sea as a closed one. To the Turks,
the issue of Black Sea access mattered less than that of sovereignty
over the Straits and the Straits littoral. Turkey’s ability to occupy
the Straits Zone unilaterally, as Germany had the Rhineland, gave
the Turks considerable leverage, as the terms of the Convention
indicate. It gave each of the major participants in the negotiations
enough of their objectives to make the arrangement acceptable. For
Britain, the principle of freedom of navigation in the Straits became
a matter of international law, and nonriparian states gained the right
to operate substantial but limited naval forces in the Black Sea. For
the Soviet Union, the restrictions on nonriparian naval forces in the
Black Sea and the privilege of passing large naval units through
the Straits mitigated failure to gain closed status for the Black Sea.
Turkey got full sovereignty, including the right to fortify the Straits,
but not sovereign control of navigation.
The provisions of the Convention restrict commercial navigation
in the Straits only if Turkey is at war, or regards war as imminent.
In that circumstance, nonbelligerent vessels may pass the Straits
as long as their passage does not assist Turkey’s enemies, which
implies Turkey’s right to inspect passing vessels. The Convention
does not distinguish between the riparian and nonriparian states
with regard to commercial navigation. In peacetime, small warships
and naval auxiliaries of both riparian and nonriparian states may
pass the Straits without restriction in daylight. Submarines of Black
Sea navies may pass through the Straits on the surface, but only if
constructed outside the Black Sea for use within it or for repair at
outside yards and return from them, not for routine deployment.
Nonriparian states may send no more than 15,000 tons of naval
shipping through the Straits at one time; riparian states may exceed
that tonnage—and thus send capital ships through the Straits—if
their large units have no more than two accompanying destroyers.
Nonriparian states may not maintain a total of more than 30,000 tons
in the Black Sea at any given time, but this provision is subject to
change. If the strongest riparian ﬂeet—meaning the Soviet ﬂeet—
expanded by 10,000 tons from its size at the time of the signature
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of the Convention, the permissible size of nonriparian ﬂeets was to
grow to 45,000 tons. Nonriparian naval forces may not remain in the
Black Sea longer than 21 days. If Turkey is at war or, signiﬁcantly,
regards itself in imminent danger of war, the passage of combatant
ships, of any power, becomes subject to its sole discretion. The
wording of the Convention makes it effectively perpetual unless one
of the signatories gives notice of intent to denounce.25
The Montreux Convention remains in force to this day. It has
survived through 7 decades of geopolitical turbulence not because
the conﬂict of interests over the Straits ended, but because it managed
the situation well enough that none of the parties had sufﬁcient
motivation to raise tensions enough to change it. It has been a classic
example of successful management as Haass describes it. The Soviet
Union sought to alter the terms of the Convention, before, during,
and after World War II. It proposed to transfer responsibility for the
security of the Straits from Turkey to a Turkish-Soviet condominium
which would have given the Soviets military bases at the Straits. This
return to the historical Russian desire to control the Straits inevitably
elicited ﬁrm opposition from Turkey, Great Britain, and the United
States. Soviet pressure on Turkey in the postwar years impelled the
United States to become involved in the eastern Mediterranean,
thus helping to establish the pattern of the Cold War. 26 Even today,
Turkey chafes under the Montreux provisions which deprive it of the
right to restrict commercial trafﬁc through the Straits.27 Successful
management regimes chafe, but rarely raise blisters.
The Prevention of Incidents at Sea Agreement.
The Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High
Seas (INCSEA), signed on May 25, 1972, by Secretary of the Navy
John Warner and Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, differs from
the Lausanne and Montreux Conventions in many dimensions. A
bilateral executive agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Navies
rather than a formal treaty, it remained in effect for only 16 years
before it was replaced by the Prevention of Dangerous Military
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Activities Agreement of 1988. It did not address a long-standing
major international issue. It encompassed only a narrow aspect of
the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Within
these limits, INCSEA achieved its objectives.
The expanding presence and increasing assertiveness of the
Soviet Navy created the need for INCSEA. Soviet ships and aircraft
often interfered with U.S. naval operations. Because the Soviets were
deploying an array of new ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, U.S.
ships often approached Soviet units closely to gather intelligence
visually. Near misses and collisions, some of which caused the loss
of aircraft and casualties, had become frequent. The United States
raised the possibility of an agreement to reduce incidents in 1968.
The ﬁnal agreement was straightforward. It required the two navies
to obey the standard nautical Rules of the Road, to avoid provocative
behaviors, such as simulating attacks on or aiming weapons at each
other, to use navigation lights properly, to use signals to warn each
other of danger, and to meet annually to review the implementation
of the agreement.28
INCSEA established a new pattern of professional interaction
among American and Soviet naval ofﬁcers. It reduced the number
of incidents and proved particularly useful during the October
1973 Arab-Israeli War, when both navies had large forces in the
eastern Mediterranean and international tension compelled the
commanders to jockey for tactical advantages. The two navies came
to value the unique service-to-service relationship and to resent
outside interference in it. During the tense period of the early 1980s,
U.S. warships repeatedly entered what the Soviets considered
internal waters in order to demonstrate the principle of freedom of
navigation. These incursions led to a number of naval confrontations
which the INCSEA annual reviews helped to resolve. When Soviet
units interfered with U.S. salvage operations in international waters
after the destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the United States
invoked INCSEA to demand that the Soviets end their harassment,
and they complied. When the United States temporarily terminated
ofﬁcial contacts with the Soviet armed forces after the murder of
Major Arthur Nicholson in 1985, the decision deeply disturbed Soviet
naval ofﬁcers.29 INCSEA became a model for a bilateral agreement
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between the German and Polish navies in 1990, and the United
States proposed a multilateral equivalent as part of a comprehensive
Middle East settlement in 1992. The U.S. and Chinese navies signed
a similar agreement in 1998.30
David Winkler, the leading authority on INCSEA, gives six
reasons for its success. Both navies wanted to avoid damage to their
ships and aircraft and the possibility of an escalation of tensions
or even hostilities as result of accident or imprudence. Because the
rapid growth of the Soviet Navy put many inexperienced ofﬁcers in
command positions, this danger concerned the Soviets particularly.
The simplicity of INCSEA’s terms, the professionalism of those
charged with enforcing it, and the practice of discussing violations
in advance of the annual review made the review process effective.
The social norms established for the review sessions created a
positive atmosphere. The low proﬁle of the agreement—which did
not require congressional approval and concerned professional
military ofﬁcers primarily—facilitated its success. The provision for
direct communications between the navies and the annual reviews
made veriﬁcation far easier than in more elaborate arms control
agreements.31 INCSEA gave the navies of both countries, especially
the insurgent Soviet Union, a growing vested interest in keeping
tensions low. This interest certainly would not have prevented
them from going to war at the behest of their political masters. It
did, however, function as a conﬁdence-building measure, which
gradually impressed observers outside of the two navies.
Precedent Conclusions.
The precedents offer a variety of models for the Persian Gulf and
Strait of Hormuz, though, of course, none ﬁts precisely. The Lausanne
Convention offers the most applicable model for a comprehensive
agreement. The primary objection to Lausanne, Turkey’s lack of
sovereignty over the Straits, would not apply to the Strait of Hormuz
because neither Iran nor any other state has claim to sovereignty; the
Strait is inherently an international waterway. Demilitarization and
international control exercised by an intergovernmental organization
devoted to the maintenance of free and secure navigation could
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beneﬁt all concerned. A more modest and less visible agreement on
the model of INCSEA, reducing local tensions and the probability of
provocative incidents, would have similar advantages on a smaller
scale. Many possibilities exist between the two extremes.
MANAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF
AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ
Several different variables deﬁne the matrix of possible
management regimes. In addition to the diversity in the scope and
diplomatic formality suggested by the precedents, the geographic
compass of an agreement could vary from the Strait of Hormuz alone
to the entire Gulf and its littoral. The United States thus has a wide
range options from which to select a management regime to meet the
fail-safe criteria. In proposing and, perhaps, implementing the regime,
the United States would have the initiative and signiﬁcant strategic
advantages. The establishment of a management arrangement
for the Gulf or Strait, properly done, would be an opportunity to
turn military capability into diplomatic advantage, not an offer of
concessions for returns which may prove ephemeral.
The strategic advantages are inherent in the power relationship
between a global maritime power and an insular regional power. The
military leverage of the United States comes, most importantly, from
the ability to interdict Iranian shipping outside the Strait of Hormuz,
in the Gulf of Oman or Arabian Sea, and to conduct effective strikes
against Iran from outside the region. No agreement restricted to the
Gulf and its littoral would affect those capabilities. Though Iran’s
military capabilities threaten U.S. interests, there is little doubt that
U.S. capabilities pose a greater threat to the Islamic Republic. This
fact makes it possible for a management regime to meet the fail-safe
criteria because it creates the possibility of a quid pro quo with the
Iranian regime which does not harm U.S. interests.
In the context of the Gulf, the United States has a narrow agenda:
the protection of the production and export of petroleum and natural
gas, and the reduction of the protection costs paid for them.32 We are
free to pursue those objectives as long as we do not compromise other
broader objectives, as would happen, for example, if a management
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regime restricted the U.S. ability to take whatever actions deemed
necessary to deal with the Iranian nuclear program. A pledge not
to attack Iranian nuclear facilities in exchange for an Iranian pledge
not to block the Strait, for example, would not be acceptable; it
would guarantee the success of Iran’s conventional deterrent. The
United States could, however, promise not to interfere with Iranian
shipping within the Gulf and Strait or attack Iranian oil and natural
gas facilities, onshore and offshore, in return for an Iranian pledge
not to attack shipping or the oil and gas facilities of other Gulf states.
By reducing the probability of attack, this type of agreement would
have a direct impact on prices by reducing insurance premiums,
even it had no other effect. Such an agreement would prohibit attack
on Iran’s most important economic assets, but it appears so unlikely
that the United State would choose to do so under any circumstances
that the prohibition appears acceptable.
U.S. military action against Iran might have one of four general
purposes: preemption, punishment, rollback of aggression or
provocation, or regime change. Preemptive or small scale punitive
operations probably would consist either of precision guided
munitions, or possibly, the insertion and extraction of special
operations forces to destroy speciﬁc military or paramilitary targets.
The Israeli attacks on the Osiraq reactor in 1981 and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunis in 1985;
Operation EL DORADO CANYON against Libya in 1986; the 1998
cruise missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan;
and commando operations like the Israeli, German, and French
hostage rescue operations at Entebbe, Uganda in 1976; Mogadishu,
Somalia in 1977; and Kolwezi, Zaire in 1978, exemplify this type
of mission. Only if the Islamic Republic used oil and gas facilities
to shield other activities, which the large number of non-Iranians
involved in the petroleum industry makes unlikely, would a
prohibition on attacking them interfere with this type of operation.
Iran’s conventional military weakness makes the type of
aggression or intervention which would require a punitive response
comparable to Operation DESERT STORM highly unlikely. Without
considering either the probability or the desirability of a military
intervention to change the Iranian regime, such an operation would
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not target the energy facilities. Energy resources and facilities form an
important component of national power, as Ray Cline’s methodology
for assessing national power indicates.33 But regime change
operations, after all, seek to overthrow governments, not conquer
nations. Iraqi oil facilities were not, and Iranian facilities are not, the
centers of gravity of the regime. Clausewitz presents the concept of
center of gravity thus: “One must keep the dominant characteristics
of both belligerents in mind. Out of the characteristics, a certain
center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends. That is the point against which all our
energies must be directed.”34 John Warden relies on this concept as
the organizing principle of his analysis of air warfare.35 The Islamic
Republic’s center of gravity consists of the mechanisms of political
coercion which keep it in power, not the economic resources of
the country in general. Attacking oil facilities also has inherent
environmental risks. The United States thus could surrender the
option of attacking Iranian oil facilities without violating the fail-safe
criteria.
To Iran, the proposition would appear less favorable, because
the ability to interfere with trafﬁc in the Strait is not only the
keystone of Iran’s conventional deterrence but also a major source
of Iran’s regional leverage. Iran might well reject such a proposal,
whatever diplomatic form it took. It would, however, do so at the
cost of appearing of intransigent, globally and regionally. An Iranian
rejection would imply that Iran considered blocking the Strait and
attacking its neighbors’ shipping and energy facilities an option,
which the other Gulf countries would hardly welcome.36
This discussion of a no-attack pledge suggests ways in which
even the proposal of a management regime could serve American
interests. Other initiatives could have similar effects. Narrowing
the geographic range of the proposed regime to the Strait and
drawing on the Lausanne precedent raises the possibility of a local
demilitarization. There would be some advantage, however, in an
agreement which simply moved Iranian forces away from the Strait.
Iranian control of the disputed islands of Abu Musa, the Great Tunbs,
and the Lesser Tunbs, some 50 kilometers west of the Strait, and
undisputed Sirri Island further west, offer it a deﬁnite advantage in
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closing the Strait, though not a militarily decisive one.37 Given the short
distances involved, Iran could ﬁre antishipping missiles or conduct
special operations with small craft from bases on the mainland.38 A
territorial arms control agreement or demilitarized zone would have
to extend well beyond the Strait to deny Iran the ability to interdict
trafﬁc in the Strait. If it did so, it would encompass the major Iranian
naval base at Bandar Abbas and the entire territory of several of the
emirates of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). But the elimination of
military forces from the Strait and their immediate environs, even
if only the islands and the tip of the Musandam Peninsula—part
of Oman, which the United States could probably prevail upon to
cooperate—would make it harder for Iran to interfere with Strait
trafﬁc without preparation, and easier for the United States to detect
and respond to Iranian actions. But the demilitarization of Omani
territory would hardly be an incentive for Iran and, from the Iranian
perspective hardly a concession for the United States. The most
relevant form of concession would resemble some of the restrictions
on passage through the Turkish Straits.
The United States could accept restrictions as long as they did
not interfere signiﬁcantly with military operations in the Gulf.
Restrictions on the total number or size of vessels inside the Gulf
would not be acceptable; a requirement for formal notice of passage
would be. A requirement that submarines pass through the Strait
only on the surface would interfere with U.S. submarine operations
there. The United States began operating submarines inside the
Gulf only when Iran acquired advanced conventional submarines
from Russia, suggesting that submarines may have an important
force protection role.39 Even so, the passage restriction might be
acceptable. Iranian naval power in the region depends far more on its
small submarine forces than the United States does on submarines.
Restrictions on passage also could include the prohibition of ships
and aircraft carrying mines through the demilitarized zone.
Whether included in a broader demilitarization agreement or not,
a prohibition of mines in the Strait area or in the entire Gulf would be
a useful management instrument. As the damage to the Bridgeton and
USS Samuel B. Roberts during the 1987-88 tanker war demonstrates,
mines pose a signiﬁcant hazard to Gulf shipping, especially if laid
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clandestinely. The removal of this threat would reduce uncertainty
about navigation substantially.40 Since Iran is the only Gulf state
likely to employ mines, it would probably not be difﬁcult to get the
remainder of the Gulf states and outside navies operating in the Gulf
to agree to a comprehensive regional ban on naval mines.
The disputed islands present another option, but unfortunately not
a desirable one. The islands have small populations and no intrinsic
worth beyond their location. Under the territorial arrangements
established when Britain withdrew from the Gulf in 1971, Iran
was to share sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunbs with the
UAE. Just before the British withdrew; Iranian forces occupied all
three islands. Iran and the UAE reached an agreement for joint
administration just before the Iranian occupation; there was no such
agreement with the UAE. The joint administration of Abu Musa has
led to friction, notably since 1992 when Iran began to assert unilateral
control over the island. There have been a number of incidents since
that time; in June 2004, for example, a UAE patrol boat ﬁred on an
Iranian ﬁshing boat. The UAE, backed by the other members of the
GCC, have sought international arbitration to resolve the situation;
Iran has refused.41 Iranian overtures to the Gulf countries have not
altered their position.42 Even the mention of the most basic agreement
regarding the islands, presumably exchanging recognition of Iranian
sovereignty for demilitarization, would deeply offend the Gulf Arabs
and encourage Iranian territorial claims elsewhere in the Gulf. Iran
asserted a historical claim to Bahrain, originally in 1927, but ofﬁcially
relinquished that claim in 1970. Recognition of the Iranian claims
to the Tunbs and Abu Musa might encourage Iran to revive the
claim to Bahrain.43 Since Iran has controlled the Tunbs for 30 years
and apparently has obtained what it wants in Abu Musa, the island
situation appears to offer little leverage for obtaining concessions
from Iran. For Iran, the islands are a national issue, not related to the
revolutionary agenda.44
The INCSEA precedent suggests a different management
approach, focused on freedom of navigation and avoidance of
provocation. Like INCSEA, an “INCGULF” could involve only
actual armed forces (air and naval) operating in the Gulf and Strait
and would regulate only behavior. It could begin with a promise
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to observe the maritime rules of the road and their equivalents in
the air and continue by circumscribing provocative behaviors,
such as the loading of mines aboard ships or aircraft or the use of
missile guidance radars, and might extend to notice of naval and air
exercises. The lack of diplomatic relations between the United States
and the Islamic Republic would be an obstacle to the negotiation
of such an agreement, particularly if it involved the creation of a
review body. But the United States and Iran already cooperate
in a program for the monitoring of wrecks and other hazards to
navigation in the Strait, managed by the U.S. Coast Guard; anecdotal
reports suggest that formal and respectful contacts frequently take
place between U.S. and Iranian naval ofﬁcers in the Strait area. A
Prevention of Incidents structure simply would place those contacts
on an ongoing basis without involving interaction at the diplomatic
level. It would improve the security of trafﬁc through Strait and thus
appeal not only to the other Gulf states and the United States, but to
all major importers of oil from the Gulf, including India and China.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, essentially the armed forces of the
revolutionary agenda, probably would reject an INCGULF out of
hand. The rejection would both isolate Iran and contribute to friction
between the regular Iranian armed forces and the Revolutionary
Guard.
The idea of a Gulf commission, modeled up to a point on the
Strait Commission established in the Lausanne Convention, offers
an intriguing prospect. (The Strait Commission could not be an exact
model, since it was imposed by the victorious Allies and actually
controlled its own territory, the Strait Zone.) A Gulf Commission
would address the question of secure and orderly navigation in the
international waters of the Strait and Gulf. It would be established
by an international convention and have responsibility for enforcing
the terms of that convention. A Gulf convention could include any of
the possible agreements mentioned above—local demilitarization, a
mine ban, an INCGULF, for example—as well as such matters as
maintenance of aids to navigation and wrecks, on which anecdotal
evidence suggests that there is already a good deal of informal
cooperation. It also could serve as a clearing house for information
on the passage of ships and aircraft. More formal and intrusive
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mechanisms of management could include requiring that an ofﬁcial
of the Commission be aboard all nonriparian vessels and all warships
operating in international waters in the Gulf, or even that ships
passing through the waters administered by the Commission ﬂy a
Commission ﬂag in addition to their national colors. The expenses of
the Commission would be considerable; it could be funded either by
fees paid by the users of the Gulf or contributions from the members
of the Commission.
Since it is impossible to bring surface ships into the Gulf
surreptitiously, the functioning of a Commission would not limit
U.S. military options signiﬁcantly. If a situation justiﬁed military
action, it would also justify violating the rules of the commission.
The convention which created the commission would have to
have an escape clause to deal with this circumstance. It also might
declare certain violations of the convention as acts of war against
the signatories. Such a structure would give the United States a
legal role in maintaining the security of Gulf. The establishment
of a commission thus would defeat Iran’s longstanding goal of
establishing a collective security structure in the Gulf which would
the exclude the United States. An Iranian rejection of an agreement
would imply that Iran valued its national interest above order and
security in the Gulf, and thus isolate Iran.45
Even if these initiatives turned out to be no more than diplomatic
theater, the United States still would beneﬁt. Thus far, the United States
has dealt with Iran’s nuclear program primarily with sanctions and
harsh rhetoric, unlike the European Union (EU), which has offered
positive incentives.46 The proposal of management instruments or
regimes for the Gulf would show ﬂexibility without altering policy
on the nuclear issue. Even if the ﬂexibility is not sufﬁcient to impress
the Islamic Republic, it would impress the global community and
might facilitate cooperation with the European powers on nuclear
issues and continuing security cooperation with the GCC countries.
If, of course, Iran accepted one of the proposals and then violated
it, it would weaken Iran’s position, even if it were not so gross a
provocation as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. In either of these cases,
the United States would beneﬁt as long our adherence to whatever
instrument or regime Iran had violated did not compromise our
ability to act in the Gulf.
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Showing ﬂexibility to the Islamic Republic would have some
risks. Iran might take plasticity as weakness and take more aggressive
actions as a result. But in doing so, the Islamic Republic would weaken
its international position. Iranian adherence to an agreement might
well pose the greatest challenge. Iranian acceptance of a management
instrument for the Gulf would be as much a strategic choice as
offering it would be for the United States. If the GCC countries,
Iran’s other neighbors, and the world community (not to mention
the United States) perceived Iranian acceptance of a management
as a sign of a new and more benign approach to the world, and
acted accordingly, the situation would become far more dangerous.
A reduction in tensions in the Gulf cannot and must not serve as
the basis for a redeﬁnition of the U.S. relationship with the Islamic
Republic. It could not replace, only complement the sanctions regime
and a vigorous military policy in the region. Whatever conﬁdence
these measures might build could not become the basis of a new
Gulf policy.47
CONCLUSION
No management instrument or regime could either dissuade
the Islamic Republic of Iran from its pursuit of nuclear weapons or
eliminate the threat to global and regional order which a nuclear Iran
would pose. The most comprehensive and formal concept would
offer no more than a marginal improvement in the overall situation.
But in such a serious situation, even the prospect of marginal
improvement is worth careful investigation. An approach to Iran,
whether through secret diplomacy or open declaration, would create
a new arena in which the United States could employ its power
to reduce Iran’s international support and freedom of action and,
perhaps, capability. A management regime can be, and must be, an
instrument of statecraft, not a substitute for it.
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CHAPTER 12
WHAT TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY ON IRAN?
Thérèse Delpech
Unlike the situation prevailing on Iraq, where Europe and
America have been arguing for years over international inspections,
war tactics, and overall policy, there is no serious transatlantic
dispute concerning Iran. There may be differences of emphasis on
the two sides of the Atlantic, but on what really matters, the positions
are pretty close. Europe and America share a common objective visà-vis Tehran. They share a common analysis of the Iranian nuclear
program,1 and they even shared a common caution concerning the
success of the negotiations that ﬁnally failed in August 2005. Yet,
this does not amount to a transatlantic strategy on Iran. Far from
it. Regular exchange of information, lack of alternative policy,
and absence of confrontation would be a better description of the
situation.
On the European side, a ﬁrst round of negotiations collapsed
in June 2004, when some of the suspended nuclear activities were
resumed by the Iranians. The international community was abruptly
set back to square one at the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) September Board meeting. The second agreement with
the three European capitals (London, Berlin, and Paris) came into
existence 2 months later—on November 15, 2004—under these difﬁcult circumstances. The substance of the negotiations was now
broader. There were three issues at stake (nuclear, trade, and
security), and the nature of the Iranian commitments was more
precise—leaving very little room, if any, for interpretation of what the
suspension actually covers. In August 2005, this second agreement
was terminated by Iran, which decided to resume suspended
conversion activities. Iranian intentions are now clearer. According
to the main negotiator, Hassan Rohani, Iran has used the talks with
the Europeans to gain time.
On the other side of the Atlantic, America has been watching on the
sidelines, without a strategy of its own, waiting to see what happens.
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The Americans have not endorsed the European initiative explicitly,
nor have they condemned it. Instead they have displayed a benign
scepticism. But at the end of 2004, President Bush himself made it clear
that a diplomatic solution to the Iranian conundrum was preferable
to any other—assuming, naturally, that such a solution was possible.
After his trip to Europe in February 2005, Europeans and Americans
came even closer.2 What will happen now that the talks have failed
is still open to question.3 Tehran had threatened repeatedly to agree
only to a “short” suspension, which was terminated shortly after the
new president took ofﬁce. A transatlantic cooperation now appears
indispensable for the next steps to take.
Finally, beyond transatlantic relations, it is important to
understand how crucial the Russian factor is as well. Moscow,
where anxieties over Iran’s nuclear program are growing, should
be on board for transmission of the Iranian dossier to the United
Nations (UN) Security Council. In August 2005, during the IAEA
Board meeting, the Russian delegation appeared worried about the
prospect of any decisive step concerning Tehran. There apparently is
much less reason than in the 1990s to suspect that Moscow will help an
Iranian nuclear program, at least directly. But the prospect of losing
the contracts associated with Bushier because of an international
crisis does constitute an important factor in Russian calculations.4
Eventually, a common strategy among these three actors—
Europe, America, and Russia—is key to any satisfactory solution
to the potential nuclear threat posed by Iran, since China, as usual,
will not like to appear isolated. But the ﬁrst indispensable step is a
transatlantic agreement.5
UNDERSTANDING THE PLAYERS
Iran.
A good understanding of what the Iranian government wants
to achieve with its nuclear program is essential; a second question
being what it can actually achieve, both politically and technically.
The ﬁrst question may be answered in different ways.
Iran wishes to create an indigenous civilian nuclear fuel. Such has
been the most frequent claim in Tehran: the program is entirely
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peaceful, and there is no reason to deprive Iran of its inalienable right
to beneﬁt from the peaceful nuclear uses that the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) guarantees in a solemn fashion in its Article IV.
Leaving aside the fact that the “right” guaranteed by the NPT is
conditional to fulﬁllment by member states of their nonproliferation
commitments, the problem with this hypothesis is not so much that
Iran’s energy resources (oil and gas) are so abundant that nuclear
energy does not make economic sense. After all, Tehran has the
right to prepare for the future with some further diversiﬁcation of
its energy policy. The problem lies elsewhere: in the long (20-year)
secrecy surrounding such “peaceful” nuclear expansion and in the
size and variety of its nuclear fuel cycle. The 50,000 P1 centrifuges
planned in Natanz appear grossly disproportionate to Iran’s only
reactor under construction (Bushier), which will receive Russian
fuel for the next 10 years. (Those ﬁrst generation centrifuges are, in
addition, uneconomical).
The kinds of imports that Iran has been engaged in also often make
little sense in a civilian program. Finally, the production of materials
such as uranium metal points in the direction of military ambitions
as well. But if Iran actually wants a nuclear energy program after
raising so many suspicions, then the solution is easy to ﬁnd. The fuel
cycle activities should again be suspended permanently, the facilities
dismantled, and the necessary fuel will be provided by Russia, with
a European guarantee, should Russia be unable to implement its
pledge. This guarantee was explicitly offered to Tehran by the three
European nations in August 2005 and rejected.
Iran wishes to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip. Parallels
with North Korea may be suggestive. For years, Washington has
favored such an analysis concerning Pyongyang’s nuclear activities.
Eventually, a good deal will lead Kim Jong Il to drop his nuclear
ambitions because the real objective was to get America’s attention
and security guarantees for the regime. There is very little evidence
to support this view in the North Korean case, particularly since it
appears that the enrichment route was investigated shortly after
the plutonium route was closed down by the Agreed Framework
in 1994. (The Joint Declaraction adopted on September 19, 2005, and
challenged less than 24 hours later by Pyongyang, does not alter
this analysis.) In the case of Iran, the regime may have reasons to be
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fearful after the insistence by the Bush administration on “regime
change” in “rogue states,” and even more after having witnessed the
short time needed for the American troops to overthrow Saddam
Hussein in March 2003. The Iranian regime indeed may wish to get
a guarantee that it can get only from America. But this cannot be the
purpose of nuclear activities started in 1985! At that time, the enemy
was Iraq, and the chemical attacks on Iranian troops already were 2
years old. The main problem with the West was not only its silence
on the proscribed use of chemical weapons (CW) (under the 1925
Geneva Convention), but its open support of Baghdad. Yet, the fact
that the Iranian nuclear program was not conceived as a bargaining
chip—a pretty obvious fact—does not mean that it could not have
become such a chip under different circumstances. But the choice of
the new regime apparently was to close this door.
Iran wants the bomb, period. All the main indicators are pointing in
this direction. If there was one major beneﬁt of the two deals with the
Europeans in October 2003 and November 2004, it was undoubtedly
the extensive knowledge acquired on the Iranian program during
the years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Iran was soon in no position to delay
further intrusive inspections on its soil, even though the very ﬁrst
inspection, planned for October 2003, only took place in February
2004. After Natanz and Arak, many other sites were subject to
international inspections, including Isfahan, Lashkar Abad, and
the Kalaye Electric factory (Tehran), which was supposed to be a
watch factory and appeared to be a pilot plant for P1 centrifuges.6
The ﬁrst explanations provided by Iran on a number of issues had to
be changed and complemented at different times in order to make
them consistent with ﬁndings or outside revelations. Actually, not
all the information came through the IAEA inspections. The Libyan
revelations and the discovery of A.Q. Khan network, for instance,
were crucial in uncovering in 2004 the P2 centrifuges deal with
Pakistan in 1995. But the reading of the different IAEA reports to
the Board show how much came out of the hundreds of inspections
performed on Iranian territory, far beyond what Iran was willing to
acknowledge at the beginning of the process. In addition, it appears
that Iran discussed acquiring technologies central to making nuclear
arms as soon as 1986 and 1987 with members of the network run by
A. Q. Khan.7 If the bomb is the only credible objective of so much
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secrecy, so many purchases,8 and so many lies, then the main question
was when the tactical decision to agree to the suspension would be
revised. The answer was provided in August 2005.
What can Iran achieve technically? This question is difﬁcult to discuss
for a simple reason. While much knowledge has been acquired
since February 2003, there is no certainty whatsoever that the entire
range of Iranian nuclear activity is known. The possible existence
of a clandestine nuclear program located in military facilities or in
undisclosed places also has to be taken into account. By deﬁnition,
what has been, is, and still may be done there is unknown. And the
relationship between the civilian open fuel cycle and hidden nuclear
military activities is unknown as well. What part of the civilian fuel
cycle is necessary for the clandestine program? The answers to these
questions are essential for assessing the current stage of development
of the Iranian nuclear program. One can note, however, that the pace
of conversion during the summer and fall of 2004 demonstrated a
good mastery of the process, and also that the advancement of
conversion activities looked urgent on the fall. This is probably why,
instead of suspending conversion on November 15 as promised to
the Europeans, activities went on until the adoption of the IAEA
resolution—and apparently until February 18 for conversion into
UF4!—in order to make the best possible use of time. This does not
mean that Iran does not face some technical difﬁculties, for instance,
when dealing with P2 centrifuges. Some technical incompetence
should not be ruled out. But progress is most probably steady as well,
as claimed by the Iranians themselves with or without assistance
from abroad.
What can Iran achieve politically? Iran’s political game is pretty
transparent. First, to get overwhelming support of the nonaligned
nations by insisting on the right to beneﬁt from peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Second, to neutralize Arab countries by emphasizing
Israel’s nuclear capability and by promoting a “nuclear weapon free
zone” in the Middle East, an objective that is particularly dear to
Egypt. Third, to question available intelligence on Iran by making
frequent references to intelligence failures regarding Iraq. Fourth,
to “cheat and retreat,” delay access, remove evidence. And ﬁfth,
to engage in discussions with as many interlocutors as possible in
order to divide them. Iran has been obliged to deal with the IAEA
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since its ratiﬁcation of the NPT, and at the beginning of the crisis
in September 2002, its relations with that agency were tense. The
resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in September
2003 was rejected by Iran. The Europeans entered the stage then,
and Iran quickly understood that some room for maneuver was
available. The demands presented by Berlin, London, and Paris were
characterized as going beyond Iran’s obligations under the IAEA
statute, and confusion was created concerning the perimeter of the
suspension agreed on in October 2003. Fortunately, thus far the three
European powers have displayed good coordination—but there may
still be some differences between them that can be exploited.9
Then there is the commercial relationship with Russia. The
Iranian hope was that Moscow would focus its attention solely on
trade, and that Europe would compete with Russia. Neither of these
beliefs proved exactly right, but even though Iran feels that it has
been let down by the Russians, it will continue to attempt to play the
Russian card. And this card still is far from being fully transparent to
the rest of the world.
Finally, there is the Transatlantic relationship. Tehran ﬁrst wanted
to secure from the Europeans a number of commitments that would
have directly opposed them to Washington. In increasing order of
importance, they were: no additional discussion of the Iranian issue
at the IAEA Board of Governors;10 no transfer of the dossier to the
Security Council; no sanctions whatsoever; a rejection of any threat
or use of force, and of any European participation should a military
operation eventually take place. No such commitments could be
made by any responsible player, but the Iranian strategy seemed to
be that it did not cost much to at least try!
The Europeans.
Initially, the Europeans came together for three different reasons:
they wanted to show that diplomatic means could succeed in stopping
proliferating nations; they were anxious to ﬁnd some unity after the
dispute over Iraq in 2003; and, last but not least, they felt threatened
by Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The deadlock that
the IAEA found itself in when Tehran rejected the September 2003
resolution was therefore the occasion for the European initiative.
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Effective Multilateralism. The European Union (EU) published
a common strategy on weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
nonproliferation in June 2003. That document covers nuclear,
biological, and CW and their delivery vehicles. One of its main
objectives was to present “multilateralism” as a means not to delay
action or postpone crises, as Washington was inclined to see it, but
to achieve concrete results. The leading role played by the United
Kingdom (UK), Germany, and France in trying to stop Iran’s nuclear
program is an essential part of this policy. Another important
illustration of “effective multilateralism” is the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), launched in Cracow but signed in Paris, which was
designed to interdict the passage of cargoes intended for use in
WMD programs. The PSI deserves special mention, since it was the
interdiction of a German ship in October 2003 that led to the discovery
of the P2 centrifuges deal between Pakistan and Iran that had been
made in 1995. Both cases are supposed to demonstrate “effective
multilateralism” not only on paper, but also in action. Therefore,
success or failure of current negotiations will be seen in the wider
context of the “European way.” This way is not limited to diplomacy:
the European pressure on Iran has been backed by a threat to send
the matter to the Security Council, which would be asked to make a
decision about any further measures imposed on Iran. As a result of
this pressure, in November 2004 Iran retracted its decision to resume
uranium enrichment. The threat is still valid, particularly after Iran’s
resumption of conversion activities in August 2005, and in this
context no action is excluded in principle. But the clear preference
of the European nations was to obtain a permanent suspension of
enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, as well as access and
veriﬁcation without sanctions, coercion, or use of force.
Solidarity of the three European Powers. Although differences
between London, Berlin, and Paris exist concerning their respective
situations and approaches, they have maintained close cooperation
at all stages of the Iranian saga, from October 2003 onwards. The
British have to take into account their military presence in Iraq, which
is unpopular in the UK, and where Iranian agents or operatives are
in a position to cause a great deal of trouble. This is particularly
relevant since the UK is operating in Shia-dominated areas. Paris
and Berlin are not burdened by this handicap. The Germans have
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a Green Foreign Minister, whose party is famous for its hostility
not only to nuclear weapons—a matter of contention with France—
but also to military action, whatever the circumstances. This last
characteristic was again very much present during the German
electoral campaign in 2005. The French have a tendency—particularly
difﬁcult to swallow in London—of deﬁning their policy in opposition
to Washington. Still, the Europeans’ common resolve to stop Iran’s
nuclear ambition by leading international pressure on Tehran took
precedence over misunderstanding or disagreement on other issues.
Regular meetings have been held in the three capitals and in Vienna
before any discussion with the Iranians, and so far the differences
between them have been more cosmetic than real. This being said, it
was always clear that should diplomatic pressure eventually fail, the
situation may change. The United States has dropped hints about
taking military action in order to halt Iranian ambitions.11 If such steps
were taken in the future, who would be most reluctant to follow suit?
The answer to this question is not easy. In fact, the greatest surprise
has come ﬁrst from London, not from Germany, when Jack Straw
declared in November 2004 that there was no military solution to the
Iranian problem. This statement came at the worst possible time, just
before a crucial meeting with the Iranian delegation.12
The Iranian Threat to Europe. Most observers have understood
the European initiative as a way of preventing some unspeciﬁed
American action against Iran.13 This interpretation misses completely
what is probably the most important point: Europe, like Russia,
sees Iran’s ambitions as threatening. Granted, the threat is, ﬁrst and
foremost, internal to the Middle East. A nuclear capability would
radicalize the region, may justify additional nuclear programs in
Arab nations (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Syria), and constitute a threat
to the security of Israel—whose very existence is not recognized by
Tehran.14 But the Middle East is one of the regions where Europe
wants to play an increasing political role. This is true in today’s
world, and will become even more so in the future. If and when
Turkey is admitted into the EU, Europe will have a border within
the Middle East. This geo-strategic situation will entail additional
responsibilities regarding the stability of the whole region. In this
context, it is difﬁcult to overemphasize the security turmoil that an
Iranian nuclear bomb would create. Moreover, such a capability
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could pose a direct threat to European territory, taking into account
the range of the Iranian ballistic missiles.
Ballistic missile programs in Iran are making steady progress.
When Tehran tested its Shehab 3 in 1998, it came as an unpleasant
surprise not only to the region, but also to Europe.15 Cooperation
between Tehran and Pyongyang is well-established, ranges are
increasing, and the prospect of seeing these delivery vehicles equipped with unconventional warheads is quite real. Iran’s basic motive
for acquiring nuclear weapons may be defensive in nature, but it may
also be coercive, part of a much more dangerous doctrinal posture.
Finally, Iran’s involvement in terrorism is well-documented, and
one cannot completely rule out threats of WMD terrorism supported
by Tehran.
America.
The United States faces difﬁcult choices in Iran, and it remains
unclear whether those choices already have been made. No clear policy
can be discerned from public statements made so far. The preference
for Security Council intervention expressed by Washington since
November 2003—which would indeed be well-founded16—does not
mesh with a more forward-looking strategy. What exactly would the
Security Council do? A clearer and more determined U.S. policy is
essential to any favorable outcome.
The Burden of the Past. In 1979 when the collapse of Reza Shah
Pahlavi took place, the event was seen in Washington as a political
and strategic disaster. It also came as a surprise: when President
Carter took ofﬁce in 1977, he had a number of foreign policy priorities,
among which Iran was not expected to be a problem. But on November
4, 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran was overrun, and the hostage
crisis began—one of the worst international situations Washington
has faced in the last 3 decades. Over the next 6 months, the Iranian
issue was given priority at the daily cabinet-level meetings, and
eventually Iran so dominated the last years of the Carter presidency
that it contributed to its defeat.
Then followed the Iran-Iraq war where Washington sided
with Baghdad, which further angered Tehran. More recently, the
bombing of the U.S. military barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi
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Arabia in 1996 was identiﬁed as being instigated by Iran. Finally,
Iran funds the Hezbollah and harbors al Qaida operatives. Since 1979
the United States has imposed sanctions on Iran that are regularly
reconﬁrmed. Diplomatic relations remain broken, and attempts to
engage even informal talks with Tehran have never succeeded. The
Iranian rhetoric with regard to “The Great Satan” may now be less
inﬂammatory than it was, but it is still harsh. Deep distrust remains
present on both sides. The recent election in Tehran is unlikely to
alleviate it.
The Iraqi Conundrum. Observers may be too quick to suspect
secret deals between Washington and Tehran, but the paramount
importance of the Iraqi dossier for the Bush administration is hard
to forget. It must be integrated into any U.S. strategy over Iran.
This being said, it probably would be a mistake to conclude that
Washington will be soft on Iran because of Iraq. The stakes in the
region are simply too high to be ignored. When former President
Khatami declared that “America is not in a position to take a lunatic
action of attacking Iran” because “the United States is deeply
engaged in Iraq,” the statement was misleading for this very reason.
But Iraq does remain the primary concern. Those who believe that
the Europeans are in a better position to negotiate, because they do
not have to take into account the Iraq dimension as much as America
does, are also wrong.
First, the UK has a problem similar to that of America, with the
presence of signiﬁcant British troops in the southern part of Iraq.17
Second, Iraq is a much more complex issue in Tehran than are the
results of the 2003 war. The Iranians have never forgotten that the West
in general, not only the United States, supported Iraq in the bloody
1980-88 war. Nor have they forgotten the absence of international
response when Iraq employed CW against Iranian troops. Although
this period is now more than 20 years in the past—the ﬁrst use of
CW was in 1983—it is still very much present in the Iranian psyche.18
As recently as October 2003, at the very moment when the ﬁrst deal
was concluded with the three European powers, an article appeared
in the Iranian press with the following sentence: “One can still see
the wounds on our war veterans that were inﬂicted by poison gas as
used by Saddam Hussein that was made in Germany and France.”19
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American Deterrence. The Iranian regime may be fundamentalist,
but it has not so far shown tendencies towards adventurous moves.20
Tehran is not North Korea, at least until now. And there is no doubt
in Iran that its military strength is dwarfed by that of America.
Washington may have good reason to think twice before deciding
on any use of force against Tehran, but the last thing the mullahs or
new president want is a military confrontation with Washington.21
If one were to take bets on who is more afraid of a military scenario,
the answer is clear. It also is obvious that any attack against Israel
by Tehran, particularly a nuclear attack, would trigger a massive
American response. What is at stake for the Iranians is both the
security of their country and the survival of the current regime.
Authoritarian regimes tend to be conservative by nature: they know
how the famous Clausewitzian concept of “friction” could change
even the most ﬁrmly established political situation during a war. And
if the current regime has succeeded in eliminating any meaningful
opposition, the fact is that it also appears inexperienced and far from
ﬁrm.
Russia.
In a recent article, an American ofﬁcial with direct knowledge of
the subject stated that “Stopping Russian assistance to Iran’s nuclear
program was a high priority for the United States throughout much
of the 1990s.”22 Moscow long has been an ambiguous player with
regard to Iran and may have changed in recent years—the coming
months will tell. In the past, Minatom has had conﬁdential agreements
with Tehran, related in particular to the training of experts and the
export of equipment—both of which could have helped the Iranian
military program. Russia may still fear that the full extent of its deals
with Tehran will surface. Moscow also still has important economic
interests in the country. But the acquisition of a nuclear capacity may
be increasingly frightening to the Russian leadership as well. And
rightly so, since Iran is far from being an ally to Moscow. Conﬂicting
interests are therefore shaping Russia’s position.
A more serious partner than in the past? Taking into account
the experience of the 1990s, Russia has long been considered an
ambiguous partner on Iran. The situation seemed to change in
295

the fall of 2003, probably because some new elements about the
Iranian nuclear program became known in Moscow. The question is
whether the leadership in Moscow has given precise instructions—
to Minatom/Rosatom in particular—to exert utmost prudence. The
decision to withhold the contract concerning the fuel destined for
the light water reactor at Bushier up to the moment where sufﬁcient
guarantees were acquired by the Russians has been seen as an
indication that Moscow not only actively supported the European
talks, but even wanted to contribute to them in kind. The contract
concerning the return of the spent fuel was signed on February
27, 2005, and the Bushier reactor may start operating in December
2006, with the fuel delivered at the beginning of the year. Granted,
IAEA inspectors are supposed to “monitor closely the use of the fuel
and where it goes,” according to the IAEA’s spokeswoman Melissa
Fleming, but the Russian move has raised some concern related to a
possible crisis just during or after the delivery. The crucial question
is what will happen to the fuel if Iran decides to put an end to all
international inspections. Under the current circumstances a wise
decision would be to delay the date of delivery.
There is no doubt in Moscow about Iran’s intentions. At the highest
levels of the Russian leadership, the judgement concerning Iran’s
intentions is no longer an enigma for the outside world: Moscow
strongly believes that Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions. Apart
from the indications that can be found in the IAEA reports, which
are already strong enough, Russia undoubtedly has intelligence of
its own on the subject. It may even know more than the West does
about people involved in the program, about sensitive imports, and
even about additional locations. After all, since so many people
from Minatom/Rosatom—and other agencies—have been in Iran
over the years, it is difﬁcult to believe that such is not the case. And
the Russians are no amateurs in the area of intelligence. Sharing this
information would add conﬁdence to the Moscow/West dialogue
on Iran, but is unlikely. An opposite result would occur if inﬂuential
ofﬁcials in Moscow were to continue making ambiguous statements
about the nature of the program. Such was the case in January 2005,
when Russian Foreign Minister Serguei Lavrov declared: “I have
no basis to believe that the situation is diverging from a normal
course and that the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program
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will be changed”;23 and again in February, just before the signature
of the spent fuel contract, when President Vladimir Putin, himself,
contrary to his own beliefs, declared that there was no indication
that Iran was pursuing a military nuclear program. In August 2005,
similar statements were again made, raising doubts about Moscow’s
commitments.
Moscow recognizes the security threat, but not openly. Lavrov’s and
Putin’s statements notwithstanding, there are indications that, in the
context of instability at the Russian southern border, this additional
and most serious development is actually worrying Moscow. The
question is whether consistent diplomatic positions based on this
awareness will be adopted, particularly at a time when new tension is
rising with Washington over the “democracy” issue, Ukraine and the
Baltic states. An important question in Moscow is whether Iran has
reached the point of self-sufﬁciency, and whether the empowerment
of those seeking a nuclear breakout is generating an unstoppable
proliferation momentum. Iran is fully aware of some change of mood
in Russia and is somewhat concerned by it, trying to keep Russian
statements as ambiguous as possible. As long as Moscow does
not openly recognize the military nature of the program, it will be
difﬁcult to know what will happen should the dossier be transferred
to the UN Security Council. Russian support may be difﬁcult to get,
as Chinese support is, for energy reasons.
For all the above reasons, Russia should be at the same time reassured
and asked to provide more clarity in its position. Europe and America
can duly consider Russia’s security fears. Russia, in return, should
coordinate its actions and support transmission to the Security
Council if talks run into a dead end. But will it?
The IAEA.
The Only Multilateral Player. The IAEA is in unique position: what
the inspectors report to the Secretariat, and what the Secretariat
reports to the Board24 are widely seen as unbiased by any national
position. Whether this is entirely true in the case of Iran remains
to be seen. Within the hierarchy of the Agency, there seemed to be
different viewpoints concerning the Iranian dossier, highlighted by
an interview Pierre Goldschmidt gave to the French newspaper,
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Le Figaro, when he left ofﬁce in June. The differences of views are
sometimes palpable in the reports. And there is also some obvious
reluctance at the IAEA to do anything that could result in a
transmission to the Security Council, whatever the ﬁndings on the
ground. In addition, there is no real expertise within the IAEA on
weaponization, with the exception of the Head of the Action Team
dedicated to Iraq who took another position in the Agency. Finally,
there have also been factual mistakes, for instance when an IAEA
report in February 2004 identiﬁed P125 and L126 as G1.27 This has
raised useless suspicions about the Agency’s competence. More
serious is the fear, expressed by George Perkovich in an open letter
to the IAEA’s Director General, that “Many capitals are so resistant
to the current administration bullying that they urge you to cook
the books to produce reports that will forestall another Iraq-style
showdown.”28 Such a belief would call into question the neutrality of
the Agency and its ability to report facts, or rather all the facts, to the
Board of Governors. In this context, it is interesting to note that at the
February 2005 Board, for the ﬁrst time, Mohammed El Baradei issued
no formal written report on Iran (the same occurred again in June).
This shift was decided at a time when signiﬁcant new elements had
surfaced (to mention just two of them: the—undeclared—existence of
a tunnel just north of the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan, and
the new evidence concerning an extensive offer by the A. Q. Khan
network in 1987). One can also wonder why the IAEA asked for an
entire month in August to produce its report on the implementation
of safeguards in Iran, losing precious time at a moment when Iran
was resuming conversion activities at full speed.
The IAEA has an uneasy relationship with Iran. The story of the
Iran/IAEA relationship is one of concealment and constant efforts
to hinder inspection,29 and of constant reluctance on the part of the
IAEA to recognize clear violations or make full use of its powers. In
January 2005, while a EU3/Iran meeting was in progress, UN nuclear
experts were allowed to take environmental samples from some
green spaces in the complex of Parchin.30 For months, the Agency
had been pressing Tehran for permission to inspect the military
complex which was used to produce high explosives and missiles.
If the intent was to assess proscribed Iranian research concerning
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explosives related to the bomb, environmental samples will be
insufﬁcient.31 And in addition, access was only very partial. But, as a
result, Iran is now in a position to pretend that access to Parchin has
been granted—and that no nuclear activity had been detected. Why
has the IAEA agreed to such bizarre modalities of inspections?32
Consequently, the IAEA did ask Iran to allow a second inspection
on the same site, which has not been accepted so far.33 The modalities
of inspection should include “complementary access” to the site and
its facilities, in conformity with the Additional Protocol signed by
Iran, rather than just environmental samples in a limited area.
The IAEA is an ambiguous partner for the Europeans. In October
2003, the IAEA, then engaged in a standoff with Iran, was somewhat
irritated by the ﬁrst European deal. The Agency narrowed the
perimeter of the suspension agreed among the three European
powers with the argument that it was too comprehensive to be
acceptable under the IAEA statute. A signiﬁcant problem has
also surfaced because the IAEA will never pass judgement on the
implementation of the “suspension” agreed with Iran by the EU/3,
while the Agency is recognized as the ultimate authority to decide
compliance or violation with commitments undertaken by Iran and
has a November 2004 Board resolution supporting the EU/Iran
agreement. When quality tests were undertaken by Iran on pieces
of centrifuges in January 2005, for instance, they were thought to
be inconsistent with the November 15 deal, but the IAEA did not
consider them a breach, having in mind the statute more than the EU/
Iran agreement. In general terms, there is no doubt in IAEA minds
that the way the Iranian program was carried out was unjustiﬁable
economically and points to a military program, but there is no clear
statement of this kind from the Agency. IAEA reports do not even
always permit obtaining a clear view of what is going on in Iran:34 in
the November 2004 report to the Board, for instance, where a long
list of breaches from Iran had been listed (see paragraph 86 of the
report), a sentence inconsistent with the report had been inserted:
“To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared
nuclear material and activities referred to above are related to a
nuclear weapons program.” To what else could all the concealment,
conversion activities in uranium metal, multiple attempts to acquire
beryllium, and contradictory statements be related? Such a sentence
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having been written, the IAEA should at least show the international
community that it indeed has done everything possible to justify the
assertion. “Complementary access” to additional sites, including
military sites, will be necessary for that purpose, but the Agency
appears unwilling to make full use of its rights. Only in February
2005 was there a clear backing by the IAEA for a comprehensive
deal with the Europeans that would address nuclear power,
regional security, and trade, but this was at a time when such a
deal already was considered highly unlikely in European capitals
because the main objective of the talks—cessation of enrichment and
reprocessing activities—was already simply rejected by Tehran at
that stage, without any alternative solution presented by Iran to the
Europeans.
SOME TRANSATLANTIC SCENARIOS
As Robert Einhorn has put it: “The Iran nuclear issue poses two
critical tests for the United States and Europe. The ﬁrst is whether,
after the deep divisions over Iraq, Americans and Europeans can
work together effectively on an issue of major importance to each
other as well as the world at large. The second is whether dissuading
a resourceful, determined country from acquiring nuclear weapons
is possible through means short of military force. The two tests are,
of course, closely related.”35 It is with this in mind that the following
scenarios should be appreciated.
America Joins European Negotiations.
Good arguments, which are unlikely to be effected at this stage,
could be presented in favor of this move, if Iran returns to suspension.
A transatlantic deal with Iran would be the best scenario for all
players concerned: Iran would shut down its fuel cycle activities and
keep proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; the nuclear fuel would
be provided by Russia with European guarantee and returned to
the supplier. The abandonment of Iran’s military nuclear ambitions
would be accomplished in return for economic and security beneﬁts.
Whether such a bargain can be realized with Iran is open to question.
It appears very unlikely with the new government and the new
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negotiator, who never accepted contemplation of a permanent
suspension. But such was also the position of the previous team,
and the price to pay for continuing fuel cycle activities useless for
a civilian program may focus minds at some point. If this scenario
would become more realistic than it is in September 2005, Washington
should be on board to help achieve it: the main beneﬁts cannot
come from Europe alone. The only meaningful security guarantees
are American, and trade with Iran is also meaningless without
American sanctions being lifted.36 In any case, negotiations should
in no case be bilateral, as some Iranian ofﬁcials have sometimes
suggested, because this would only add confusion and room for
maneuver in Tehran. The beneﬁt of an American involvement can
result only from good coordination with the Europeans. Should the
talks succeed, Washington would be part of the success. And success
could mean either reaching an agreement or buying time in order for
the Iranian leadership to evolve. Should negotiations fail, the Bush
administration would be in a position to maintain that it has tried
to help the diplomatic process to no avail. As a precaution though,
Washington could present three conditions to the Europeans. First, it
would be prepared to help the process only if the suspension could
be considered permanent in an explicit—not only implicit—manner,
with an endorsement from the Security Council now that Iran has
breached a second agreement with Europe. Second, the UF6 produced
in Iran since August 2005 should leave the territory of Iran. Third, any
signiﬁcant ﬁnding would lead the Europeans and the Americans to
work together to transfer the Iranian nuclear dossier to the Security
Council for harsher measures as soon as November 2005. There the
United States, Europe, and Russia would be able jointly to choose a
range of measures that should be determined between them in advance.
Last but not least, America—along with the European powers—
could mobilize Arab states that are also worried about nuclear
developments in Iran. As George Perkovitch notes, they currently
are much too passive. Egypt, for instance, sees it very much as Israel
does: as a threat to its very existence, but its diplomacy at the NPT
review conference in May 2005 has, in fact, shielded Iran. Why? Gulf
nations have no doubt about Iran’s hypocrisy when Tehran tries to
neutralize them.37 Nuclear weapons in Iran are seen as an indication
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of Iran’s will to exert dominance over the region, particularly over
the Gulf, and to reshape the Middle East.
This ﬁrst scenario had gained some ground at the beginning
of the second Bush administration. After returning from Europe
in February 2005, President Bush reportedly asked his advisors to
think about a list of incentives to offer Tehran as part of European
talks with Iran. But events on the Iranian political scene since have
again put it on the back burner.
Europe Joins America in the Security Council.
This is an outcome that the Europeans have never ruled out.
Again on January 19, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel
Barnier stated that, “In case the negotiations fail, the dossier will
be brought to the Security Council where a resolution will deﬁne
what the international community should do.” And in August 2005,
Jacques Chirac repeated the same threat: “If Iran does not reestablish
conﬁdence, the Security Council will have no other choice than to
take up the dossier.” In the ﬁrst half of 2005, the Europeans have
been delaying the Iranian program but not solving the problem.38
What was lacking in the European negotiations was a clear threat of
precise punitive measures to back the talks. Without such a threat,
the talks were actually doomed.39 The Security Council was not
seen by Iran as a realistic scenario because the kind of action that
could be adopted in New York remained unclear. Beyond a clear
endorsement of the European demands, the UN Security Council
could ask for more intrusive powers for the inspectors who currently
have no sufﬁcient access to sites, documents and personnel; adopt
sanctions related to investments on oil and gas infrastructures, very
much needed in Iran; decide on an arms embargo; and at the end of
the process, if nothing else has worked, an oil embargo and even a
threat of further action. The only condition to fulﬁll is to take into
consideration the importance of time : if action is not quick enough,
the international community may ﬁnd itself with another North
Korea, able to blackmail the world with capabilities that are not fully
known.
The second round of negotiations has been presented all along
as the “last chance” for Iran. The deal was to suspend any transfer
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to the Security Council while the suspension of fuel cycle activities
were themselves suspended. At the present stage, no option should
be withdrawn from the table,40 and such is the IAEA message of the
September resolution. But it is fair to acknowledge that a transfer to
the UN Security Council would have been easier in November 2003,41
when a long list of violations was acknowledged, than now, when
additional problems have surfaced without any major new violation
being identiﬁed. By major violation, one can understand either
further discovery related to nuclear materials or Iranian activities on
weaponization. So far, the strongest evidence of a nuclear weapons
program is the 1987 A.Q. Khan offer, and, if conﬁrmed, the thousands
pages of Farsi-language computer ﬁles that were revealed by The
Wall Street Journal in March and July, documenting Iran’s efforts to
adapt its Shehab 3 missile for delivering a nuclear warhead. The paper
gives speciﬁcations for size, weight and even height of detonation.
This highly classiﬁed information was reportedly shared with
the three Europeans and with the IAEA. However, short of using
intelligence, transfer to the UN Security Council can still use past
violations, that, according to the IAEA statute, shall be reported to the
Council, without any speciﬁcation of date. In addition, the IAEA has
recognized in its reports to the Board that it was not in a position to
verify in detail the chronologies and descriptions of the experiments
which took place in Iran, and that the lack of records with regard
to the amount of uranium rendered impossible a precise material
accounting in the country. This is also a ground, according to the
IAEA statute for referring the matter to the UN Security Council.
The Two Sides of the Atlantic Break Apart.
This is Iran’s preferred scenario, and the most dangerous
outcome. It could happen in a number of ways: the Americans
continuing to remain inactive on Iran, insisting on regime-change;42
the British giving priority to the fear of Iranian interference in
Iraq, and downplaying the Iranian nuclear threat;43 the Germans
remaining reluctant to use any means of coercion, particularly
during an electoral campaign; the French—along with the British
and the Germans—refusing to condone any U.S. threat to use force,
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whatever the circumstances.44 In addition, taking into account that
the only meaningful sanction would concern investments on oil and
gas infrastructures and Iranian oil sales, there may be reluctance in
the three capitals to go that far for a number of reasons. One is the
Iraqi precedent;, another is the effect on oil prices, already very high;
and a third is China’s already stated position that Beijing would veto
such measures at the Security Council. But whether this European
reluctance would amount to a transatlantic divide is unclear. After
all, America also might worry about the international consequences
of such a move. But all the players would be well-advised not to
forget that this particular dimension of the Iranian nuclear issue is
far more complex. If Iran continues its military program, a number
of regional players will be tempted to follow suit—including Saudi
Arabia. Since this is the major oil producing nation in the world, what
will be the effect on oil prices and how would this new problem be
dealt with?
CONCLUSION
Time is running out in September 2005 and stakes are high for
both America and Europe. A multipolar nuclear Middle East is
the last thing both partners wish to see develop.45 For that reason,
even an Iranian advanced nuclear capability that has not yet built
a bomb is unacceptable. Such a situation would give rise to similar
ambitions in the region and encourage the same kinds of military
developments. As North Korea has taught us in East Asia, where
Japan increasingly is nervous, ambiguity is dangerous.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12
1. As Robert Einhorn puts it, “Prospects for forging an agreed transatlantic
approach toward Iran depend to a signiﬁcant extent on whether the United
States and Europe share a common understanding of Iran’s nuclear intentions.”
“A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The Washington Quarterly,
Autumn 2004. They did not in the 1990s. They now do.
2. On March 11, 2005, the U.S. Secretary of State issued a statement supporting
the EU/3 efforts, underlining that “The Europeans have been very clear with the
Iranians that there will have to be certain objective guarantees that Iran is not trying
to use a civilian nuclear program to provide cover for a weapons program.”
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3. But for the ﬁrst time on March 10, 2005, the three European powers have
made clear that they “will have no choice but to support referring Iran’s nuclear
program to the UN Security Council,” if Iran does not maintain the suspension of
all its nuclear enrichment related and reprocessing activities and does not fulﬁll all
its international agreements.
4. The agreement signed on February 27, 2005, between Russia and Iran
concerning the fuel necessary for the Bushier reactor was consistent with the
European negotiation in that it showed that Iran does not need fuel cycle
activities of its own. But the fear of losing this contract may now have undesirable
consequences.
5. The Euro-American talks at the end of January in Washington may well
have had this purpose, in preparation for the visit to Brussels of President Bush
in February. And the need for closer contacts was felt in August as well, when
resumption of conversion activities took place in Iran.
6. Among the other inspected facilities were Bushier Nuclear Power Plant,
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, Laser Separation Laboratory, Lashkar Ab’ad,
Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, and Karaj Nuclear Research Center.
7. The evidence relunctantly was turned over by Iran to the IAEA in February
2005. Mr Khan’s representatives offered in particular the technology necessary to
cast uranium metal.
8. Or even attempts of purchases. For instance, there is evidence that Iran
has attempted to purchase signiﬁcant quantities of the substance. Five countries
were involved in the attempts: Russia, China, Germany, Kazakhstan, and the
United Kingdom. According to Reuters, January 21, “The only successful import
of beryllium by Iran was a few grams purchased in Britain.” There is no evidence
that the other attempts succeeded.
9. The common letter signed on March 10 by the EU/3 is the best show of unity
so far. It states clear readiness to refer Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Secuirity
Council under certain circumstances, namely if full suspension is not maintained.
Germany apparently had forgotten it in August.
10. When Iran renewed its enrichment activities in June 2004, the pretext was
already that the Europeans had not honored their “promise” to remove the Iranian
nuclear issue from the IAEA agenda. No such promise had ever been made.
11. At the beginning of the second Bush mandate, though, a number of
statements were made in Washington concerning the absence of any military
plans against Iran in the near future.
12. Probably to show that he did not do it by mistake, Jack Straw repeated
the same position on January 19, saying that there was no alternative to Europe’s
approach of using diplomacy to try to persuade Iran to give up technology that
could be used to make nuclear weapons.
13. This interpretation was revived in January 2005 when media reported that
the United States had been ﬂying drones over Iran to locate hidden nuclear sites.
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On February 15, Iranian state TV even reported that a missile had been ﬁred from
an unknown ﬁghter not far from the Bushier nuclear reactor.
14. It would be more accurate to say that the regime in Tehran calls explicitly
for the destruction of the State of Israel.
15. Since then, progress has been made in Iran. In October, Tehran announced
successful trials of its Shehab 3 ballistic missile with a range of 2000km, putting
parts of Europe, as well as Israel and U.S. bases in the Gulf, within reach.
16. Because of the many violations Iran has already committed in the last 20
years!
17. In June 2004, eight servicemen were abducted by the Iranian Pasdaran to
remind London, if need be, of their nuisance capability.
18. Rafsanjani himself noted: “The war taught us that international laws were
only scraps of papers.” See IRNA, 19 October 1988.
19. To my knowledge, the real issue on the French side at the time of Iraqi
chemical attacks on Iranian troops was the use of French aircraft for the delivery
of the gas.
20. In January 2005, the ISNA Student news agency quoted President Rafsanjani
as saying, “The Islamic Republic is not a place for adventurism.”
21. On January 18, there was a cryptic statement in Tehran: “We are able to say
that we have strength such that no country can attack us because they do not have
precise information about our military capabilities due to our ability to implement
ﬂexible strategies. We can claim that we have rapidly produced equipment that
has resulted in the greatest deterrent.” The IAEA should ask for an explanation
concerning the meaning of what appears to be a nuclear threat. But it remembers
Saddam’s statements and Kim Jong Il’s statements more than an actual threat that
would lead Iran to the Security Council.
22. Robert Einhorn.
23. Interfax News Agency, January 18, 2005. Serguei Lavrov was in Petrozavodsk
when he made this statement. The worst part of the statement is actually what
follows: “The Iranian leadership assures us that the peaceful character of the
nuclear program is precisely the aim of Tehran.” An expert in leadership like
Serguei Lavrov certainly knows what conﬁdence can be attached to such empty
claims.
24. There have been seven written reports to the IAEA Board so far:
GOV/2003/40, dated June 6, 2003; GOV/2003/63, dated August 26, 2003;
GOV/2003/75, dated November 10, 2003; GOV/2004/11, dated February 24,
2004; GOV/2004/34, dated June 1, 2004; GOV/2004/60, dated September 1, 2004;
and GOV/2004/83, dated November 15, 2004.
25. Iranian centrifuges in Natanz, Iran.
26. Iranian centrifuges found in Libya in 2004. The Iranian and the Libyan
models are based on design information stolen in the Netherlands by A. Q. Khan.
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27. The G1 is a subcritical, single tube German model from the 1960s far
simpler than the supercritical Dutch centrifuges. This mistake has correctly been
denounced by Nuclear Fuel in January 2005, and the IAEA consequently should
make a corrigendum in its next report.
28. George Perkovich, “Memorandum to Mohammed El Baradei,” Foreign
Policy, January-February 2005, pp. 60-64.
29. A ﬂavor of the uneasy IAEA/Iran relationship can be provided by the
last IAEA report, GOV/2004/83, where one can read on the ﬁrst page—in the
inimitable IAEA style—that the September Board of Governors,
strongly urged that Iran respond positively to the Director General’s
ﬁndings on the provision of access and information by taking such steps
as are required by the Agency and/or requested by the Board in relation
to the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, including the
provision of prompt access to locations and personnel, and by providing
further information and explanations when required by the Agency and
proactively to assist the Agency to understand the full extent and nature of
Iran’s enrichment program and to take all steps within its power to clarify
the outstanding issues before the Board’s 25 November 2004 meeting,
speciﬁcally including the sources and reasons for enriched uranium
contamination and the import, manufacture and use of centrifuges.
30. Out of four areas identiﬁed by the Agency to be of political interest, the
Agency was permitted to select one area. In addition, in that area the Agency was
requested to minimize the number of buildings to be visited.
31. Unless some radioactive (other than ﬁssile) material has been used in the
process.
32. There was probably an internal debate on this subject within the IAEA
since some days after the useless inspection, the agency was expressing the wish
to come back to the Iranian military complex.
33. See “IAEA wants to conduct second Parchin inspection,” Nuclear Threat
Initiative, Global Security Newswire, January 19, 2005. Tehran considers that there
is no justiﬁcation for any additional visit.
34. What can be made for instance of the following sentence: “The Director
General noted an increased degree of cooperation by Iran, while noting that some
of the information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, and
that some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran.”
GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003.
35. Einhorn.
36. This being said, contrary to the security basket, where the United States
is the only serious player, the Europeans have a list of possible exports and
investments that present a real interest for the Iranians.
37. The First International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Gulf Dialogue
in Bahrain (December 3-5, 2004) made this point abundantly clear. See also George
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Perkovitch, “Iran is not an Island: A Strategy to Mobilize the Neighbours,”
forthcoming Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief.
38. In order to have a clearer view on this point, it would be necessary to
know how the overt program, which is suspended, is connected with the covert
program.
39. See Gary Samore to AFP January 20: “In a way, the American threat to
bomb Iran is also indirect pressure on Europe to do its very best to achieve a
diplomatic solution.”
40. The New Yorker has carried a detailed and only partially denied report that
U.S. forces are carrying out missions inside Iran, pinpointing sites that could be hit
by air-strikes. If such is the case, it may be part of a deterrence policy more than the
indication that a choice has already be made.
41. This has long been the position in Washington, and the Americans have a
point here.
42. A more moderate regime might bring some positive development, but it
should be kept in mind that any threat of regime change would have the effect
of strengthening the more conservative Iranians and that the Iranian youth are
apparently supporting the nuclear option. See Ray Takeyh, “Iran Builds the
Bomb,” Survival, Vol 6, No. 4, Winter 2004-05, p. 59. In addition, reformers have
lost ground during the last years.
43. How the British elections in the spring will inﬂuence the negotiating
process is an open question.
44. In January 2004, a number of European leaders have indicated that talks
with Iran were excluding any threat to use force. Geermany repeated this position
in August, when talks failed.
45. This is why, as a group of eminent experts gathered in November 2004
in Washington put it: “Just as the Europeans must be prepared to punish Iran
should it fail to uphold the latest agreement, the United States must be willing to
engage in a security dialogue with Tehran.” See Iran Watch Roundtables (with the
following panelists: Rolf Ekeus, Stanley K. Fraley, John Sigler, Terence Taylor, and
Marcus Winsley).
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